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ABSTRACT 
 
The energy sector dominates in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and consists of various 
assets - electricity, oil and natural gas - that are geographically dispersed and connected 
by systems and networks. The protection of these systems and assets within the energy 
sector, especially the safeguarding of the oil and gas infrastructure from any internal and 
external threats, should become a top priority in the UAE. Threats to geopolitical and 
economic stability that need to be considered and prepared for include tectonic activity, 
climate change, nuclear energy, terrorism and war. The aim of this research is to 
develop a framework to enhance the resilience of the UAE’s critical energy 
infrastructure facilities through a strategic disaster mitigation plan. 
The philosophy of this research is interpretivism. The research approach is inductive, 
whilst the research strategy is case study. The secondary data was taken from various 
academic and professional sources whilst the primary data collection included 
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. Three facilities were selected for this 
research and they were electricity generating plants using gas - one in Abu Dhabi, one 
in Dubai and one in Sharjah. In total 100 questionnaires were distributed, out of which 
42 were answered by energy sector workers (20 from Abu Dhabi, 15 from Dubai and 7 
from Sharjah). Respondents of the questionnaire discussed issues such as energy sector 
preparedness, vulnerability and barriers to be overcome. Respondents believed that 
while the energy sector is best prepared for terrorism, extreme heat, and health and 
safety related accidents, it is ill prepared when it comes to facing natural hazards. The 
risk of terrorism was thought to be the greatest vulnerability. In addition, a total of 9 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with Emirati energy sector managers who 
discussed the questionnaire responses and proposed further solutions to the concerns 
raised. 
This thesis provides important practical knowledge and makes a contribution to the 
provision of advice and methodological steps, derived from fieldwork, when it comes to 
developing a strategic mitigation plan and communicating it to the energy sector. It 
provides key information that could be used to improve the design and structure of 
current educational and professional programmes undertaken by individuals in the 
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disaster sector. The thesis provides tools for qualitatively evaluating the various threats 
and vulnerabilities faced by the UAE and acts as a platform for change. 
In terms of theoretical contributions, this research represents the first of its kind that 
engages both workers and managers in the Emirati energy sector. This gives academics 
and professionals unique insights into some of the significant problems that have 
become latent and perhaps would have continued unnoticed but require more 
comprehensive investigation. The study has specific implications for policy and 
practices within energy organisations operating in such settings, not to mention the way 
disaster is viewed.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to establish the background to the research, 
its rationale and justification, its aim, objectives and underlying research questions. It 
also highlights contributions to knowledge that could emerge, then provides a brief 
overview of the research methodology and the overall layout and structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Background 
Hazards, either natural or anthropogenic in origin, are converted into disasters by a 
complex mix of the overall environment and other interacting external factors. In the 
period 2000 to 2011, disasters affected 2.7 billion people, 1.1 million of whom were 
killed. The financial cost of disaster recuperation was estimated at $1.3 trillion 
(UNISDR, 2012). The cost in 2011 was the highest on record and since 1973 disaster 
statistics have seen a rising trend (UNISDR, 2012; Guha-Sapir et al, 2003). Developing 
nations, in particular, are vulnerable to natural hazards and ill-prepared for terrorist 
threats and activity (Naudé et al. 2009). Any disaster they experience is likely to have 
grievous consequences, in terms of loss of life and infrastructural damage (Petley et al., 
2012). It is important that any potential disaster or threat of disaster is managed 
appropriately, in order to protect the increasing numbers of those who may have to 
suffer it. A pattern is emerging whereby recent developments in the field of disaster 
management have progressed towards the concept of disaster resilience and resilient 
communities. Disaster mitigation and strategic planning can shorten the recovery period 
and protect infrastructure, particularly critical infrastructure, such as that utilised by the 
energy sector, including power stations, transformers and oil pipelines; this is defined 
more elaborately in section 2.2. Both can be made effective by improving the disaster 
resilience measures required in the disaster management cycle (please refer to Section 
2.13 in Chapter 2). This research specifically focuses on the disasters that have 
frequented the United Arab Emirates (UAE), or have the potential to do so. A special 
emphasis is placed on the effects disasters have on the energy sector, its personnel and 
infrastructure. The range of disasters that the UAE could face is appreciable given that 
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they could stem from tectonic activity, climatic change and even terrorism. These 
threats are as complex and diverse in origin as they are in effect. Having outlined the 
background to the research, this introduction turns now to its justification.  
 
1.2 Justification of the Research 
According to the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (2012), disasters 
are increasingly threatening sustainable development. Indeed, evidence suggests that 
disaster risks are rising at a rate faster than affected communities can build resilience.  
The increase in the number of disasters and the number of people affected by such 
disasters in the last thirty years (1974-2003) is shown in Figure 1.1.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Trends in numbers of natural disasters, of persons affected and of 
deaths. Source: Guha-Sapir et al.(2003) 
The increase in disasters since the 1970s has been linked to various factors. One such 
factor is the rise in national gross domestic product (GDP). This is for two reasons: One 
is that wealth generally improves the capacity of individuals and national research 
institutes to collect, process and publish data on disasters. The other reason is that with 
increased GDP comes increased infrastructure and thus a greater exposure of potential 
human populations and services to a natural or man-made hazard (Gonzalez-Diez et al., 
2012). Another factor put forward by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) (2012) is that of climate change and the increased frequency of climate based 
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disasters such as floods and droughts. Cities, where more than 50% of the global 
population resides and where most economic assets can be found (WHO, 2014), are 
very much the epicentres of the destruction and loss brought about by natural and 
manmade disasters. Cities experiencing rapid but often poorly planned growth are 
among the most vulnerable. Africa and Asia have experienced the fastest rate of 
increase in the number of disasters recorded (Guha-Sapir et al., 2003). They have also 
experienced the most accelerated economic growth and urban development. That said, 
the highest economic losses, in absolute terms, are those experienced in the high income 
regions of Europe, North America and Australia.  
 
Table 1.1: Number of Disasters by type (1900-2006). Source: Smith and Petley 
(2009) 
 
 
Table 1.1 lists the number of fatalities according to disaster type. The type of disaster is 
a significant consideration; drought, a potential problem in the UAE, claims half of the 
recorded fatalities. Indeed, as Dilley et al. (2005) state, 50 percent of the world’s 
population is exposed to one or more natural hazard. Figure 1.2 illustrates the cost from 
2000-2011; 2011 is the costliest year on record, given the number of people affected 
and killed by natural disasters, largely due to the tectonic disasters in Japan. Also, as 
indicated in Figure 1.2, in the last few years there have been a significant number of 
disasters with some of the worst recorded involving tectonic activity. The Indian Ocean 
Tsunami (2004), triggered by an earthquake measuring between 9.1 and 9.3 on the 
Richter Scale (Walton, 2005), left approximately 180,000 dead and half a million 
displaced in Indonesia alone (Meisl et al., 2006). The Chilean Earthquake in 2010 left 
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over 8 percent of the total population without shelter (Larrañaga and Herrera, 2010), 
whilst the Japanese Tsunami in 2011 crippled the economy and sent one of the world’s 
most developed country into meltdown (The Economist, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Financial cost, numbers affected and killed by natural hazards. Source: 
UNISDR (2012) 
Given such events, it is important to build disaster resilience, especially in the energy 
sector. The energy sector is a strategic component of any modern society. As the 
demand for electricity and thermal energy grows, so do the complexity of the system 
and the need to protect it. The significant increase in consumer demand and population 
generally in both developed and emerging countries means that not only is society 
dependent upon the energy sector, but also that more people and businesses require an 
increasing energy supply, in order to operate normally (US EIA, 2013). Failure to 
protect the energy system and build resilience into the infrastructure could have 
catastrophic affects, should a nation or region experience a natural or manmade disaster. 
A country without power is one that is severely weakened in its ability to defend itself. 
Communication systems, transport links, hospitals and the emergency services all 
depend on a stable and constant energy supply, no more so than in the aftermath. A loss 
of power will most likely have longer impacts on the economy and geopolitical 
position. It will also affect social cohesion and individuals’ ability to rebuild their lives 
and the communities in which they live. 
The UAE holds a very important global position in the world’s economy because of its 
natural resources. As a country it is also very important politically; it is seen as an ally 
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by the West and has a political stability that is currently not readily found in the Islamic 
world, following the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya etc.). The UAE 
should have strong national interests in protecting its assets and security from any 
natural or terrorism based threat (Black, 2008). It is important to explore the key 
concepts of disaster resilience for future planning in urban development, in order to 
minimise the impact of natural disasters such as earthquakes, of terrorist activity, of 
climatic phenomena linked to global warming, etc. In Emirati cities such as Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai, it is also important to identify key issues such as formal training, which will 
improve the competence of employees in the energy sector and their ability to react in a 
more coherent manner during a disaster event and its immediate aftermath. The UAE 
should also improve the long-term planning and procedures that contribute to the 
overall wellbeing of the energy sector, and of the nation as a whole, by reducing the 
time needed to recover from an event. In short, this research addresses the need to 
provide the cement for the five pillars of resilience: preparedness; protection; early 
warning; emergency response and recovery; and reconstruction (please refer to section 
2.3 in Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion) within the energy sector.  
Another reason why this thesis is justified is its potential contribution to academia and 
to the field of disaster theory. Limited literature exists which directly relates to the 
culture and practices of the Middle East in relation to disaster theory. Furthermore, any 
literature in this area that pertains to an Islamic nation is even more scarce. This thesis 
has a responsibility to provide data and accessible information, as to the reality 
experienced in the Gulf Region, and specifically for those energy organisations 
operating there. It is justified because it builds on previous studies regarding disaster 
phenomena and corroborates such information. This undoubtedly makes subsequent 
research easier, as the obtaining of reliable secondary sources presented one of the more 
difficult challenges. In many cases, Chapter 2 updates information which has not been 
generally available since 2007. This research potentially represents the first of its kind 
in that it asks energy sector workers and managers about the issues that concern them. 
This gives a unique insight into some of big problems that have become latent ones.  
The thesis serves to highlight some issues of perception and challenges in the UAE and 
calls disaster practitioners to use their knowledge and expertise to help the Emirati 
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government disseminate information such as that relating to renewable energy or 
disaster management programmes, in a more efficient way. Finally, it deserves attention 
because it ensures that the voices of those operating day to day in the energy sector are 
heard by sector professionals, by Emirati government ministries and by the wider 
academic community. This should result in increased resilience as those in a position of 
power and responsibility become more acutely aware of the reality on the ground and 
can thus use their expertise to help find solutions. 
1.2.1 Emirati Energy Sector and Vulnerability  
Prior to the onset of the economic crisis, the Gulf region witnessed an extensive and 
phenomenal rate of urbanisation and development (Shanableh et al., 2005) with the 
greatest proportion of such activity occurring in the UAE. Since then, the crisis has hit 
the country hard, leaving the oil sector largely responsible for the UAE’s federal 
finances (Emirates 24/7, 2011; Augustine, 2010). In other words, energy dominates the 
UAE, especially in terms of its production and supply. Indeed, future energy 
requirements are expected to grow at a rate of 9 percent per year - three times the global 
average (Gulfnews, 2013a). Unlike other countries, the UAE does not need to be overly 
concerned about where its energy comes from, given its substantial oil reserves. Rising 
natural gas demand nationally has however turned the UAE into a net gas importer, 
despite its relatively plentiful reserves. Furthermore, the country does need to consider 
the wider issues that could threaten or damage energy security and subsequently its 
financial recovery and growth. One can only imagine the disastrous effect on the local 
and global financial and political security should the 4
th
 largest exporter of oil suddenly 
be unable to provide to the export market (CIA, 2011). Any cuts of natural gas or 
electricity supply in an increasingly energy hungry nation would also spell certain 
disaster. The electricity infrastructure is already strained by a lack of spare capacity at 
peak seasonal times due to the lack of natural gas. Figure 1.3 illustrates the sudden 
increase in gas imports post 2006, as demand soared. 
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Figure 1.3: UAE Natural Gas Trade Balance 2000-2009. Source: 
http://www.eia.gov/cabs/UAE/Full.html 
 
Service disruption is a real possibility, given the country´s vulnerability to various man-
made and natural hazards. Preparations for any potential disaster have been slow and 
have featured on the national scene, at an appropriate scale, only recently. In short, it 
has only been part of the UAE’s political focus and policy within the last few years.  
There are 25 seismogenic source zones in the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Amri, 2005) 
including the Zagros Thrust Fault which defines the western coastline, running from 
Abu Dhabi through Dubai and Sharjah to Al Khaimah (Rogers et al., 2006; Wyss and 
Al-Homoud, 2004). Yet despite this, there is little in the form of seismic detection, 
protection, resistance or design for some of the newest and tallest structures in the world 
(Petrovski, 2005; Shanableh et al., 2005). In fact, the seismic risk is increasing as 
dramatically as the UAE skyline with the strong wind, known locally as shamal, 
thought to be a concern to the UAE’s super tall structures (Samarai and Quadah, 2007; 
Wyss and Al-Houmoud, 2004). Extensive coastal development is particularly ill-
considered and Emirati strategic planning (or lack of) has amplified rather than 
diminished the likelihood of disaster. Reclaimed land is potentially more susceptible to 
liquefaction and slope failure (Williams, 2005), whilst building on the salt flats, or 
sabkha, apart from the obvious ecological degradation, intensifies extreme and flash 
flooding events (Aspinall, 2006). The annual shamal combining with sea surges also 
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contribute to this problem (Gulfnews, 2005; Jordan et al., 2005) and such threats are 
expected to increase with the likelihood of climate change.  
Despite the fact that in the last decade and a half only the UAE and Oman have been 
free of terrorist incidents, threats remain a possibility (Clark, 2010; Shaheen and Dajani, 
2010). The cause for concern is increased in light of the lack of national preparation for 
man-made disasters (Swan, 2011). The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
webpage states (October, 2012) that the threat of terrorism is “high” and that “terrorists 
may be planning to carry out attacks” (FCO, 2012). The US also remains concerned 
about the close proximity of Iran (Katzman, 2012). Potential threats to national stability 
stemming from regional uprisings since the Arab Spring, from terrorist activity and 
from nuclear reactor-associated issues are also a national concern. The last of these is 
particularly important in light of the new nuclear development at Braqa, which 
according to Al Farra and Abu-Jijleh (2012), is planned to consist of four APR1400 
reactor units designed to produce up to 1400 MWe each, for a total capacity of 5600 
MWe. 
Therefore, this research examines the application of disaster resilience and investigates 
how planning can be applied to the UAE, a country of considerable geopolitical 
importance and economic position as a major conventional fuel provider of the Gulf 
Region. Specific focus is given to the UAE energy sector and its vulnerability to natural 
and man-made hazards. The results can help to build resilience in the energy sector, in 
order to improve the overall quality and speed of the national response, should disaster 
strike.  
1.3 Research Questions 
A number of questions that emerge from the discussion above are given below: 
 What are the current disaster management practices and their relation to those 
infrastructures deemed critical within the energy sector? 
 How and to what extent are the Emirati critical energy infrastructure facilities 
vulnerable to hazards? 
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 What are the barriers that affect the application of disaster management practices 
on critical energy facilities in UAE? 
 How could these barriers be reduced? 
 Why does the Emirati energy sector not adopt a strategic disaster mitigation 
plan? 
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives  
1.4.1 Aim of the Research 
The aim of this research is to develop a framework to enhance the resilience of the 
UAE´s critical energy infrastructure facilities through a strategic disaster mitigation 
plan. 
1.4.2 Research Objectives 
In order to achieve the research aim, a number of objectives have been identified. 
1. To identify Emirati critical energy infrastructure facilities and their 
vulnerabilities to hazards. 
2. To examine current disaster management practices and their relation to those 
infrastructures deemed critical within the energy sector. 
3. To comprehensively evaluate existing barriers to the application of disaster 
management practices on critical energy facilities in the UAE. 
4. To contextualise and define the concepts of disaster resilience and strategic 
mitigation planning within the UAE.     
5. To develop a framework through a strategic disaster mitigation plan for critical 
energy infrastructure. 
 
1.5 Research Scope 
This research focuses on the disaster management efforts of the UAE. Specifically, it 
investigates the impact of natural and manmade events/hazards on the energy sector and 
its infrastructure. Although regional events such as the shamal are considered, the 
investigation is limited geographically to the confines of the borders of the UAE. The 
disasters assessed are both natural and manmade in origin. The former is however 
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considered in more depth with the impact of climate change, which has both natural and 
anthropogenic elements.  
The research is focused on the energy sector, which is understood to be those 
components relating to the electricity network and the oil and gas sector, because, as 
Table 1.2 indicates, the primary and secondary energy consumption in the country has 
increased by 41.8 and 69.5 per cent respectively. It is thus an increasingly important 
component of the economy and national development. It is also therefore a sector which 
must increase in resilience, for the stability of the nation and its population. 
Table 1.2: Energy Consumption in the UAE 2004-2010. Source: Various IEA 
statistics. 
 
In addition, this study focuses on the pre-disaster phase, particularly disaster mitigation 
and strategic planning for the building of resilience. The term ‘pre-disaster’ refers in this 
thesis to extensive data collection, maintaining directories of resources, the development 
of action plans, capacity building, and training and community awareness activities, 
undertaken to prevent, prepare for and mitigate potential disasters (Sundar and 
Sezhiyan, 2007).  
1.6 Research Methodology  
Methodology is viewed as an established, habitual, logical or prescribed practice or 
systematic process of achieving certain ends with accuracy and efficiency, usually in an 
ordered sequence of fixed steps. In order to address the research aim and objectives and 
to answer the research questions, the researcher adopted a qualitative approach, while a 
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quantitative approach was also used to supplement research findings as well as to 
enhance the research quality. 
The research onion introduced by Saunders et al. (2009) is adopted as the 
methodological framework. An interpretivist stance has been selected as the main 
research philosophy for the following reasons: this research falls within the remit of 
social sciences, as it deals with the beliefs, perceptions of reality, attitudes and 
experience of people involved with the Emirati energy sector, in the event of disaster. 
This orientation is supported by researchers such as Hussey and Hussey (1997); and 
Collis and Hussey (2009). Secondly the subject under investigation is not supported by 
an extensive theoretical background because of the lack of previous research on this 
subject, as highlighted by Creswell (2003).  
The research approach is inductive, whilst the research strategy is case study. The 
secondary data was taken from various academic and professional sources whilst the 
primary data collection included questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. Three 
case studies were carried out for this research and they were electricity generating plants 
using gas - one in Abu Dhabi, one in Dubai and one in Sharjah. In total 100 
questionnaires were distributed, out of which 42 were answered by energy sector 
workers (20 in Abu Dhabi, 15 in Dubai and 7 in Sharjah). The research methodology is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
1.7 Structure of the thesis  
The thesis is organised as follows. 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Research. This chapter introduces the main focus of 
this thesis: building disaster resilience within the Emirati energy sector and its 
infrastructure through comprehensive strategic mitigation plans. It provides the 
background to the study with information on the Emirati energy sector and its 
vulnerabilities. This section then presents the justification of the research. It also sets 
out the research aim, objectives, questions and scope. The chapter concludes with a 
brief overview on research methodology adopted for this study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review. This chapter looks at existing literature (books, journal 
articles and reports) on the key concepts explored in this thesis. Specifically, it looks at 
disaster theory and management, resilience and strategic planning, critical infrastructure 
and energy facilities.  All these aspects are discussed in the UAE context. 
Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework. This chapter sets out the content and structure of 
the draft disaster mitigation framework and strategy, along with the need for its 
communication and development via a tripartite committee. It forms the basis of the 
final framework presented in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 4: Methodology. This chapter discusses at length the research philosophy, 
approach, strategy and the methodology employed to achieve the aim and objectives. 
Chapter 5: Results and Analysis. At this point in the thesis, the results of the 42 
answered questionnaires and 9 semi-structured interviews are presented and analysed 
through statistical analysis and the drawing of graphs. Respondents of the questionnaire 
discussed issues such as energy sector preparedness, vulnerability and barriers to be 
overcome.  
Chapter 6: Discussion. This chapter evaluates in a comprehensive manner the fifth 
research objective. It looks in depth at what a strategic mitigation plan is by definition, 
what it should contain, how it should be developed and by whom. The communication 
of such a plan is also discussed. Chapter 6 also evaluates the significance of the results 
presented in Chapter 5 in the context of the Gulf Region and the United Arab Emirates, 
discussing how these results could contribute to the development of a disaster 
mitigation process. In light of this, the contributions of the thesis to theoretical and 
practical knowledge are presented and its limitations are considered. Amendments to the 
draft disaster mitigation framework found in Chapter 3 are highlighted and explained. 
Finally, proposals are made for future research which could serve to enhance the work 
presented here. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion. This chapter provides a synthesis of the new findings and their 
significance in both the Emirati energy centre and disaster theory. The successes and 
limitations of the thesis are also reflected upon here. 
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1.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduces the concept of disaster, both natural and manmade, vulnerability 
and resilience. It outlines the aim and objectives of this thesis by preliminarily 
investigating disaster management practices and the significant infrastructure of the 
Emirati energy sector. Global disaster trends are evaluated, as are recent disaster events 
in the UAE, within their regional and cultural context.  This information is built upon in 
the following chapter, in the form of a literature review, and thus provides the basis of 
the strategic disaster mitigation. An indication of the methodology to be adopted and of 
the scope of the research has been provided. Finally, an outline of the structure of the 
thesis has been identified. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
A literature review is an important component of a thesis. It gives an overview of the 
field of inquiry: what has been previously discussed on the topic, who the key 
contributors are, what prevailing theories and hypotheses are being developed, what 
questions have been and continue to be relevant, and what methodology or methods are 
appropriate and useful for continued research. The literature review here is split into 
four parts, due to the multi-disciplinary approach undertaken in this research. The first 
part is disaster theory and management, whereby the concept and nature of disaster and 
the scope of the discipline is defined. Disasters are classified and the disaster cycle, its 
stages and its significance are introduced. Following these are the general definition of 
energy facilities and critical infrastructure and the concepts of resilience, strategy and 
strategic planning. Finally all these issues are placed in the Emirati context, with a focus 
on the energy sector.  
2.1 Disaster Theory 
Disaster theory and research affects how national, regional and even sectoral or 
corporate policy are undertaken in writing and practice, including in training. In order to 
understand the nature of “disaster theory” two things must be defined; the term 
“disaster” and what constitutes a theory. A simple explanation is that a theory is based 
on rigorous scientific study and rationality. This has been widely accepted as a valid 
explanation of a given phenomenon (Zimerman, 2012). A scientific theory follows a 
hypothesis that has been supported by sufficient evidence, following testing. A theory 
may also relate to the “entire body of knowledge available in the given discipline” 
(McEntire, 2004; p.2). 
Long (2009) states that disaster theory deals with the maintenance of the ideal 
conditions that society desires, not only to function, but to prosper. In other words, 
humans do not want to experience devastating disasters and expect policy and practice, 
typically directed by the government, to mitigate any potential disaster, via a managed 
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response and recovery effort. The following sub-section examines definitions of 
disaster. 
2.1.1 Definition of Disaster 
When defining “disaster” one is rapidly reminded that the term is a semantic 
construction, like any other label which is used to explain and characterise an event or 
occurrence (Boin and Hart, 2007). This is because not every windstorm, earth-tremor or 
rush of water is a catastrophe (Carr, 1932, p211). In fact, a “disaster” may enter the 
Emergency Events database (also known as EM-DAT) only if one of the following has 
occurred: ten or more people are reported to have been killed; one hundred people are 
reported to have been affected; a state of emergency has been declared; or a call for 
international assistance has been made (CRED-OFDA, 2004). However, an event need 
not necessarily be considered a disaster or crisis by those experiencing it. Put simply, 
objective indicators, whilst important, are not decisive (Boin and Hart, 2007). Indeed 
even if one were to define a “disaster” within strict numerical parameters, consensus is 
by no means guaranteed. A flood that kills two hundred people in two topographically 
flat and vulnerable countries such as Bangladesh and the Netherlands will undoubtedly 
generate different types of response and consequences. The former’s emergency may be 
regarded as somewhat routine whilst the latter’s may be declared an absolute tragedy. If 
this is the case, a “disaster” or a “catastrophe” is what the individuals affected, either 
directly or indirectly, make of it (Boin and Hart, 2007). Such observations lend support 
to the argument of Horlick-Jones (1995) that catastrophe actually originates in the 
cultural disruptions of a modern society that cause a loss of faith in the institutions that 
are supposed to keep hazards under control. For some, disasters are simply one of the 
prices societies must pay for the gains they reap in discovering cultural inadequacies, 
resulting in advanced knowledge and protection from risk (Williams, 1958). Meanwhile 
Kreps (1982) regards the true nature of disaster as a social construction that does not 
exist in and of itself.  Such definitions suggest disasters, although concerning the 
physical, built and social environment, are primarily social in nature (Mileti, 1999).  
Defining disaster is a strongly contested and congested discourse, with conflicting 
voices across a range of disciplines fighting for space within a crowded paradigm. The 
core dispute in the “hazard paradigm” began in the 1970s and involved relocating the 
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perception of hazards and disasters as arising from the impact of the environment on 
humans, to the reverse view i.e. that they are the impact of humans on the environment 
(Marten, 2001). This debate continues as researchers still piece together the what-
why/effect-cause question and decide whether the defining task is to clarify what a 
disaster is or what a disaster does or to explain why a disaster takes place (Oliver-Smith 
and Hoffman, 1999). Dombrowsky (1998) argues that the widely accepted paradigm 
results in a misdiagnosis that freezes a complex social process into a static event – that 
there is no separation between a disaster and “its” effect and that disasters do not cause 
effects, because the effects are what society calls disaster. 
It is this tension of the value-laden term, coupled with the conflict between objective 
desirability and the subjectivity of the cultural and political spheres, which shape 
disaster’s reality and manipulate human responses (Zane, 2009). The traditional modes 
of explaining and coping with disasters become meaningless and insufficient as 
“modern” societies, characterised by perpetual social change and cultural development, 
face the need for new modes of explanation and better ways of coping with disasters 
(Dombrowsky, 1981).There is no basis in logic and little hope in practice, that a single 
definition can be devised that is universally accepted and useful (Quarantelli, 1987); 
hence the complication.  
2.1.2 Classification of Disasters 
Classification is a critical tool used for the organising or ordering phenomena on the 
basis of their inter-relationships (Bailey, 1973) and the construction of paradigms within 
a discipline (Kreps, 1989). Kreps (1985) refers to it as a key to the “scientific” goal of 
content-driven qualitative description – an essential element of the theory of disaster, its 
knowledge production and development. Drabek (1986) first called attention to this 
area, stating it as the most pressing issue confronting the field at that time. Quarantelli 
(1987) similarly asserted the need for a system of classification capable of 
distinguishing the varying disaster agents, including those that fall within the same 
category through, for example, the dimensions (scope of impact, speed of onset, 
duration of impact, social preparedness) introduced by Barton (1969). Quarantelli 
(1987) further argues for consensus in typologies, not just the definition of disaster. 
There is also a need for the disaster community to engage on the subject and scrutinise 
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the rationality underpinning a classification, such as the choice of taxonomic procedures 
and criteria when creating classifications (Kreps, 1989).  
Classifying disasters and their causation is by no means easy, but it is vital because any 
discussion of disasters depends on, and often references, a common understanding of 
disaster taxonomy (Green and McGinnis, 2002). Indeed many disasters and their causes 
may defy simplistic classification (Alexander, 1993) and may require a growth in 
understanding (Perry, 2005) and an appreciation of the epistemology of disaster theory. 
Some may be far easier to distinguish as simple or compound, “natural” or “manmade” 
(refer to Figure 2.1; Gad-el-Hak, 2008). They may even be classified relative to the 
anticipated response such as the manner developed by Gunn (1990) which subsequently 
divides into the level of support required to effectively deal with a disaster and its 
aftermath, or that proposed by Burton et al. (1978) which considers timescales involved 
in adequately managing a given natural hazard (refer to Figure 2.2). Other basic 
distinctions as stated by Alexander (1993) could involve “duration or frequency of 
event.”  
 
Figure 2.1: Classification of the Constituents of Disaster. Adapted from Gad-El-
Hak (2008)  
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Additional and easily recognisable systematic classifications involve the intensity of a 
hazardous event such as that of Saffir and Simpson (1974), which relates to hurricane 
wind speed and pressure, the Richter Scale for earthquakes, the Soloviev-Imamura for 
tsunamis and the Fujita Scale for tornadoes. The significance of having a universal 
scheme is that it gives officials an informative, quantitative measure of the magnitude of 
the disaster, so that proper response can be mobilised and adjusted as warranted. It 
applies to all types of disaster, putting them on a common scale (Gad-El-Hak, 2008). 
Not all such hazards (floods are an example of this exception), are however amenable to 
the classification of the intensity of their physical impact or human effects (Alexander, 
1993). In answer to this, Fischer (2003) developed a quantitative measure based on the 
level of social disturbance a hazard could create to classify flash floods of mountain 
rivers as either extreme emergencies or small-town disasters. Other increasingly 
important issues such as terrorism and climate change induced drought have no form of 
intensity measure (Gad-El-Hak, 2008). Causation of disaster is also an important way of 
categorising. 
 
Figure 2.2: Timescale for Dealing with Hazards. Source: Burton et al. (1978) 
Distinctions between causation can however be blurred, as a natural disaster or 
phenomenon can trigger a secondary disaster which results from the weaknesses of 
human elements (Veenema, 2007). The 2011 Tsunami in Japan provides a timely 
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reminder of the vulnerability of even the best prepared population as it struggled to 
prevent a nuclear incident triggered by a magnitude 8.9 earthquake (Reuters, 2011; 
Spiegelhalter, 2011). Disaster management for the Japan tsunami and any other relief 
efforts and recovery relies on reliable classification to identify the significance and 
value of the most relevant factors. Rigorous classification may however actually serve 
to inhibit rescue and relief teams trying to respond with already limited resources and 
manpower (Verma, 1998). Therefore, classification systems despite this criticism, 
remain an excellent tool for making comparisons and developing suitable solutions for 
disasters of the same genotype (Perry, 2005). The importance of this cannot be over-
stressed (Drabek, 1986) or undervalued. This study classifies disaster as natural or 
manmade, based on origins and causes of hazard as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Geological, 
hydrological and meteorological hazards and some aspects of climate change are 
examples of disasters with a natural origin whilst manmade disasters are those linked to 
conflict and technical issues. Natural disasters which affect the UAE include 
earthquakes, droughts and floods whilst manmade disasters are often linked to 
terrorism. 
2.1.3 Disaster Management Cycle 
Risk can be defined as the objective (mathematical) or subjective (inductive) probability 
that something negative will occur. The probability of an earthquake occurring in the 
UK is quite low compared to that same hazard happening in say California or Turkey.  
The possibility of the event occurring plays an important role in determining how 
important it is that a community is prepared to face it. Certain natural hazards and their 
risk factors can be modified by a good working knowledge of the phenomenon and 
disaster risk management. 
The ultimate goal of disaster risk management is to break the disaster life cycle 
(Frumkin, 2010), but this can be challenging, as a major issue relating to the concept is 
the identification of stages. All disasters are said to follow a cyclical pattern (refer to 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4) termed the disaster cycle (Hogan and Burstein, 2007) or disaster 
continuum (Novick and Marr, 2003). The cycle is an overall view of stages within a 
continual loop (Forsman, 2007) such as that described by Ciottonne (2006), who states 
that it includes prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. The first 
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term, prevention, typically refers to those actions taken to prevent a potential hazard 
from occurring, if it can be avoided. Should that not be possible, preventative steps 
would prevent or diminish any potentially harmful effects from on human life or 
financial assets. According to Sena (2006), “prevention” involves hazard identification 
and vulnerability assessments. The former identifies the actual threats facing a 
community, the latter is an evaluation of community risk and capacity. Mitigation refers 
to the effort required to reduce loss of human life, wildlife or financial assets in the 
event of foreseeable disaster. An effective mitigation, according to the US Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA, 2014), requires that all involved understand 
risks, address the hard choices and invest in long-term community wellbeing. Planning 
involves the continuous cycle of organising, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating 
and taking corrective action so as to ensure effective coordination during incident 
response (Department of Homeland Security, 2013). According to the UK Government 
guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (p10):  
Response encompasses the decisions and actions taken to deal with the immediate 
effects of an emergency. It is the decisions and actions taken in accordance with the 
strategic, tactical and operational objectives defined by emergency responders. At a 
high level these will be to protect life, contain and mitigate the impacts of the 
emergency and create the conditions for a return to normality... Response encompasses 
the effort to deal not only with the direct effects of the emergency itself (e.g. fighting 
fires, rescuing individuals) but also the indirect effects (e.g. disruption, media interest). 
Recovery is defined as the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the 
community following an emergency. Although distinct from the response phase, 
recovery should be an integral part of the response from the very beginning, as actions 
taken during the response phase can influence the longer-term outcomes for a 
community. 
All these form components or stages of the disaster cycle, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: A Four Stage Disaster Cycle. Source: Shaw et al., 2009 
  
The ultimate goal of disaster risk management is to break the disaster life cycle 
(Frumkin, 2010) or as Lewis (1999) believes, to break the dual disaster cycle. His dual 
cycle stems from the idea that some events invoked in a disaster result not from the 
natural hazard itself but from the context in which it happens, e.g. the level of 
development.  “Individuals and communities progress through phases at different rates 
depending on the type of disaster and the degree and nature of disaster… this 
progression may not be linear or sequential” (Roberts and Ashley, 2008, p4). It is 
argued that any false separation between the different aspects makes the society in 
question all the more vulnerable and susceptible to disasters (Satendra and Sharma, 
2004). The process of dividing the disaster process into various, albeit overlapping, 
stages is a useful heuristic device driving better understanding (Levinson and Granot, 
2002) from which a disaster management plan can be implemented. This can be quite 
difficult, however, because they are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Latfifi, 2010). 
A major challenge associated with disaster cycles is the identification of stages. 
Ciottonne (2006) recognises five; the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources (Miththapala, 2008) considers six steps within two phases (refer 
to Figure 2.4); FEMA lists four; and the United Nations lists eight: prevention, 
preparedness, early warning, impact and immediate needs assessment, relief or 
emergency response, rehabilitation, reconstruction and sustainable recovery 
(Westlund, 2007, p.24).  
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Figure 2.4: The Disaster Management Cycle and Phases Source: IUCN (2008) 
 
2.1.3.1 Pre-Disaster Phase  
The three components of the pre-disaster phase, i.e. prevention, mitigation and 
preparedness, which were explained comprehensively in the previous section, involve 
extensive data collection, maintaining directories of resources, the development of 
action plans, capacity building, training and community awareness activities (Sundar 
and Sezhiyan, 2007). Policy decisions and actions during the prevention and mitigation 
stages have enormous and far reaching consequences with the success of post-disaster 
management largely dependent on pre-disaster steps. It is essential that all natural and 
socio-economic resources are mapped in order to ascertain resource dependence and it 
is important to fully understand their function from an infrastructural and ecosystem 
service perspective (Miththapala, 2008). This community profiling is particularly useful 
when outside agencies join the project or when it is necessary to build rapport and 
develop dynamic interactions with a local group. This information then facilitates the 
community risk assessment identifying vulnerabilities and issues of the disaster specific 
to the context (Yodmani, 2001). In this way, disaster preparedness and the other 
elements of this phase are guided in a manner which adequately protects communities in 
its comprehensive, multi/inter sector, community based and cultural sensitive/specific 
approach (Cittone, 2006), a key approach for the research presented here. 
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2.1.3.2 Post-Disaster Phase  
In the period following disaster, confusion abounds and many people working on the 
immediate response are under huge pressure and stress to make the right choices and 
take the right action. Their decisions must be quick and decisive. In many respects, such 
decisions and actions carry a high level of intuition, in addition to those issues based on 
a strategic disaster mitigation plan. The latter must provide some practical vision and 
stability in the chaos. In short, it must help guide decision makers in selecting the right 
course of action within a rigid framework which is strong enough to direct resources 
and people in a way that builds resilience and confidence in the government’s response, 
its systems and the government per se. The initial relief stage after a disaster tends to 
attract the highest level of media response and it is here that the humanitarian agencies 
and volunteer groups play the most significant role. This is where agencies address the 
basic human needs of food, clean water, sanitation and shelter (Penuel et al., 2011). 
Communities that have developed their own contingency plans can support the work of 
those involved in the immediate response and in doing so can greatly reduce the time 
lag between the immediate aftermath and post-disaster recovery (APA, 2005). 
The recovery phase begins after the immediate emergency relief has ended (Penuel et 
al., 2011) and lasts as long as the effects of the incident can be expected to persist and 
can be described as the coordinated efforts and processes to effect the immediate, 
medium and long-term holistic regeneration (Cole, 2006, p.7). This stage creates a 
sense of normality and is often identified as a “window of opportunity” because it is 
here that corrective actions can be implemented regarding recovery planning, urban 
planning and other national/regional policies which will serve to benefit the totality of 
the community in the re-building (Penuel et al., 2011; Birch and Wachter, 2006) and 
potentially in the restructuring. 
When considering this stage, the term “post-disaster recovery planning” needs to be 
defined in order to optimise the process. It can be defined as the development of a 
strategy or various strategies which serve to assist an affected community in its 
rebuilding following disaster. In this respect, it can be thought of as a community 
blueprint for reconstruction. It helps communities engage in post-disaster activities and 
address the failings that led to the disaster, or the difficulty in managing it in the first 
26 
 
place. According to the Partnership for Disaster Alliance (2007) there are a number of 
activities that can be applied: 
- Post disaster recovery plans 
- Recovery ordinances 
- Business and government continuity plans  
- Post-disaster buildable land inventories 
- Utility recovery and reconstruction plans 
- Temporary shelter and housing plans 
- The establishment of a coordinating organisation and guiding principles for 
reconstruction 
 
There are also the long term considerations that come with the need to identify critical 
issues and the establishment of a framework with which to assign personnel and 
resources for their management. This requires local, regional and national input and 
expertise and is, in many ways, the first step involved in the developing of a long term 
recovery plan. Such a plan will identify policies, operational strategies, roles and 
responsibilities for implementation that will, when necessary, guide decisions that affect 
long-term recovery and post-disaster community redevelopment. It places the emphasis 
on the need to seize opportunities for hazard mitigation and to maintain community 
improvement which is consistent with the goals of the local comprehensive plan. This is 
something which by its very nature involves full community participation. According to 
FDEM (2011, p.9) recovery issues considered typically include: 
 “Sustainable land use, housing repair and reconstruction, business resumption and 
economic redevelopment, infrastructure restoration and mitigation, long-term health 
and social services support, environmental restoration, financial considerations, and 
short-term recovery actions that affect long-term redevelopment as well as other long-
term recovery issues identified by the community”. 
This thesis focuses on the pre-disaster phase in its in depth investigation on disaster 
mitigation and strategic planning in order to build resilience. Pre-disaster, when used in 
this research, refers to extensive data collection, maintaining directories of resources, 
development of action plans, capacity building, and training and community awareness 
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activities required to prevent, prepare and mitigate (Sundar and Sezhiyan, 2007). This 
information facilitates the community risk assessment identifying vulnerabilities and 
issues of the disaster specific to the context (Yodmani, 2001). In this way, disaster 
preparedness and the other elements of this phase are guided in a manner which 
adequately protects communities due to its comprehensive, multi-sector, community 
based and culturally sensitive approach (Cittone, 2006), hence the need to employ 
strategic planning and resilience enhancement in such communities.  
2.2 Critical Infrastructure  
Undoubtedly, national security, economic prosperity and quality of life for most people 
in modern society depends on continuous and reliable national public infrastructures – 
most of which are interdependent (Al Khaili et al, 2014). The protection of 
infrastructure is thus one of the most important and difficult tasks for any government 
and for national security. This is because it is so large that it is logistically and 
economically impossible to protect absolutely everything from a potential attack or 
natural event. Therefore one of the highest priorities for state authorities is to shield 
critical infrastructure, and not just infrastructure per se, from any detrimental 
occurrences and minimise serious impacts on the health, safety, security or economic 
wellbeing of citizens (Wuchte, 2012). In this study, critical infrastructure, according to 
the definition adopted by the US Patriot Act 2001, is considered to be not only physical 
assets but also virtual systems so vital to the State that the incapacity or destruction of 
such systems would have a debilitating impact on international security, national 
economic security, national and/or public health or safety. It is thus taken to embody 
components that contribute to the wellbeing of a nation and essential to the chemical 
sector, transportation network, defence security, telecommunications, banking and 
finance, water utilities, public health system, emergency services and the energy sector 
(i.e. electricity network, power plants etc.). The identification and designation of 
criticality is discussed in Directive 2008/114/EC, which looks at how vulnerabilities in 
the transport and energy sector (production and transmission) impact the EU as a 
whole. One should not look at critical infrastructure as a collection of geographically 
defined objects but rather see it as a network which goes beyond and is not confined by 
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the boundaries. Neither is critical infrastructure necessarily confined to one particular 
sector, as there are in fact many potential overlaps.  
The greatest challenge for policymakers, managers and engineers, when it comes to 
critical infrastructure, is the vastness of size and the complexity of identification and 
prioritisation. That is perhaps why governments try to group them into some sort of 
taxonomy (as with the above examples of the US Patriot Act), which reflects a 
provision of a good or service. According to Macaulay (2008), this taxonomic style 
grouping is not without its problems, given the lack of the consensus between different 
administrations (or even nations) as definitions morph and evolve, and the tendency to 
assign arbitrary meanings with no agreed methodology. 
Another key consideration is whether a failure or loss of infrastructure is caused by a 
primary, secondary or tertiary order impact. A first order impact would be a direct 
impact caused by an earthquake such as a fire. A second order one would then be the 
effect of that fire on an entity which did not experience that fire. A third order would be 
the cascading effect of the second order impact. The concept is best explained by the 
domino effect. 
The need to face the challenges of critical infrastructure is recognised in the 2003 U.S. 
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets. 
The first objective of this strategy centres on the identification and protection of assets, 
systems and functions that the U.S. Government deems to be critical for public health, 
governance, economic security, national security and public confidence.  
According to Flammini (2012), little progress has been made towards a unified 
approach to critical infrastructure protection, even though more than 250 tools and 
methods currently exist for evaluating criticality in infrastructure. Identification and 
prioritisation of the most critical components of critical infrastructure remain a 
challenging intellectual problem. 
The assigning of criticality levels, despite the lack of consensus, can be said to be 
associated with the contribution (real or perceived) that a given infrastructure has in 
maintaining the dependent society at a minimal level of national, regional and 
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international law and order. This level will in turn relate to aspects of public safety and 
health, the state of the economy and the environment.  
According to 2008/114/EC, there are three cross-examined aspects involved in any 
assignation of criticality: 
 The number of casualties 
 The economic impact (including potential environmental effects) 
 Public impact (psychological and political) 
 
All infrastructures, particularly that of the highest criticality, need to become more 
resilient through vulnerability assessments, continuity of operations planning, and 
deliberate investment in cost-effective technologies which improve the capacity of 
service providers and public authorities to maintain those critical functions (Auerswald 
et al., 2005). The protection of these systems and assets and within the energy sector, 
especially the safeguarding of oil and gas infrastructure from any and all internal and 
external threats, should become the top priority of the UAE and other oil-providing 
nations against all forms of threat. 
2.2.1 Critical Energy Infrastructure  
Infrastructure in all its forms is a valuable asset and vulnerable to many natural and 
manmade hazards. The protection of infrastructure is thus one of the most important and 
difficult tasks for any government. The energy sector, which dominates the UAE 
economy, consists of various assets—related to electricity, oil and natural gas—that are 
geographically dispersed and connected by systems and networks (Al Khaili et al, 
2014). The term “energy sector” is not easily defined, nor is the concept of critical 
energy infrastructure. That said, given that the energy sector of any nation or region 
provides fuel for and to its people via its infrastructure, in a process that depends on the 
existing transportation, communications, finance and government infrastructures 
(Kolevar, 2007), it is important to find an accepted understanding of these terms. The 
Energy Charter Treaty, signed by 51 countries, establishes in Article 1, paragraph 5, that 
energy sector investment is “an economic activity concerning the exploration, 
extraction, refining, production, storage, land transport, transmission, distribution, trade, 
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marketing or sale of Energy Materials or Products”, these last two terms referring to 
coal, natural gas, petroleum and petroleum products, and electricity (De Brabandere and 
Gazzini, 2014, p69). The UAE became an observer to the Energy Charter in 1991. 
The Australian Government (2010) states that critical energy infrastructure includes 
physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication 
networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, 
would significantly impact on the nation or affect its ability to ensure national security. 
When critical energy infrastructure is damaged, transportation may also be affected; for 
example, electricity lines may block roads and other routes, making transportation 
difficult or dangerous. 
One important (if not the most important) issue related to the long-term security of a 
national or even a regional energy system is the failure of international supply, whether 
on technical or political grounds. Any resilient energy network requires cooperation and 
the shared interests of all involved to work towards protection from “shocks”. This is 
especially the case if long term resilience is regarded as a secure supply. Resilient 
critical infrastructure, based on Olinsky-Paul (2013), is defined in this thesis as that 
which has the self-sustaining ability to supply emergency electricity during outages 
where normal operations are absent or disrupted. 
Finally, natural disasters which destroy energy supply infrastructure are equally 
hazardous or threatening to suppliers and consumers alike. It is thus important that both 
forge a strong relationship which recognises the symmetrical nature of the risks which 
may later lead to disaster. In short, they must be adequately addressed in the planning, 
mitigation and preparation stages of pre-disaster phase (Minullin and Schrattenholzer, 
2011). A weak management team and poor planning throughout the process would 
arguably only serve to amplify any failures during the immediate and longer term post 
disaster period. It would almost certainly make a community less disaster resilient. The 
next section discusses in more detail the concepts of resilience and vulnerability. 
2.3 Disaster Resilience and Vulnerability 
The term ‘vulnerability’ inherently involves various other somewhat complex ones such 
as resilience, marginality, susceptibility, adaptability, fragility and risk. It can also 
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involve issues such as exposure, sensitivity, coping capacity, robustness and criticality, 
hence the need for in-depth discussion of such terms in this chapter (Liverman, 1990; 
Fussel 2006). Perhaps the easiest way to understand it is to clearly describe a vulnerable 
situation and distinguish it from the vulnerability, or risk, factors that could be 
considered in such situations. A useful example of this is vulnerability to climate 
change. 
Moss et al. (2001) identify three aspects of climate change vulnerability. The first is 
what they refer to as the physical-environmental dimension, which they state “accounts 
for the harm caused by climate”. It includes biophysical impacts such as agricultural 
productivity and the distribution of disease vectors. The second aspect is that of 
socioeconomics, which refers to a given society’s or region’s economic and social 
capacity to recover from extreme events and the use of wealth and financial institutions 
to adapt over the longer term. Their third dimension, external assistance, is defined as 
“the degree to which a region may be assisted in attempts to adapt to climate change 
through its allies and trading partners, diasporic communities in other regions, and 
international arrangements to provide aid”.  
The United Nations (2004), meanwhile, identifies four groups of vulnerability factors 
that are relevant in the context of disaster reduction: physical factors, i.e. those that 
describe the exposure of vulnerable elements; economic factors, affecting the economic 
resources of individuals, population groups and communities; social factors, i.e. non-
economic factors that determine wellbeing, such as the quality of education, security, 
access to basic human rights, and good governance; and environmental factors.  
A related concept which it is equally important to define is that of disaster resilience. 
The present study adopts the definition coined by researchers at the Multidisciplinary 
Center for Earthquake Engineering in Buffalo, New York, for whom disaster resilience 
is the ability of social units (e.g. organisations, communities) to mitigate hazards, 
contain the effects of disasters when they occur, and carry out recovery activities in 
ways that minimise social disruption and mitigate the effects of future disasters 
(Fitzgerland and Fitzgerald, 2005, p5). These effects can be related to the acronym 
TOSE, which stands for the four measures of resilience listed by Chang and Shinozuka 
(2004):  
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 Technical resilience refers to how well physical systems perform.  
 Organisational resilience refers to the ability of organisations to respond to 
emergencies and carry out critical functions. 
 Social resilience refers to the capacity to reduce the negative societal 
consequences of loss of critical services.  
 Economic resilience refers to the capacity to reduce both direct and indirect 
economic losses. 
Each must be managed in a way which builds what Hays (2013a; 2013b) terms the 
“Five Pillars of Resilience”:   
 Preparedness: This involves identification of potential hazards and 
vulnerabilities through risk assessments, the development of forecast and 
warning systems, modelling and training for a number of disaster scenarios of 
different hazards and at different magnitudes, the development of insurance 
infrastructure and the growth of an intelligent community more capable of 
dealing with incidents. 
 Protection: This can be done through the implementation of improved building 
codes and standards, site-specific design and performance norms for critical and 
essential facilities and infrastructures such as the power plants considered in this 
report. 
 Early Warning: A provision of advance warning: models, sensors, 
communication networks and protocols, evacuation protocols and the 
assignation of “safe havens” and transportation/ road network tests. This 
assignation must ensure that these havens really are safe and are accessible 
before, during and after an emergency,  i.e. logistic evaluation of the journey to 
and from homes or temporary constructions, in the event that homes have been 
destroyed. Such systems reduce recovery time, as less infrastructure is damaged 
in the first place. 
 Emergency response: The development of an emergency evacuation 
programme, training and tests of a “search and rescue” operation for those 
individuals who were unable to reach the safe zone.  Provision of emergency 
personnel and medical assistance, investigation of road network under an 
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emergency scenario (before during and after). Testing and creation of networks 
to support the affected area in obtaining local, regional and international 
assistance is also necessary.  
 Recovery and reconstruction: The development of insurance and 
indemnification to facilitate the re-initiation of “business as usual” in terms of 
commerce and day-to-day operations improves the ability of the affected society 
or community to recover. This would typically involve undertaking post-disaster 
studies to improve pre-disaster preparedness in a similar event. 
The success in building these pillars can be better represented and evaluated by the 
resilience triangle (Figure 2.5) whereby the quality of performance is plotted against the 
time period needed to restore and recover, following a 50 percent loss of infrastructure. 
Disaster mitigation and good strategic planning can reduce this period.  
 
Figure 2.5: The Resilience Triangle. Source: Tierney and Bruneau (2007) 
The recovery period can be shortened by improving the disaster resilience measures 
required in the disaster management cycle to restore and replace damaged infrastructure. 
This in turn increases the resilience of a given community. The better a community is 
able to withstand a crisis event and recover quickly from its impacts, the more resilient 
it is considered to be.  Communities that are most resilient would (in the figure above) 
produce only an almost imperceptible resilience triangle when faced with the exact 
same disaster circumstances (ICOA, 2008).  
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Decision makers can alter the size of the triangle with an effective disaster management 
strategy and resilience building programme.  Jha and Stanton-Geddes (2013) propose 
education and communication, higher levels of preparedness and investments, better 
urban planning, coordination and development as the main tools with which to address 
the risks that a vulnerable community might face in the event of disaster. The 
Commonwealth Office of the Australian Government (2011) add another dimension to 
disaster management – increasing awareness of the local community regarding the 
threats directly relating to them and of what can be done on an individual (household) 
level to actively plan and prepare for the protection of life and property.  
To increase disaster resilience, emergency management planning should also be based 
on risk and be integrated with strategic planning of government and communities. It 
should consider risks and risk treatments across the social, built, economic and natural 
environments (COAG, 2011, p2).   
One of the keystone features of strategic planning and community resilience is public 
participation, because it can strengthen the interface between government and the 
people. Participation, as part of strategic planning, also reduces the likelihood of 
assumptions, miscommunications and the margin of error that could lead to failure in 
the most disastrous of circumstances (Borodzicz and van Haperen, 2002). Thus, such 
planning should find a place as part of disaster mitigation, in the overall urban planning 
framework for resilience (Byahut and Parikh, 2006). A limited, or absent, national 
strategy and its resulting plan will inhibit a country’s ability to cope with disaster 
(Penuel et al., 2011) and any ad-hoc intervention without comprehensive and 
fundamental planning at the post-disaster phase of the cycle will have unpredictable, 
random, unexpected and subsequently unacceptable consequences, with service 
disruptions such as electricity cuts right at the time when such services are most needed 
(Chiba, 2011). This could mean, for example, that lights go out during evacuation, 
making searches within the disaster zone all the more difficult. This must be avoided 
through strong contingency or strategic planning, as discussed in the next section. 
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2.4 Strategic Planning 
Planning, by its very nature, deals with the future and how current decisions are taken 
and expected to affect that future. Strategic planning, for its part, is a process or a series 
of steps that look at the chain of cause and effect over time for a decision that either has 
been taken or is yet to be taken (Barksdale and Lund, 2006). Strategic planning is a thus 
way of identifying A, B and C and the links between them – whereby A is representative 
of where an organisation is, B where it wants to go and C how to get there. In order to 
be effective, this requires efficient data gathering, analysis and synthesis, in addition to 
the clarification of goals and the development and exploration of rational alternatives. It 
can amongst other things support: 
Communication, participation and judgement, accommodate divergent interests and 
values, foster wise decision making informed by reasonable analysis, promote 
successful implementation and accountability and enhance ongoing learning (Bryson, 
2011, p10). 
Strategic planning is therefore a useful management tool to help an organisation 
improve by focusing its energy and ensuring that all members involved are working 
towards the same goal and are able to contribute to the agreed aims (Doherty, 2008). It 
is fundamental to and intertwined with strategic management precisely because it looks 
at the alternatives of a particular decision over others and evaluates the relevance and 
benefits of each in turn. Once a course of action is selected, it becomes the subsequent 
basis for current decisions and operations.   
All managers within an organisation will need to plan to ensure smooth running 
operations which, for the long term, require strategy.  Strategic planning is central to 
supporting managers in delegating strategic management responsibilities to other 
members of staff involved in operations and day to day running of the organisation. In 
this respect, it is vital to the success of the goals of both the public and private sector. 
That said, and according to Steiner (2010), strategic planning is not an attempt to force a 
blueprint, nor something set in stone and inflexible to the need for periodic revision as 
dictated by the corporate world, the public, government policies or global events. Good 
strategic planning is open to changes and is readily modified to take advantage of 
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developments. It is also flexible enough to be easily used by the various departments 
and individuals who need to apply it in their own field and activities.  It should never be 
used to undermine those who use it; neither should it replace managerial intuition and 
judgement. It is instead a systems approach which allows room for manoeuvre and can 
help an organisation navigate within uncertainties to achieve previously determined 
aims. This is effectively why the wrong strategy can lead to serious negative 
implications, regardless of how efficient or competent employees and management may 
be. Chandler (1962) defined “strategy” as the formulation of long term goals followed 
by the marshalling and allocation of resources to achieve those goals (Goodstein et 
al.1993) developed the idea further by stating that it is a coherent unifying and 
integrative pattern of decisions with the means of establishing an organisation’s or 
nation’s long-term objectives, action plans and allocation of resources. Minzberg (1987) 
stated that strategy is a position – that is to say a mediating force – between an 
organisation and the environment. Figure 2.6 illustrates a generic strategic process 
model introduced by Rea and Kerzner (1997) that helps an individual or group to focus 
on their external and internal issues that affect and/or influence their operations. 
Strategic planning is the basic direction and rationale for determining where an 
organisation should head, providing that there are  specifications against which any 
organisation may best decide what to do and how to do it. It is the basis for creating and 
describing a better future in measurable terms and the selection of the best means to 
achieve the results desired (Kaufman, 2003). 
Put simply, strategic planning is a disciplined, deliberative approach to help key 
decision makers in organisations figure out what they think they should be doing, how 
and why (Bryson, 2011). 
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Figure 2.6: Traditional Strategic Planning Model. Source: Rea and Kerzner (1997) 
One must remember that strategic planning is the process by which one develops a 
strategy to achieve a certain purpose (Abraham, 2012). In the case of disaster 
management, this purpose is to reduce the possibility of the impact of a natural event or 
a manmade hazard, on a given community, and to increase the resilience of that said 
community. “Strategy” is thus a key component of building disaster resilience, as also 
seen in the extended strategies of the five pillars proposed by Hays (2013a; 2013b).  
This is because the strategic planning process assumes a critical situation and seeks an 
effective and direct solution.  It defines directions and plays an integral role in making 
decisions for the allocation of the necessary resources (human and monetary capital) 
with which to pursue its strategy (Doherty, 2008). Such planning also  identifies 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as in a SWOT analysis, so as to 
increase the likelihood of achieving success in tackling disaster (or any other) 
phenomenon. Arnold (2006), in a World Bank publication, provides an example of how 
a SWOT analysis, falling under strategic planning, can bring benefits to a community 
affected by disaster.  
Successful strategic thinking, planning and action lead to various benefits, including 
improved organisational performance, the development of teamwork and expertise, the 
amendment of inherent organisational issues and the establishment of clarified norms 
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and priorities - all of which clearly serve to advance disaster management and resilience  
(Bryson and Delbecq, 1979). According to Sadeghi (2006, p.22): 
Strategic planning [thus] provides the appropriate infrastructure for integrated, 
coordinated decision making following natural disasters such as earthquakes. Hence, 
applying strategic planning to disaster management can reduce the impact of 
catastrophe on the community which results in reducing the number of casualties. 
According to Doherty (2008, p.33), there are five steps in putting together a strategic 
plan for disaster management: 
1. Identify the targets – who they are and who they are not. 
2.  Type of help – Who needs assistance and who does not? 
3. Timing – When will the assistance be most useful and when will circumstances 
and the situation allow such assistance? 
4. Theme – What are the themes, issues, concerns and threats that should be 
considered in order to build and plan the right invention package? What has 
already happened and what will happen in connection to the incident? 
5. Team and Resources – What resources will it take in order to provide the right 
interventions at the right time(s)? 
 
In order to answer these questions one must consider the threats through an in depth 
analysis and assessment; one must then develop and implement alternative responses 
and decide how any information should be communicated to all those involved. Any 
decisions arrived at need a procedure stating how they should be taken and in which 
circumstance.  Finally one should state how a return to normal operations, once the 
threat or crisis has subsided, should be coordinated. 
A comprehensive plan will consequently formulate the implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation stages and will form the basis of enriched and improved communication and 
coordination among the different parties for the various different scenarios. 
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2.5 United Arab Emirates in Context 
The UAE is located between latitudes 22.0º and 26.5º N and 51º and 56.5º E. 
Collectively, the Emirates and its archipelago that extends over the Arabian Gulf cover 
83,600 sq km. The Emirati coastline extends approximately 700 km. The country shares 
land borders with Qatar to the west, Saudi Arabia to the south and west and Oman to the 
east and south. 
Four-fifths of the UAE’s land mass is desert. The highest altitude is 1,500 m in the 
Hajar Mountain range which extends into the northeast region and into Oman. Other 
land forms occur along the extremely shallow and gently sloping continental shelf of the 
Arabian Gulf where there are various offshore islands, salt marshes and coral reefs. The 
littoral zone of the UAE is characterised by active coastal sabkhas, or salt flats 
(Doherty, 2009). 
The climate is arid and subject to ocean effects due to the proximity of the Arabian Gulf 
and the Gulf of Oman. The coast brings humidity along with very high temperatures 
during the summer months. The Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains, due to their high 
altitudes, create generally cooler weather conditions. There are two seasons: winter, 
from November to March and summer, which is from April to September. During 
winter, temperatures are generally mild, given that it is rare that they ever fall below 
6ºC (Ministry of Energy, 2006). In summer, conditions can be extreme, reaching 48ºC 
and 90% humidity at the coast, but normally oscillating between 50-60%. Inland 
humidity is lower at around 45% but temperatures are known to climb to 50ºC. As one 
might expect, rainfall is few and far between. Any abnormally high rainfall, which is 
usually tied to the combination of winter shamal wind and atmospheric depressions, 
makes headline news. In November 2013, heavy flooding caused a number of minor 
injuries and one fatality when a man was swept from his vehicle. Medical staff stated 
the need for careful and considerate driving (Hasan, 2013). Likewise, in February 2014 
heavy rainfall and unusually cold conditions made headlines with traffic generated and 
drivers urged to exercise caution (Kazmi, 2014). Summer rainfall is infrequent outside 
of the mountainous and south eastern regions (which experience 140-200 mm/yr). 
Whilst rainfall is typically low, even in the wettest months of February and March, 
evaporation is considerable, averaging 8 mm daily (Ministry of Energy, 2006). 
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Politically, the country is a federation of seven Emirates – Abu Dhabi Ajman, Dubai, 
Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al Quwain. In terms of population, the 
UAE is experiencing one of the fastest growth rates in the world. Most of this influx can 
be linked to the arrival of working age immigrants (Figure 2.7), typically from India, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan (who account for 90% of the nation’s workforce) but also the 
United States and Western Europe. In fact, the 2013 estimated figure for the migrant 
population was 7.8 million, which equated to 84% of the total. It also means that the 
UAE has the fifth largest immigrant working stock in the world (Malit and Al Youha, 
2013). 
 
Figure 2.7: UAE Population Pyramid, 2010. Source: ESCWA (2010) 
In 1980 the total population was 1 million. It increased to 8.4 million only 30 years 
later. The UN expects this figure to reach 15.5 million by 2050 (ESCWA, 2010). This is 
a huge growth rate on the 287,000 present in 1971. In 2004, the three most populous 
Emirates were Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah. Collectively, they accounted for roughly 
85% percent of the total population. The overwhelming majority of the population lives 
in urban areas in coastal zones, which are also prone to a vast number of natural hazards 
and manmade threats (Ministry of Energy, 2006). These are discussed in the following 
sections. 
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2.5.1 Natural and Manmade Hazards of the UAE 
2.5.1.1 Natural Hazards 
The term "natural hazard" includes all atmospheric, hydrological, seismic and volcanic 
and wildfire phenomena that, because of their location, severity, and frequency, have 
the potential to affect humanity, the wellbeing of their society and the effectiveness of 
their activities. If a hazard is described as “natural”, it does not relate to any manmade 
phenomenon such as war, pollution, or chemical contamination. These are discussed in 
Section 2.5.1.2. 
The natural hazards considered include those relating to tectonic activity (earthquake, 
tsunami) and atmospheric phenomena (shamal, climate change). 
2.5.1.1.1 Earthquakes 
There are 25 seismogenic source zones in the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Amri, 2005), 
including the Zagros Thrust fault which readily generates earthquakes measuring 5 on 
the Richter Scale, such as the Masafi Earthquake (magnitude ~5)  whose accompanying 
shocks were felt throughout the northern Emirates (Rogers et al, 2006). This fault 
defines the western coastline, running from Abu Dhabi through Dubai and Sharjah to Al 
Khaimah (Wyss and Al-Homoud, 2004). Other potential threats come from the Hurmuz 
Straits, north of which is one of the most seismically active zones in the world 
(Shanableh et al., 2005; Figures 2.8 and 2.9). 
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Figure 2.8: Fault line in the Gulf Region (Jamali et al., 2006)  
Evidently, the UAE is exposed and vulnerable to tectonic activity from a number of 
sources, and yet there is little in the form of seismic detection, protection, resistance or 
design for some of the newest and tallest structures in the world (Petrovski, 2005; 
Shanableh et al., 2005). In fact, it is clear that with its rapid progress, the UAE’s seismic 
risk is rising as dramatically as its skyline (Wyss and Al-Houmoud, 2004). This danger 
is particularly acute for tall buildings located on reclaimed land because little is known 
about the underlying or nearby fracture zones, whilst such land is potentially more 
susceptible to liquefaction and slope failure (Williams, 2005). Two earthquakes in quick 
succession (9
th
 April and 16
th
 April, 2013), measuring 6.3 and 7.2 respectively on the 
Richter Scale, forced residents in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah and some 500 km 
across the Arabian Gulf to rush out from high raise buildings (Kazmi et al., 2013). 
Whilst no casualties or property damage was reported, the lead national authority 
responsible for managing and coordinating emergencies and crises in the UAE, 
NCEMA, were forced to react quickly to the rapid panic and the publishing of 
misinformation (Al Hoscini, 2013). Other incidents of recent tectonic activity 
experienced in the UAE are shown in Figure 2.9. 
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Figure 2.9: UAE Earthquakes experienced in the last 8 years: Magnitude and 
Place. Source: Author (Al Khaili) Data taken from Gulf News (2013c). 
2.5.1.1.2 Tsunami 
Tsunamis are gravity water waves and typically occur following a large and relatively 
shallow underwater earthquake in coastal regions. They are generated by a sudden 
vertical motion of the ocean floor due to earthquakes, landslides, volcano eruptions or 
asteroid impacts (Heidarzadeh et al 2007). The main tsunami source in the region is the 
seismic activity of the Makran subduction zone (Rodriguez et al 2013). The 1945 
Makran earthquake generated a tsunami of 11.5-17 metres in height (Murty et al, 1999; 
Pararas-Carayan, 2006), killing four thousand people and affecting not only the South 
Asian region but also the Arabian Gulf, including Iran and the UAE’s large sand bar at 
Ras al-Khaimah (Chadha, 2007; Jordan, 2008). In 2012, the Pacific Tsunami Warning 
Centre initially forecast that a Tsunami could reach Fujairah in the UAE, following an 
earthquake in Sumatra, Indonesia. The threat did not however materialise (Shane, 
2012). In 2015, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah were all vulnerable to the possibility of 
tsunami activity (Kumar, 2009). Such activity also needs to be considered in light of the 
nuclear development which will bring four reactors (of combined capacity 5600 MWe) 
to the coastal site of Barakah (WNA, 2011) – (see in section 2.5.1.2.1 Nucleur Energy 
for more details). 
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2.5.1.1.3 Shamal and Dust Storms 
Shamal is an Arabic word that can be translated into English as “north.” It refers to the 
above normal northerly to north-westerly wind that blows in the Gulf. As of 2010, there 
is still no universal consensus as to what exactly defines a shamal. The UK 
Meteorological Office (1991, page unknown) states that it is a hot, dry north-westerly 
wind which blows with special persistence in summer over Iraq and the Persian Gulf” 
and that it is “often strong during the daytime but decreases at night. Others such as 
Rao et al. (2001) define it according to its speed and duration, given that it must register 
a mean hourly speed of 17 knots and last for at least 3 hours in any given day. It is the 
only persistent strong wind in the region that can last for several days. It routinely 
produces gale force winds and 3–4 m (10-12 ft) high sea waves (de Villiers, 2010).  
There are two distinct shamal seasonal patterns, one in the summer and the other in the 
winter due to the specific dynamic processes.  The winter one is the most intense in its 
horizontal and vertical extent (Perrone, 1979; Safar, 1980).  It can, as a result of the 
turbulent mix of the cold frontal boundary with high wind speeds, throw up dust as high 
as 5 km. This carrying of dust combined with speeds of 8-15 m/s (up to 25 m/s for 
gusts) is known to significantly impact visibility, which can fall even to 0 m 
(Wilkerson, 1991). 
The summer shamal meanwhile results from the interaction of the high pressure from 
the Mediterranean with that of the summer monsoon as it flows out of southwest Asia 
and into Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Bartlett, 2004). Daily summer shamal winds,  
although longer lasting, are at a slightly lower velocity than their winter counterparts 
and average 7-13 m/s. Dust particulates reach slightly lesser heights too – approaching 3 
km (Wilkerson, 1991).  
As an atmospheric phenomenon, the summer shamal brings with it a wave of high 
pressure lasting from three to forty days, when passing through the UAE. It is thought to 
be, amongst over things, a concern to the UAE’s super tall structures as its velocity 
differs at heights surpassing 400 m (Samarai and Quadah, 2007). As a yearly recurrent 
storm event (Hellebrand et al., 2004), it also presents a major and frequent disaster risk 
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to the coastal region (Jordan et al., 2005), which is also the most heavily populated area, 
where incidentally most of the construction and oil production occurs. 
The true impact of the winter shamal winds on the coastal region and construction 
industry were evidenced on 11
th
  January, 2005 when the shamal, combined with a high 
tide and storm surge, led to wave heights of four metres and the loss of a construction 
worker as he was swept out to sea (Gulfnews, 2005). In 2008, the shamal once more 
caused flooding in Ajman (Khaleej Times, 2008). In February 2014, shamal winds 
helped contribute to unstable cool weather and strong offshore waves that led to 
shipping warnings. Small inland dust storms were also reported (Kazmi, 2014).  
Dust storms are also common and may cause a variety of problems. The reduction of 
visibility increases traffic accidents, and may increase the occurrence of vertigo in 
aircraft pilots. Meanwhile the environmental impacts include reduced soil fertility and 
crop damage, damage to telecommunications and mechanical systems, dirt and air 
pollution which lead to an increase in the incidences of respiratory diseases (Furman, 
2003). 
The UAE is one of the places in the world which suffer increasingly from dust storms 
(Al Mandoos, 2013). Between 2007 and 2011, dust events in the UAE occurred 
somewhere in the atmosphere for 239 days. The highest number of dust storms which 
affected terrestrial activity directly was in 2008 (68 days), the lowest number was 32 
days in 2010 (Todorova, 2014). In 2013, sand and dust storms caused various low 
visibility issues leading to widespread warnings for drivers (Ruiz, 2013). 
2.5.1.1.4 Climate Change 
Fighting climate change should be a priority for the Emirati government, since 85% of 
the UAE population inhabits a thin strip of land along the coastline. The biggest city, 
Abu Dhabi, which lies practically at sea level, consists largely of reclaimed land. 
Furthermore, by 2050 the sea level increase could engulf 722 km
2
. This anticipated rise, 
resulting from global warming, is expected to increase the severity and frequency of 
natural and manmade disasters resulting from oceanic and coastal hazards. 
Environmental catastrophes off the coast of the UAE were registered in 1996 and 1998, 
when a mass coral bleaching and mortality episode occurred due to seawater 
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temperature anomalies. This fact was published by the IPCC (2007) in their Third 
Assessment Report. The IPCC, in the same report, also highlighted concerns that climate 
change in the region could alter patterns of erosions and accretion. 
According to Kumar (2009), the expected sea level augmentation of 5mm/yr is expected 
to seriously impact low-lying coastlines, which due to the high degree of infrastructural 
development, poses a serious concern for cities such as Abu Dhabi.  Indeed between one 
and three percent of the land mass will be affected in the event of just a one metre sea 
level rise (Tolba and Saab, 2009). In addition, it can be argued that such offshore 
townships built on reclaimed islands could also be affected by inundation and erosion, 
due to that same sea-level rise and the related increase in storm surge events. If the sea 
rises not by one but by three metres, the UAE coastline is expected to shift 35 km 
towards the south-east, leading to a loss of around 80 percent of its mangroves, spelling 
ecological catastrophe for many of the coastal fauna and flora (Chowdhury, 2010; 
Oxford Business Group, 2010).  
Apart from those complications associated with a sea level rise, climate change is also 
likely to exacerbate heat waves. They are forecast to become not only more frequent, 
but also more intense and prolonged. Heat waves, most certainly a health risk, are 
consistently linked to higher mortality rates. Other health issues set to rise in the UAE 
are those relating to an increase in the seasonal concentrations of allergens in the 
atmosphere. These allergens can cause severe allergic reactions and increase proneness 
to pulmonary disease. Malaria may also become prevalent (Tolba and Saab, 2009). 
The UAE, in the face of such events, has however tried to mitigate the impact of global 
warming and associated disasters through various initiatives including the establishment 
of the Green Arab Council, the construction of Masdar—the first zero carbon city—and 
a mass afforestation programme. Masdar, in particular, is seen globally as an innovation 
in the fight against climate change, with its emphasis on new clean tech and technology 
transfers so as to remain in the vanguard. Solutions include concentrated solar power, 
waste-to-energy technology, geothermal solutions, power distribution, water 
management, desalination, cooling technology, grey water recycling, light rail and 
logistical platforms (Oxford Business Group, 2010). 
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New more demanding building codes are also being incorporated outside of Masdar to 
cut down carbon emissions (Bodart and Evrard, 2012). That said, general environmental 
concerns remain as do concerns about nuclear energy, given that this type of energy is 
being cited as a solution to the country’s growing carbon footprint (see Section 
2.5.1.2.1). 
2.5.1.1.5 General Environmental Concerns 
The enormous demand for aggregate, stone and cement has led to very extensive 
quarrying in the mountains and gravel extraction on the outwash plains, resulting in the 
loss of pristine mountain habitat and extensive dust pollution, whilst the development of 
artificial islands, ports, marinas and coastal residential areas has brought alteration and 
degradation of marine habitats through pollution and dredging (Gardner and Howarth, 
2009). 
Uncontrolled and uncoordinated urban growth has been shown to cause a lot of different 
ecological and socio-economic issues and risks in the UAE. The Dubai World Centre, 
for example, has already impacted the pre-existing 140 km
2 
sand dune and sabkha 
ecosystem and has threatened nine species of mammals, diverse resident and visiting 
bird species, seventeen reptile species, a wide range of invertebrates and 43 species of 
plants (Gardner and Aspinall, 2006). This could lead to an environmental disaster with 
the full scale of its effects as of yet unknown. The same is true for Abu Dhabi as coastal 
development increasingly comes into conflict with the region’s ecological and 
geomorphic systems and processes (Al-Harthi, 2008). This is largely due to the 
temporal inadequacy of a contractor’s Environmental Impact Assessment which does 
not consider transient species or seasonal variation (Gardner and Howarth, 2009). In 
addition, the increasing demand for potable water and human land reclamation coupled 
with microclimatic change is expected to destroy the halophytic cover of the coastal 
dunes (Kendell et al., 2000). Extensive oil production is also known to take its toll with 
31 percent of the world’s barrels passing through the Strait of Hormuz daily and 
threatening marine life in multiple ways: from oil pollution to thermal discharges 
(Doughty et al., 2009).  
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2.5.1.2 Manmade Hazards  
A manmade hazard is one which is caused directly or predominately by identifiable 
human actions, either deliberate or accidental. In this section, the thesis discusses war, 
terrorism and nuclear activity.  
 2.5.1.2.1 Nuclear Energy  
Electricity for heating and cooling is the highest greenhouse gas (GHG)-emitting sector, 
accounting for 25 percent of global GHG emissions (Al Hammadi, 2013). Every year 
the UAE’s global contribution of carbon is increasing because the Emirati energy 
demand has risen in the 21
st
 century by nine percent per annum. This percentage is three 
times the growth of most other countries. The electricity usage per capita in the UAE is 
also notably high. To address this footprint, the country has increasingly committed to 
diversifying its energy generation technology and adopting cleaner technologies and 
practices, through the Peaceful Energy Programme. Nuclear energy forms an integral 
part of the programme and is expected to help reduce Emirati GHG emissions by around 
12 million tonnes (Al Mazroui, 2013). 
Nuclear energy is, however, very controversial. The 1986 Chernobyl accident and that 
of Fukushima Daiichi in 2011 are two important disasters that have highlighted the 
public to the particularly catastrophic consequences of failure. Risks relating to nuclear 
waste disposal are also known and have been well documented (Murray et al., 1982).  
The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) has set the target of delivering 
electricity to the UAE grid by 2017. It is projected that by 2020 nuclear energy will 
satisfy nearly a quarter of the nation’s electricity needs (ENEC, 2013). In April 2010, 
Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation lodged license applications and an environmental 
assessment for its preferred site at Barakah, which is situated on the coast 53 km west of 
Ruwais and 300 km west of Abu Dhabi city. It is planned to consist of four APR1400 
reactor units designed to produce up to 1400 MWe each for a total capacity of 5600 
MWe (Al Farra and Abu-Jijleh, 2012). 
The applications were assessed by the Federal Authority of Nuclear Regulation 
(FANR). This assessment was subsequently re-written following the tsunami in Japan. 
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The building of the second of four reactors was made publically known in 2013 (WNA, 
2013; Gulf News, 2013a). This made the country the first since China in 1985 to 
construct a nuclear plant where none had existed previously (Quevenco et al., 2012). 
Safety and public perception is thus of paramount concern. 
2.5.1.2.2 Terrorism 
The UAE’s main association with global terrorist activity is through its financial 
institutions. Illicit cash is also said to be responsible for the continuation of international 
crime and the continued support of terrorist groups (Mathiason, 2010).  This has been 
blamed on a lack of border controls due to inadequate police funds and on the finance of 
many involved in illegal activity, including the Taliban, which render the anti-terrorist 
legislation useless (The Guardian, 2010; Cartwright et al., 2007).  In 2014, a new anti-
terrorist law was passed in an attempt to severely curb any form of terrorist activity by 
(or perceived leniency shown towards) such groups or individuals within the country’s 
border.  
Terrorism is a difficult concept to define. It has arguably become increasingly difficult 
to do so as the methods and networks used to conduct terrorism have become 
increasingly complex. It is a term which is contested and intensely political in nature 
(Der Derian, 2005) with as yet no true consensus (Laqueur, 2003). Schmidt and 
Jongman (1988) compared some 109 different definitions and found that the most 
commonly occurring words were “violence, force”, “political” and “fear”, which were 
found in 83.5, 65 and 51 percent respectively of them. The most complete definition and 
the one used in this thesis when referring to either “terrorism” or “terrorist activity” is 
that provided by Hoffman (2006, p 40): 
“The deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of 
violence in the pursuit of political change... it is specifically designed to have far-
reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist 
attack. It is meant to instil fear within and thereby intimidate a wider “target 
audience”.  
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The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office states that the threat of terrorism in the 
UAE is “high” and that “terrorists may be planning to carry out attacks there” (FCO, 
2012).  
In addition, Australia, as of March 2013, states on its government webpage that: 
We advise you to exercise a high degree of caution in the UAE because of the threat of 
terrorist attack. We have in the past received reports that terrorists are planning attacks 
against Western interests in the UAE. – Australian Government, DFAT (2013) 
The US also remains concerned about the close proximity of Iran with regard to both 
nuclear and terrorist activity (Katzman, 2012). It also associates the UAE’s large 
expatriate population, which includes several million Indian and Pakistani nationals, 
with a potential increase in terrorist activities, given that there have been incidents and 
terrorist groups in their native countries, which could have an impact on Emirati 
national security and stability (Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2013). That said, 
initiatives such as Dubai’s Al Ameen, first launched in September 2013, provides a 
service whereby its citizens can communicate confidentially with the authorities via 
social media when there is a potential threat to the stability, safety and security of the 
UAE (Al Ameen, 2013; Kantaria, 2012). 
UAE nationals also are shown to worry about terrorism. Research undertaken by 
Alomash and Al Khattar (2013), as shown in Table 2.1, indicates that the highest 
percentage of respondents, students of the University of Sharjah, saw terrorism as the 
“source most threatening to stability, societal and individual security”. At 32 percent, 
the perceived possibility of high level threat is significantly higher than for natural 
hazards and still more than for war. 
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Table 2.1: Perception of Security Risk and Threats, according to a student 
population Source: Alomash and Al Khattar (2013). 
 
Potential threats to national stability, stemming from regional uprisings since the Arab 
Spring  in 2011, include terrorist activity and nuclear power-associated issues. The 
sudden explosion of extremist pseudo-religious groups, such as Islamic State in 2014, 
prompted the development of stringent national anti-terrorist legislation and penalties, 
some as harsh as capital punishment for the taking of female hostages and prison 
sentences for the carrying of mock bombs and other explosive devices in public (Dajani, 
2014). The rationale behind this is to prevent the country becoming a fertile ground for 
terrorist organisations and training. Referred to as the strictest anti-terrorist law in the 
history of the UAE, terrorist activities were established as those acts:  
..which result in the death of a victim, including attacks on a head of state or his family 
or a representative or officer of a state; coerced recruitment of individuals into a 
“terrorist” organisation; hijacking; hostage-taking; infringement of diplomatic or 
consular premises in committing a “terrorist” act; use of nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons and assaulting security forces. (Salama, 2014)  
As of late-2014, 83 organisations are listed in the UAE as terrorist groups (WAM, 
2014). Some of them have obvious connections to terrorist activities due to their use of 
violent and criminal means to dictate their ideology. Obvious examples of this are 
Islamic State and al Nusra Front (an offshoot of Al-Qaeda). The designation of 
“terrorism” for others is less clear and even subject to criticism. The UK based charity 
Islamic Relief and the US based Council on American-Islamic Relations are two such 
organisations whose charity work, legal advice and fund raising is far from the terrorist 
activities the anti-terrorist law was designed to prevent (Bayoumy, 2014) The cause for 
concern and the heightened sensitivity surrounding terrorism have increased in light of 
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the lack of national preparation for manmade disasters (Swan, 2011). As of April 2013, 
some 97 people are on trial for local terrorism and trying to “overthrow the 
government.” Western media has, as with the designation of western European 
headquartered Islamic charities, however questioned the legitimacy of this action, 
especially as the nation is yet to face any terrorist incident (Law, 2013). 
In December 2012, the world’s first-ever International Center of Excellence for 
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) was inaugurated in Abu Dhabi.  The centre, 
which is still in its embryonic stages, will be proactively engaged in three programme 
areas: research, dialogue and cooperation, and training (Gulf News, 2013). In June 
2013, a national law was passed which meant that the centre became part of the private 
sector. Hedayah was established due to the strategic challenge and widespread 
agreement on the need to prevent individuals from starting down the paths toward 
radicalisation, the embrace of violence, and support for terrorism, as well as to divert 
those already on that path before they are fully committed and mobilised (Hedayah, 
2013). 
2.5.1.2.3 War 
There are as many points of convergence as there are of divergence, when it comes to 
the similarities between war and terrorism. Both are clearly violent acts with instigators 
using them as an ultimate “solution” to complex problems which, they believe, cannot 
be fixed through more peaceful means. In many cases, both will stem from resource 
conflict. This could be in the form of high value minerals, such as gold and oil, or land 
and ancestral land rights. According to Tahmisoglu and Özen (2009), the major 
difference between war and terrorism is the way that capital (human, monetary, natural 
resource) is employed. Wars often have a legal element and may be defined as legalised 
attacks on one State from another, or in the case of a civil war, one group of identified 
people on another. Terrorism meanwhile is typically performed by a small group of 
individuals with the ultimate aim of changing a nation’s or region’s policy in a way that 
benefits the aggressors. Not all terrorist activity is perceived as “bad”, especially if the 
ruling party is seen as oppressive or corrupt.  It is often about wanting to see change and 
forcing that change. Terrorism in the 21
st
 century has been heavily linked to the Middle 
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East region and the rise of Islamist ideology, meaning that the UAE does occupy a 
vulnerable position socially and geographically (Mallat, 2015). 
The UAE is a stable country politically with good relationships with the West. It is 
however situated in a volatile region and, like many of its Gulf neighbours, worries 
about the impact of the previous conflict in Iraq (Terrill, 2005). Relations with Iran, due 
to the UAE’s strong relationship outside of the Islamic states, particularly with the US, 
is also seen as a threat to national security and trade. In 2012, there were fears that 
Iranian-Emirati tension could cause the breakdown of maritime activities (Badih, 2012). 
National concerns surrounding the ownership the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater 
Tunb, and the Lesser Tunb have also proven detrimental to Iran-UAE relations (Assl, 
2012). Many among the Emirati population are sensitive to the issue and believe that it 
is a cause of concern which could generate conflict, as shown by the primary 
questionnaire data reported in this thesis. 
The regional conflict in Syria has not affected the stability of the UAE. The UAE does 
however participate in war zones and is the only Arab nation frequently involved in 
coalitions with the US, including in Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Bosnia-Kosovo, and 
the 1990 Gulf War, where it has either deployed force or provided assistance (EUAEW, 
2012). 
2.5.1.2.4 Crime 
The general crime rate in the UAE is relatively low. Dubai residents, for instance, have 
a 0.00085 percent chance of being involved in a crime such as murder, assault, robbery 
or theft (Kantaria, 2012). According to a survey conducted in 2010 by the Emirati 
newspaper, The National, over 97 percent of the population (nationals and expats) felt 
safe. In 2014 an updated survey was undertaken by The National (2014) which 
suggested once more that neither Emirati nationals nor expatriates felt particularly 
unsafe or affected by crime. The number of concerned individuals did however rise. 
One third felt that crime represented some kind of an issue whilst 15 percent said that 
there was no issue at all. Where it was a problem, respondents believed the main causes 
of crime were alcohol (39 percent), drugs (37 percent), unemployment (32 percent) and 
a lack of discipline from parents (32 percent). Some researchers believe that this low 
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level of crime (or at least low perceived crime rates) results from the fact that 80 percent 
of the total population are immigrant workers who fear that illegal activity would result 
in their deportation (Gornall and Hassan, 2010).   
2.5.2 Critical Emirati Energy Infrastructure: Resilience and Vulnerability 
The Arabian Gulf is shallow, about 200 meters or less in most areas. The Gulf water 
moves slowly and has limited tidal waves. That said, the terrain, as observed by Hafez 
and Halim (2007), is flat, which plays a role in flooding risk and frequency. Most of the 
oil installations are either on the shore or in shallow water areas and major oil fields are 
either in the shallow area of the Gulf or in the desert adjacent to the Gulf shores. Severe 
weather, though infrequent, can include large tidal waves or sea storms. Terrorism 
presents a key issue which could easily affect the geopolitical stability of the region, if 
not the entire globe (given the number of energy installations), in addition to the impact 
on global trade, economy and operations (refer to Figure 2.10). 
 
Figure 2.10: Key oil infrastructure as of 1994. Source; Encyclopedia Britannica 
[within] Hafez and Halim (2007) 
As discussed elsewhere, the energy sector dominates the UAE and the Gulf region 
generally. The Emirati economy is the second biggest in the region, after Saudi Arabia 
(Kawach, 2011). The energy sector is therefore very much an economic powerhouse 
55 
 
responsible for the positive development of the nation. Some OPEC nations and many 
non-OPEC nations have seen production decline over the last five years, but the UAE 
has increased its total production of crude oil by approximately 31 percent and thus 
plays a highly significant role in global energy markets (EUAEW, 2011). Energy 
security and supply are equally a priority for a country that has built its reputation as the 
region’s most stable country, both politically and economically, with attractive business 
opportunities that are not found elsewhere (Dalli and Wilcox, 2006a). The new 
development of nuclear power at Braqa, 33 miles from the coast, provides another 
prime reason for comprehensive strategic planning in the mitigation of disaster. The 
technological choice of  Generation III APR1400 which has enhanced safety features 
such as longer plant life (normally 60 years), enhanced user-friendliness, and burn-up 
rates ,and reduced fuel consumption and waste production (Al Farra and Abu-Jijleh, 
2012), is a good example of manmade prevention (as opposed to hazard preparation). 
It is irresponsible to ignore the UAE’s vulnerability to various natural hazards. As 
development continues, the country and its people become even more vulnerable to the 
effects of those hazards. The issue of disaster is particularly acute on the coast where the 
highest population densities, the large number of high-rise buildings and 
commercial/residential structures are located. Ill-planned urban development has 
intensified, rather than abated, disaster. Preparations for any impending disaster have 
been slow and in fact, due to the country’s recent legal establishment as a nation, large 
scale disaster preparation has featured on a national scene at an appropriate scale only 
recently. Every year brings more encompassing disaster management legislation and 
initiatives (Al Ghanim, 2010). In 2007, for example, a national emergency strategy was 
set-up to ensure a prompt, coordinated and efficient response to any potential disaster 
(Al Kindi, 2007). This is particularly important because of the four-fold nuclear reactor 
development at the coast of Barakah and the crippling effect of the Japanese Tsunami 
(WNA, 2011). The UAE must act in a proactive manner and must subsequently develop 
an appropriate disaster management strategy before any disaster event occurs. 
2.5.3 Current Disaster Practices in UAE  
The National Crisis and Emergency Management Authority (NCEMA) established in 
2007 is the key government body for disaster and its management within the UAE’s 
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borders. It comes under the Higher National Security Council and has the primary 
objective of ensuring the safety of the lives of all citizens and residents in the territory 
of the United Arab Emirates and to preserve the property of the country (NCEMA, 
2014). It is responsible for the regulation and coordination of all matters related to 
emergency and crisis management, as well as for the development of a national plan for 
responding to emergencies. Its mission is: 
To enhance the UAE’s capabilities in managing crisis and emergencies by setting the 
requirements of business continuity, enabling quick recovery through joint planning, 
and coordinating communication both at the national and local level (Ibid, 2014). 
NCEMA work on the principle of using an extended network to advise on the scale and 
the nature of a registered disaster, considering all its contributing factors. This obtaining 
of information is then followed by an “escalation procedure.”  This procedure has four 
categories of seriousness with four being the lowest and one the highest. Any escalation 
must be well-documented in any crisis/emergency plan and top management must be 
provided with a copy of the typical protocol. The steps for notifying NCEMA are the 
following (NCEMA, 2012, p.22): 
NCEMA becomes aware of the event and declares it to be an ‘emergency’, formally 
notifying the NCTE Chairman, identifying the requirement to activate the NCTE team 
and /or government representatives; NCTE formally notifies Licensee(s) 
A critical component of worldwide disaster management in 2015 is the use and control 
of social media. Social media is a rapidly growing global phenomenon and a tool for the 
mass and rapid dissemination of information. In the UAE, the spreading of information 
regarding two earthquakes, which occurred in quick succession on 9
th 
and 16
th
 April 
2013, was almost as instantaneous as the earthquakes themselves. According to Al 
Holsini (2013), much of this information was misinformation, a situation which forced 
the NCEMA to appear on national television and various press conferences in order to 
calm the public after exaggeration led to widespread panic. This was despite the fact 
that no fatalities or physical injuries were recorded and no single building nor any form 
of infrastructure had collapsed. The threat of panic due to incorrect and/or 
unsubstantiated information entering the public realm has also meant that NCEMA must 
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maintain a constant presence on social media platforms, which it does through its 
YouTube, Twitter and Facebook accounts, giving members of the public the facts about 
disasters, the information necessary for their prevention, and advice during and 
immediately after their occurrence.  
NCEMA also produces quarterly internet-based magazines in Arabic and English to 
keep the public informed as to disaster management practices, legislation and activity.  
Important developments which will shape disaster management in 2015 and beyond 
include Law No. 7 of 2013, which centres on the establishment of an independent and 
distinguished national academy for the training and development of young members of 
staff in the fields of safety, security, defence, emergency preparedness and crisis 
management, with the ultimate aim of achieving a standardised, integrated and efficient 
response to all types of threats, risks, incidents and crises. It is also expected to offer 
specialised conferences, forums and workshops to foster academic, scientific and 
professional partnerships in cooperation with relevant local and foreign authorities and 
agencies to exchange expertise and to establish and develop a modern database that 
would serve as reference to professionals and specialists (NCEMA, 2014).  
Furthermore, and in line with the UAE’s strategy for emergency preparedness, the 
Environment Agency - Abu Dhabi (EAD) inaugurated its Emergency Operations Centre 
(EOC) in 2013. The EOC collaborates with NCEMA and in many respects strengthens 
its position and expertise. It is thus heavily involved with risk analysis, scenario 
planning, provision of advice to executive emergency authorities, potential on-site crisis 
inspection, and direct line communication with key stakeholders. It does, however, 
work predominately on Abu Dhabi crisis issues and serves as a training centre to build 
emergency response capacities among the EAD staff (EAD, 2013). Dubai, meanwhile, 
was the venue for the 2014 International Emergency and Catastrophe Management 
Conference & Exhibition (IECM). The objective of the event was to support capacity 
building during an emergency situation. Through new practices, methodologies and case 
studies, it focused on issues faced by, and trending topics within, the Emergency 
Management Sector extending across the community (IECM, 2014). For the energy 
sector, specifically, another key organisation is the International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA). It is headquartered in the UAE and is tasked with supporting the 
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building of resilience by diversifying the national energy matrix. The problem with 
these practices is that such conferences or international bodies have limited reach 
behind a small number of professionals, many of whom are international figures, in the 
industrial and the academic sphere. It is not enough to stage events or build 
headquarters. The government needs to work harder in ensuring that expert information 
is passed down to national actors for the benefit of Emirati development. It must 
facilitate communication and committees that serve to break down, not act as barriers. 
2.5.4 Existing Barriers to Emirati Disaster Preparation and Resilience  
The barriers in the UAE to disaster preparation and resilience are influenced, as in the 
case of any country, by a multitude of factors including external and internal influences 
on personal behaviour. 
Specific to the UAE, Jones (2011) talks about one key attitude of entitlement rather than 
responsibility, which could affect the level of disaster preparation and resilience. Many 
Emirati citizens look to the State to deal with disaster and many other related aspects 
and do little in the way to proactively manage their own personal level of risk to a 
particular threat. In short, people either blame somebody else or feel there is nothing 
they can do. They do not assume personal responsibility (Bohm and Pfister, 2001). As 
Ayubi (1995, p319) asserts, instead of the State taxing the citizen, then, the citizen is 
seen as taxing the State. This barrier is one of expectation and a lack of participation 
from the grassroots level, given that everything is expected from the top down.  
2.5.4.1 Disaster Education 
To raise the skill base of Emirati society and to advance in the general direction of 
public policy, student and school performance and quality must be raised to 
international standards (Asimakopoulou, 2010). The first national media reporting of 
the Dubai Health Authority’s Disaster Management Committee’s call for disaster 
education, with emphasis on mitigation, at the school level was in 2010 (Saseendran, 
2010). Yet by 2015, there had been no reported progress outside conferences and small 
meetings. Literature in English and in Arabic relating to education and disaster is 
notable by its absence. 
59 
 
2.5.4.2 Awareness 
According to ACNielson (2007), only 16 percent of Emirate nationals are aware of 
climate change and global warming and even fewer are concerned. This statistic is 
perhaps not surprising, given the distinct lack of scientific literature and knowledge 
concerning the UAE climate. ScienceDirect and other academic databases indicate that 
the few English journals available on the subject arguably remain as limited, incomplete 
and scattered as they were in the 1990s (Boer, 1997). The availability of Arabic 
literature is considerably lower. This does not reflect the fact that the region is 
extremely susceptible to mass scale lifestyle changes in addition to economic and 
ecological devastation due to its geographical position, high levels of consumerism, 
unsustainable primary energy consumption (Kazim, 2007) and reliance on the energy 
market, as the reader has seen throughout. 
The issue of limited education having a detrimental effect on disaster preparation and 
management is something which extends to the professional sphere.  Loney et al. (2012) 
use the example of cement workers provided with masks to protect themselves from 
dust, only 12 percent of whom are trained in when and how to use them. Many third 
world expatriate workers have reported (i) a lack awareness of the negative health 
consequences of  specific occupational hazards; and/or (ii) not having been  trained in, 
or not perceiving the benefits of adhering to specific health and safety requirements, 
such as the use of appropriate personal protective equipment (Loney et al., 2012, 
p.299).  
A further issue related to disaster management is that many people in the Middle East, 
as followers of Islam, believe in the idea that life events (i.e. one’s destiny) are written 
in advance (Aw, 2010) as reflected by the commonly used term “inshallah” or “if God 
wills”. The concept of God’s Will means that directing people to take precautions when 
working in occupations which demand health, safety, environmental or disaster 
management has cultural and religious sensitivities that do not generally apply to the 
Western world (Loney et al., 2012). 
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Finally, a major consideration in terms of energy sector resilience is the limited 
application of renewable energy solutions, with the exception of the concentrated solar 
panel.  
2.5.4.3 Renewable Energy Integration within the National Grid 
Renewable energy has an important role in the development of a more secure energy 
sector, sustainable economy and resilient community. When larger conventional power 
plants fail, following an earthquake for example, the distributed form of energy that 
comes from solar and wind farms etc can play a part in keeping the lights on in those 
urban areas affected by a disaster. The ability to keep important facilities such as 
hospitals or emergency service locations working then further reduces the risk of 
indirect casualties or fatalities. Urban energy networks are particularly vulnerable 
during and after a disaster due to their geographic density and interconnectivity. Power 
outages caused in the U.S. by hurricanes Katrina and Sandy contaminated local water 
supplies, stopped telecommunications, and disrupted the availability of petrol and 
diesel, which then had an impact on the transportation of further goods and services 
(Leavitt and Keifet, 2006). Alternative energy options could have reduced the size of 
the resilience triangle in these communities.  
Renewable energy is an important alternative in the energy matrix because it does not 
require the transport of fuels to generate electricity. During an earthquake it is not just 
roads but gas/oil pipelines that can become damaged or ruptured. This means that even 
if a centralised oil power plant has not been directly affected, it will not, after a disaster, 
be able to support the system. In fact, it will simply become another problem to solve.  
A dip in power due to the inability of a plant to stay online can cause immediate issues, 
given that it is a time consuming and costly procedure to bring base load installations 
back into working condition. Further blackouts can then occur creating further 
implications throughout the grid. More people are likely to be affected by a lack of 
electricity. As Panfil (2014) states, renewable energy does not only feed into the grid. It 
can also operate independently as a micro-grid and continue to supply electricity even 
when the rest of the system is down. This autonomous energy is then used locally. This 
is why further coverage of wind, solar and waste to energy technologies should become 
a priority for a well-developed and resilient disaster mitigation strategy, policy and plan. 
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The UAE has a strong potential to capture energy from renewable technologies. The 
most important resource is solar. The country has an average horizontal irradiance of 
2100-2300 kWh/m
2
, and clear skies some 80-90 percent of the time (ReCREMA, 2013). 
Despite this, in 2010 renewable energy did not contribute at all to the UAE’s primary 
energy mix and was almost negligible in the secondary (Matsumoto, 2013). Abu Dhabi 
chose subsequently to make important and highly publicised investments into renewable 
energy technology in order to tackle natural gas shortages and issues surrounding the 
underproduction of electricity on the domestic front. The city’s overall goal is to 
produce 2.5% of its total power by renewable means. Such a percentage is not 
particularly notable on a global scale. Austria, for instance, produces 78% of its 
electricity via clean energies (Krane, 2014). It is however notable in the Middle East, 
especially in the case of a country that is not obligated by United Nations to cut carbon 
emissions. The UAE government plans to cut the latter, via renewables, by 30 percent 
(Abu Ali, 2012). Shams 1, the world largest concentrated solar project, at 100 MW, is 
located in Abu Dhabi and is expected to power 20,000 homes (Saadi, 2014). Shams 2 
and Shams 3 are two future projects that are to add a further 150 MW to installed 
capacity. Other solar projects involving rooftops are also key aspects of the 
government’s goal to build upon the previously installed 10 MW solar photovoltaic 
project at Masdar (ReCREMA, 2013). Apart from Masdar, the fact that IRENA is 
headquartered in the UAE shows that the government is moving in the right direction.  
Despite these obvious benefits, renewable energy alternatives must overcome various 
barriers. One of them is the question of directives, legislation, regulatory and financial 
systems that have evolved to promote, or at least facilitate, the development of the 
conventional energy options at the detriment to renewable innovation and adoption. 
Another issue, and perhaps interconnected, is the evident confusion over and lack of 
understanding when it comes to renewable energy options for electricity and/or heat 
production. Lack of training opportunities, even for energy sector workers, sector and 
public awareness and day to day dealings with renewables also means that the benefits 
of such technologies are not fully realised or even that they remain unknown. This, then 
in turn, increases the perceived risks of replacing or supporting oil and gas with solar 
panels, wind turbines etc. Media miscommunication, inaccuracy of information and 
lobbying have also slowed the uptake of renewable energy and created, in some cases,  
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public or sector apathy for alternative technologies. Political/economic strategy and 
limited transparency has also not helped matters, particularly in the UAE (Kumetat, 
2014; UK House of Commons 2005; Assmann, 2012). 
2.5.5 Strategic Mitigation Planning in UAE 
The first of ten defined objectives for NCEMA (2007) on its establishment as a federal 
entity under the jurisdiction of the Supreme National Security, the lead national 
authority responsible for managing and coordinating emergencies and crises in the 
UAE, as stated on the organisation’s webpage, was the following,: 
Participating in, and supervising the preparation and coordination of, strategic plans to 
manage emergencies and crises and take all necessary measures in order to implement 
these plans in cooperation with organizations that have key responsibilities – NCEMA 
(2007)  
In addition, the UAE Government (2011) stated the need for a national government 
strategy and direction to: 
Respond effectively to climate change and environmental hazards by mitigating and 
adapting to the impact of climate change, ensuring compliance with the UAE’s 
international environmental obligations, ensuring an effective response to UAE-specific 
environmental challenges, and improving food security (UAE Government Strategy, 
2011-2013, p.15) 
Strategic mitigation planning has therefore been at the forefront of Emirati politics and 
actions since 2007, and is something which is continuing into 2020. Whilst there 
appears to be both policy and political support for strategic planning for disaster 
mitigation, there is very little in the way of detailed information or practical steps which 
could make this policy drive a practical reality on the ground. There is also, apart from 
the author’s own publications (Al Khaili and Pathirage, 2014), no updated information 
post the 2011-2013 Government Strategy. This is why, as discussed in depth in Chapter 
5 and 6, this thesis plays a key role in enhancing disaster management and strategic 
planning for the Emirati energy sector. 
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2.6 Chapter Summary 
This section states the issues of disaster management and the building of resilience 
within the context of the Emirati energy sector. It first involves a discussion on the 
theory, concepts and tools used, including how a disaster is defined and classified and 
how different disasters can be collectively classified into phases which can be managed 
according to the disaster management cycle. The literature review then becomes more 
specific, developing a discussion on resilience, strategic management, and critical 
infrastructure and energy facilities within the Emirati context. The review then turns to 
those phenomena, both natural and manmade, which cause vulnerability within the 
national (and regional) energy sector infrastructure including tectonic activity, climate 
change, nuclear energy, terrorism and war. The literature review finally looks at the 
barriers to disaster preparation and resilience, such as a lack of understanding of 
renewable technologies, through the lens of cultural and religious sensitivities and 
expectations. This review feeds into the framework development of Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3:  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
This chapter uses the information presented in the previous chapter to put forward a 
conceptual framework that would help to mitigate disasters within the Emirati energy 
sector. This will subsequently be modified in line with the results reported in Chapter 5 
and converted into a final framework in Chapter 6. 
The purpose of a framework for disaster risk management and mitigation is to reduce 
the underlying risk factors and to prepare for and respond to a disaster event, when and 
if it should occur. The focus of this framework, as with the literature review, is the pre-
disaster phase. Actions in this phase aim to improve community capacity and disaster 
resilience through prevention, i.e. avoidance, or where this is not possible, mitigation, 
i.e. limiting the impact of adverse effects and providing timely and reliable hazard 
forecasts. As one moves on to the response phase, the focus changes to one of saving 
lives and property. In the post-disaster phase, the focus changes once more to recovery 
and rehabilitation.  
This chapter should therefore form the basis of a public and institutional commitment, 
including organisational capacities, policy and legislative development and community 
action, as well as environmental management, land-use, urban planning, protection of 
critical energy facilities, research and development, and partnership and networking, 
through a tripartite committee. The framework,  through that committee, should have 
the scope to provide space for traditional communities to be involved constructively and 
to take ownership of the strategic disaster mitigation plan, thus diminishing excessive or 
unnecessary dependency generated by relief offered by those from outside the 
community or even outside the UAE. 
The data analysis presented in Chapter 5 will allow this draft framework to be amended 
and support the development of a final strategic disaster mitigation plan (Figure 6.1) to 
be presented to the Ministry of Energy, amongst others.  
3.1 Constructing a Strategic Disaster Framework 
Sekaran (2003) defines a strategic framework as “a conceptual model of logical sense of 
the relationships among the several factors that have been identified as important to the 
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problem”. Fisher (2007) mentions that the relationship between a literature review and a 
framework is that the former provides the raw materials from which the latter is built or 
developed (as in the case of this research). Saunders et al. (2009) indicate that a 
framework helps organise and direct data collection and analysis (as this research does). 
Furthermore, Fisher (2007) points out that a framework prepares and helps undertake 
research findings, and gives a sense of control over the research.  
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2014), in a press release 
entitled Towards a Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, discusses the 
need to improve conceptual disaster frameworks in order to enhance disaster risk 
management. One of the key considerations is how disaster risk management, 
particularly full risk assessments, can contribute to national (and regional) development. 
Risk reduction and resilience building must come from integrated development 
mechanisms that include all societal members. Any real tackling of disaster, from its 
roots, must “incorporate national public investment planning systems, social protection, 
and national and local infrastructure investments” (UNISDR, 2014, clause no. 14). The 
design and answering of the questionnaires and interviews should identify where there 
are weaknesses in planning and local infrastructure investments, so that resilience in all 
its forms—technical, organisational, social and economic—can be enhanced. 
3.1.1 How should strategic planning be considered in a framework to develop a 
plan for the mitigation of disaster in the Emirati energy sector? 
In Chapter 2, the terms “strategy” and “strategic planning” and their application within a 
disaster management context are evaluated. The purpose of strategic planning is to 
reduce the possibility of a natural event or manmade hazards impacting the Emirati 
energy sector. It defines directions and plays an integral role in the making of decisions 
for the allocation of the necessary resources (human and monetary capital). This type of 
planning also identifies strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, leading to 
various benefits, including improved organisational performance, the development of 
teamwork and expertise, the amendment of inherent organisational issues and the 
establishment of clarified norms and priorities - all of which clearly serve to advance 
disaster management and emergency response (Bryson and Delbecq, 1979). Doherty 
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(2008, p33) identified five steps in putting together a strategic plan for disaster 
management: 
1. Identify the targets – Who might be affected and who might not? 
2. Type of help – What assistance do they need? 
3. Timing – When will assistance be most useful and when will circumstances 
allow assistance? 
4. Theme – What are the themes, issues, concerns and threats that should be 
considered in order to build and plan the right intervention package? What has 
already happened and what will happen in connection with the incident? 
5. Team and Resources – What resources will it take to provide the right 
interventions at the right time(s)? 
In a conceptual disaster framework, and in order to answer the above questions, it is 
important to clarify the definitions of those terms that are used in the disaster discipline. 
In the previous chapter, the literature review, the reader was introduced to the concepts 
of hazards (manmade and natural), risk, vulnerability and disaster resilience. These 
interrelated—and perhaps even competing—conceptualisations and terminologies are 
particularly problematic in a discipline such as disaster theory, which incorporates 
various other sub-disciplines and is characterised by considerable collaboration between 
scholars from many different research traditions, including risk assessment, climate 
science, sustainable development, economics and policy (Fussel, 2006). It is thus of the 
utmost importance that these practitioners (frequently exposed to disaster theory) and 
the general public (ignorant of it) understand a common language, so as not to create 
general tensions and cause communication breakdown. Once a common language has 
been decided, those involved in disaster management can operate more effectively and 
efficiently.  
3.2 Key Components of the Framework 
A solid disaster framework will need to consider the exact nature, not just the definition, 
of hazards and vulnerabilities, critical energy infrastructure, barriers as discovered in the 
data analysis and latent issues that can affect the four measures of resilience, as listed by 
Chang and Shinozuka (2004):  
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 Technical resilience refers to how well physical systems perform.  
 Organisational resilience refers to the ability of organisations to respond to 
emergencies and carry out critical functions. 
 Social resilience refers to the capacity to reduce the negative societal 
consequences of loss of critical services.  
 Economic resilience refers to the capacity to reduce both direct and indirect 
economic losses. 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework for improving energy sector disaster resilience. 
3.2.1 Hazards and Vulnerabilities 
Any conceptual framework must introduce the natural and manmade hazards likely to 
be faced by a given community. In this thesis, most of this information will come from 
the secondary sources included in Chapter 2. Any primary information will come from 
the carefully selected members of a tripartite committee. This committee should include 
members of civil society as well as established members of the government and key 
individuals within the energy and associated industries. A productive and ultimately 
successful tripartite body will convene when necessary. Fundamentally, it is established 
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to provide actors from each of the three positions who can contribute to a national 
forum, that is to say, a platform upon which the country can solve or at least mitigate a 
given set of problems that have been identified in areas from policy to social action 
(Casale, 1999). All of those involved must agree clear definitions of the terms used 
within the discipline, as has been explained in Chapter 2 and then in this one. 
Probability calculations and past occurrences should be discussed, along with current 
and future concerns such as those linked with anthropogenic global warming. The 
framework and the subsequent final disaster mitigation plan will direct the tripartite 
committee to look at all such hazards, natural and manmade, and the interactions 
between them. It will also look at the geographical dimension of hazards, recognising 
that they can occur on an international, national, sub-national or local scale. 
3.2.2 Critical Infrastructure 
Any disaster framework for the energy sector must identify the critical infrastructure. 
These considerations can be amended in the final strategic mitigation plan, as key 
information from the data collection and analysis comes to light (please refer to Chapter 
6). 
In Chapter 2, critical energy infrastructure was shown to have a broad definition. It was 
said to include any: 
“… physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication 
networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, 
would significantly impact on the nation or affect its ability to ensure national security” 
[p30]. 
Critical infrastructure is not an easily definable physical object but rather an indefinable 
network, not confined to boundaries. This lack of boundaries means that critical energy 
infrastructure should not be seen only as that which exists within the conceptual walls 
of “energy generation”. There can be no true sense of ownership when the “parts” of a 
network often, if not always, constitute more than one sector and are critical to many 
societal functions, not just those related to power production. All parts make up the 
whole and it takes a holistic perspective to fully immerse oneself in the real concept of 
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critical infrastructure. That said, whilst an infrastructural network may be neither 
definable nor confined, a thesis is by definition bound by a scope that takes into 
consideration the researcher’s and participants’ resources and time. Here in this 
framework, it will be the energy sector managers who identify the most critical aspects 
of infrastructure, their jobs and functions.  
If the idea that no single part is more important than any other - given that the failure of 
one will still affect the whole system- is the one that most readily resonates with disaster 
theorists and those involved in energy production management, any strategy and 
mitigation plan must likewise construct all future contingencies on that basis. That is 
not to say, however, that more resources should not be in place to protect the most 
expensive, delicate or complex installations. It would be counterproductive or even 
impossible, to afford the same level of protection and financial input one gives to a gas 
turbine, to the safeguarding of a single cable. In a disaster mitigation framework there 
should be a weighted comparison provided as to the importance of each part and a cost-
benefit analysis undertaken to evaluate the most appropriate division of resources 
(human, financial, etc) so as to best support optimal performance of the electricity grid 
and the energy sector.  
A cost-benefit analysis is a planning process most readily associated with the decision 
to commit (or not commit) funds or assets. According to Bennett (2007, p.323), it is a 
systematic attempt to measure or analyse the value of all the benefits that would be 
achieved from a particular expenditure. This expenditure can take various forms. In any 
case, it typically involves three steps – 1) the identification of all direct and indirect 
consequences of a given expenditure, 2) the assignation of a price (monetary value) to 
all costs and benefits resulting from that expenditure and 3) the discounting of potential 
costs and savings that have occurred as a result of that expenditure. 
A cost-benefit analysis should be combined with a more quantitative model based 
approach for risk analysis. The latter is comprised of risk assessment and risk 
management. The former refers to the measuring of risk, taking into account 
probabilities, system vulnerability and expected damage. The latter involves the process 
of selecting counter measures and modelling their impact on risk reduction (Setola and 
Geretshuber, 2009). 
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An interpretation of a risk model would still have to occur but value judgements are, 
following a modelling procedure, more likely to be uniform and perhaps even better 
understood and replicable at other sites. For example, in taking into consideration data 
relating to historical records, and in analytically determining measurable consequences 
such as time of service interruption and the number of people injured, decisions are 
more likely to reflect the seriousness of any given implication and not excessive 
individual concern or whim. Modelling has the added benefit of fine tuning and 
relatively “easy” updates and amendments as more data becomes available.  
A lack of data makes it more difficult not only to model the effects of disaster but also 
account for losses and investment decisions. Energy sector management can defend 
with vigour their investment decisions if they can show some logic. Governments and 
private sector actors can only show a logical chain of decisions once they are able to 
take ownership of their assets and identify through a suitable form of risk analysis that 
which is most vulnerable. 
According to Butts and Shenoi (2014), a good risk analysis should be able to show any 
professional exposed to a hazard, the current risk levels, how and why the cost-benefit 
analysis decisions have been taken, their effect on risk reduction across multiple assets 
and at multiple hierarchal levels, including management and the changes in resilience 
over time. Most of the information required to do this is generically available, in any 
number of case studies from across the globe. After determining the definition of critical 
energy sector, one must consider the role of disaster risk management and how this 
supports sustainable development. 
3.2.3 Barriers to Improving Disaster Resilience 
The section on barriers and the TOSE measures of resilience will discuss disasters of all 
types, both natural and manmade. The former are classified as those linked to tectonic 
activity (earthquake, tsunami) and to atmospheric phenomena (shamal, climate change, 
dust storms), while the latter are those associated with environmental concerns, nuclear 
energy, war and crime. More specifically, this section will consider the following 
points, which could affect the level of disaster preparation and resilience: 
71 
 
- The fact that many Emirati citizens look to the State to deal with disasters and 
many other related matters, while doing little to proactively manage their own 
personal levels of risk to particular threats;  
- Disaster education and training; 
- Disaster awareness; 
- Renewable energy integration within the national grid. 
This discussion will be developed further in light of the data presented and analysed in 
Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
3.3 High Level Community-Based Dialogue: First Priority, Three Way Process 
The first step in a comprehensive disaster framework should be the development of a 
dialogue. For high level communications to be successful, all the important actors in the 
public and private sector must be invited to participate and the logistics of this must be 
considered at this stage of the draft framework so that decisions are not restricted to 
those solely in the energy sector, given that its infrastructure and energy provision do 
not operate in isolation. In fact, as aforementioned, any structures involved in electricity 
generation constitute more of a network than a physically defined boundary. Thus, for 
resilience to be built, cooperation must be prioritised at all government levels and across 
company policies. Meetings need to be scheduled in order to create dialogue and trust. 
The issues presented in Chapter 2, along those which will become clear following the 
data presented and analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, must be shared if one is to 
bring about real change.  
For a tripartite council to function “properly” and to ensure all voices are heard, all three 
components must be equally represented. This may, but does not have to necessarily, 
mean that if there are three government members, there are also three from the private 
sector and three from civil society.  Tripartite cooperation is not however a “numbers 
game”. All parties must be strong enough to carry out their functions and roles 
effectively and decisively. There needs to be structure, and representatives must have 
not only technical capacity and theoretical knowledge, but also the commitment to drive 
the process forward (ILO, 2000). It is also about finding a balance and common ground 
between the interests and needs of all the representatives involved. 
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To take two of the three parties of a tripartite body thus formed - civil society and the 
government - both the State and its citizens can benefit from the construction of a 
network connecting them and a series of mediating steps.  Government programmes, 
including but not limited to disaster mitigation, are enhanced when the government 
interacts with organised groups of people. Civil society also benefits as it finds power 
and when it acts as a means to mobilise social capital and meet development objectives 
(Krishna, 2001). As the reader has seen, sustainable development and good disaster 
management policies and practices go hand in hand. A working relationship between 
the two concepts relies on strong bonds of trust and dialogue, and these in turn create 
and maintain social capital. According to Krishna and Prewitt (2000, p4): 
  Social capital in this reckoning has both a cognitive dimension - consisting of 
norms, values, attitudes and beliefs that predispose people toward collective action - 
and a structural dimension, composed of formal or informal organizations that 
facilitate collective action for achieving some common objective. 
An important common objective would be the safety and prosperity of a community 
well-rehearsed, informed and subsequently resilient when it comes to facing disaster. 
Some authors, such as Hamada (2014), argue that for the effective reduction of natural 
disasters, tripartite elements are indispensable. The author is not surprised by this view. 
After all, industry is an important partner given that its designs, innovations and 
implementations are just as responsible for a building not falling in the event of an 
earthquake, as a government is when it puts into place policies to protect its citizens and 
infrastructure. Academics, themselves part of civil society, who advise on policymaking 
also have their role and responsibility. Therefore quite clearly: 
The task of mitigating the effects of natural disasters is not restricted to the fields of 
science such as seismology, geology and engineering… to effectively confront this 
challenge, those working in the fields of sociology, economics, humanities, information 
science and medical science must also be involved – Hamada (2014, p xiii). 
An Emirati tripartite council for disaster management must include government 
representatives and must not be limited to those working in the planning departments 
(national and local). This council should include the Critical National Infrastructure 
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Authority, the National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority, 
members of the Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Environment and Water, Ministry of 
Education especially the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, 
Ministry of Culture, Youth and Community Development and the national and local 
environmental authorities and law enforcement members. Industry associations and 
affiliations and key constructors already in the UAE, along with manufacturers of key 
energy generating equipment are members of the industrial sector. Inviting important 
innovators and providers in renewable energy technologies is also advisable, given the 
points discussed in this chapter. As for civil society members, there is the need to invite 
key community members, academics across the disciplines and institutions and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) normally involved in disaster relief operations. 
NGOs should be a combination of both international and national actors. All should be 
encouraged to share advice and build capacities. National examples include the Khalifa 
Bin Zayed Foundation, Zayed Bin Sultan Foundation, Dubai Cares, Dubai Charity 
Association, Human Appeal, and Fujairah Welfare Association. International options 
may include organisations such as the Red Crescent and the United Nations. 
Themes that need to be discussed and the rationales behind them, as supported by the 
collected data in the literature review and the primary data from the field, are presented 
in Table 3.1. The column “urgency” is a transitional concept whereby the tripartite 
council should not merely prioritise those elements considered highly urgent but go on 
to address those less urgent through them. 
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Table 3.1: Themes to be discussed in a tripartite disaster community in 
preparation for a final strategic disaster mitigation plan. Source: Author 
Themes Urgency Rationale 
Leadership in 
Disasters: 
Measuring 
Effectiveness 
and Strategies 
High  
Disaster management must be integrated into mainstream 
government operations if it is to be successful.  A leader’s 
capacity to collaborate effectively with disaster networks 
is essential. Frequent interaction, including participation 
in planning and training exercises, builds capacity and 
enables those in the highest positions to measure the 
effectiveness of strategies and actions (Waugh and Streib, 
2008). 
Risk 
Management, 
Reduction and 
Mass 
Communication 
High  
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), 
for example, can be used to support the practice of 
disaster risk management. They can be mass utilised in 
times of crisis, planning and reconstruction. Their 
potential stems from their ability to instantaneously 
connect vast networks of individuals and organisations 
across great geographic distances. This facilitates fast 
flows of information, capital, ideas, people and products 
(Crane and Phillips, 2014). All these are extremely 
necessary if a community is to become more resilient. 
Recovery: 
Defining, 
Planning, 
Measuring and 
Financing 
High 
Long term recovery from disastrous events is more of a 
central concern than ever before.  Pre-disaster recovery 
planning is likewise important. There is also the added 
pressure to combine recovery with economic 
development. It is also seen as a catalyst for the tackling 
of social and environmental issues, especially if they 
exacerbate or are exacerbated by a potential hazard. 
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Themes Urgency Rationale 
Disaster Law 
and Policies 
High 
Policies and legal frameworks are indispensable tools in 
addressing the threat of disaster. According to the 
collaborative effort by the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
(2011), empirical evidence has shown that, when well 
designed and adhered to, laws can focus and strengthen 
State efforts to prevent and respond to disasters. They can 
also empower communities and civil society 
organisations to contribute effectively to disaster 
management and resilience. On the other hand, when 
poorly prepared, legal and regulatory regimes can block 
and frustrate progress, contributing to, rather than 
reducing, the impact of disaster. 
Identification of 
Risk Groups: 
The vulnerable 
elements of 
society 
Medium 
Prioritising of resources and providing of support to those 
that are considered to be the most at risk ensures that 
disaster management is optimised through a well-
coordinated programme which minimises, monitors and 
controls the probability and/or impact of unfortunate 
events or maximises the realisation of opportunities. 
Community 
Resilience: 
Initiatives, 
engagement and 
recovery  
Medium 
Managing disasters efficiently and effectively begins and 
ends with communities. Those located in hazardous areas 
are not helpless victims of events outside their control. 
They may have limited options but if given opportunities, 
they can engage in initiatives that build resilience (UNV, 
2011). 
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Themes Urgency Rationale 
Behaviour 
change: 
Cultural, public 
and 
organizational 
Medium 
A good disaster risk reduction framework is composed of 
public commitment and institutional frameworks, 
including organisational policy, legislation and 
community action, along with public awareness, provides 
a good structure for behavioural change. 
Public awareness activities foster changes in behaviour, 
leading towards a culture of risk reduction. This typically 
involves public information, dissemination, education, 
radio or television broadcasts, use of print media, as well 
as the establishment of information centres and networks 
and community and participation actions (DMIB, 2015). 
 
Resilience in 
Infrastructure 
Medium 
A discourse in resilience needs to be developed and 
defined for critical infrastructures (such as the supply of 
basic services like water, food, energy, transport, 
housing/ shelter, communications, finance, health). The 
wider public should be integrated into the process to 
better address human and social dynamics in crises and 
disaster situations. Resilience concepts must lead to the 
anticipation, planning and the implementation of key 
strategies and processes throughout the disaster cycle. 
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Themes Urgency Rationale 
Local 
Government 
Initiatives 
Medium 
Virtually all disasters are experienced at the local level. In 
many cases any affected community will be isolated for 
up to 72 hours after the original impact. Thus, and 
although all levels of government are involved in disaster 
management, the role and actions of the local government 
is perhaps the most critical (Col, 2007). 
Empowering local governments and communities enables 
them to bring their skills, knowledge and experience to 
the forefront of disaster preparedness, response and 
recovery efforts (Queensland, 2013). 
Volunteers: 
Engagement, 
training and 
support 
Low 
Volunteers provide essential surge capacity and links to 
community resources (Waugh and Streib, 2008). 
During disaster, there is a heightened need for manpower. 
The planning of the recruitment and retaining of 
volunteers is essential. Better preparation results in a 
more effective response. A comprehensive volunteer 
management system must be developed. It must include a 
volunteer needs assessment, and a way to recruit, match, 
train, supervise and give recognition to volunteers 
(Wong, 2006). 
Innovation in 
Disaster 
Management 
and Governance 
Low  
 Innovative thinking in risk, crisis, and disaster 
management provides more successful ideas and action 
plans for dealing with these. Approaches could include 
delegated authority and exploitation of 'lay' knowledge 
(Bennett, 2012). 
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Themes Urgency Rationale 
New 
Technology and 
Social Media 
Low 
The advent and establishment of social media and 
networks, particularly in the Middle East, has led to 
progressively more freedoms, ill-afforded by the 
mainstream media. According to Jamali (2014), it has 
become an important and active means to express opinion 
and share knowledge among the general population. This 
can as, Potts (2013) points out, be an important tool in 
disaster management. 
Technological advances with good governance saves 
lives and limits destruction. Innovative options that the 
tripartite council may consider include early detection, 
warning, notification and command and control systems, 
erosion and other disaster prevention and control 
technologies, new roads and evacuation vehicles. 
According to Sutton (2013), drawing up an effective 
social media strategy and tweaking it to fit an emergency 
is a crucial part of preparedness planning. In addition, the 
public must be taught how to use social media effectively, 
how to get information from the Internet and to put out 
useful information. 
  
In addition to permanent members of the committee, there should also be expert 
consultants who join proceedings when it is necessary or when what they have to say is 
of added significance. Some of these experts may be international and well-known in 
their field. The input of a geotechnical expert would be valuable when a tectonic 
disaster has affected a power plant or when one is being designed and built to withstand 
such an event. Other important consultants may include PR leaders and those who work 
in the media. Citizens and newspaper reporters and informers have insight into a whole 
range of issues and typically have access to a wider social network. This is useful when 
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the committee needs to engage with a specific community. It may also be of value when 
there is a desire to disseminate information or even prepare a press release or initiate a 
social media campaign. This can be done in the form of a roster whereby key and 
trusted members of the local, national and international press operate as dual 
communication channels. They provide information to the committee, regarding 
conditions on the ground in the aftermath of a particular disaster and feed advice that 
reduces the immediate impact or helps build resilience in the long term.  
The initial five-year plan, say for 2016-2020, should form the baseline of a disaster 
mitigation programme. It should also be treated as a working document that is subject to 
updates as more information becomes available, according to a clearly stated and 
proactive timetable or Gantt chart. All stakeholders, i.e. those who are required to read 
and act on the plan or are simply affected by it, should be notified when it is revisited 
and reviewed. They must be informed as to who reviewed it, where exactly and for what 
purpose. Any major changes, substitutions or additions of sections and/or content must 
be made clear and communicated efficiently (Todaro, 2009). Such updates can be 
emailed, posted or presented in person as amendments or annexes. The exact means of 
communication will depend on the group or individual and should have been identified 
in the communication chapter or in a more comprehensive sister document. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined the practical knowledge needed to develop a draft strategic 
mitigation plan. This draft will be consolidated by the findings elaborated in Chapter 5 
and discussed in Chapter 6. The final strategic disaster mitigation plan will be 
elaborated on in Section 6.7. The present chapter has discussed some of its key 
elements, such as how it will be constructed and which content is significant. The latter 
includes the definition, explanation and typology of hazards and vulnerabilities, critical 
infrastructure and barriers to resilience in technical, organisational and economic terms.  
Finally, this chapter has looked at how high-level dialogue might occur, its mechanisms 
and the personnel needed to support it. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.0 Introduction  
Research methodology is considered as a key element in any thesis. It refers to the 
selection and use of a certain philosophy, strategy and techniques for data collection and 
analysis (Collis and Hussey, 2009; Chandler, 2006).The research aim and objectives are 
the main issues that determine a suitable research methodology (Saunders, et al., 2009). 
The uniqueness of disaster theory and its methodology is not the knowledge obtained in 
the research, or even the instrumentation of methodology, but rather the unique set of 
circumstances in which otherwise conventional methods are applied. Any disaster 
researcher must consider not only research methods but also how the circumstances 
surrounding disaster affect the implementation of these methods (Stallings, 1997).  
This chapter investigates the types of philosophies, approaches, strategies and 
techniques of data collection used in this present research. Subsequently, this part of the 
thesis describes the interview protocol and the validity and reliability of the analysis 
employed in achieving the aims and objectives set out in the first chapter.   
4.1 Research Methodology 
According to Connaway and Powell (2010, p1), research methodology is a “method of 
study by which, through the careful and exhaustive investigation of all ascertainable 
evidence bearing upon a definable problem, one can reach a solution to that problem”. 
Methodology is an established logical and systematic process of achieving certain ends 
with exactness and efficacy, commonly in an ordered sequence of fixed steps (Business 
Dictionary, 2014). Likewise, Hanze University (2014) defines research as the 
purposeful and methodological search of new knowledge and practical solutions in the 
form of answers to questions formulated beforehand. 
Saunders et al. (2009) describe research methodology as an ‘onion’ with six layers, as 
shown in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1. The external layer is the research philosophy, the 
second layer is the research approach, the third is the research strategy, the fourth the 
choices made, the fifth the time horizons and the sixth data collection and analysis 
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(Figure 4.1). It is one of the widely accepted frameworks that can be used to clarify a 
methodological position. Its multiple layers become progressively more detailed as one 
moves from the outer to the inner layer. Wedawatta (2011) affirms that it is important to 
consider these layers in determining what methodology to adopt for a particular study. 
Subsequent sections describe these layers and their relevance to this research.   
Table 4.1: The breakdown of the research onion. Source Saunders et al. (2009)  
Layer Approaches 
1.Research Philosophy Positivism ,Interpretivism (Or Phenomenology), Realism 
2.Research Approach Deductive , Inductive 
3.Research Strategy Experiment, Survey, Case Study, Ground Theory, 
Ethnography, Action Research 
4.Time Horizons Cross Section, Longitudinal 
5.Data Collection 
Methods 
Sampling, Secondary Data, Observation ,Interviews, 
Questionnaires 
6.Research Choice Mono-Method, Multi-Method, Mixed Method 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The research onion Source: Saunders et al. (2009) 
 
This research examines the resilience of UAE’s energy sector, and aims to develop a 
framework to facilitate the improved resilience of its energy infrastructure facilities by 
developing a strategic disaster mitigation plan. In order to understand the components of 
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the energy sector (from key electricity plants, network equipment and final users) of key 
Emirate states, it needs a research methodology to describe the overall approach used to 
generate new knowledge, based on the appropriate philosophy. The next section sets out 
the research philosophy adopted here. 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
Saunders et al. (2009) argue that research philosophy reflects the way the researcher 
thinks about the development of knowledge. Likewise, Yin (2009) and Collis and 
Hussey (2009) state that there is no definite rule of which philosophy to select when 
doing research. It all depends on the nature and scope of the thesis, research aim, 
objectives, research questions and source of data collection. 
Saunders et al. (2009), Collis and Hussey (2009), Easterby-Smith et al. (2004) and 
Hussey and Hussey (1997) attest that there are two main research philosophies in social 
sciences: positivism and interpretivism. However, before defining theses stances, an 
author must know the philosophy behind it; that is to say, its ontology, epistemology 
and axiology. 
4.2.1 Ontology  
Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality. It is a general set of assumptions about 
what is reality (knowledge) (Aouad, 2011). It is a concept concerned with the existence 
of, and relationship between, different aspects of social actors, cultural norms and social 
structures (Jupp, 2006).   
In a philosophical sense, it is the study of the nature of being, becoming, existence and 
the concept of “reality”.  Audi (1995) refers to ontology, as the study of explaining 
reality by breaking it down into concepts, relations and rules. In positivist philosophy 
the reality is objective, structured and external to the researcher, as in the field of natural 
sciences, consequently, there is only one reality experienced by us all (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009; Sutrisna, 2009). However, Sutrisna (2009) and Collis and Hussey (2009) 
argue that interpretivism states that the world holds an unknowable reality, as in the 
field of social sciences, where every person has his/her own sense of reality. Therefore, 
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interpretivists believe that there are multiple realities because reality is socially 
constructed by people differently (Aouad, 2010).  
In the context of knowledge sharing, which is one of the fundamental pillars of 
successful disaster management, ontology according to Grolinger et al. (2011, p2) is: A 
formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptualisation that provides a common 
understanding of information. They also provide a way of representing human 
knowledge, making it readable and understandable. This, in turn, represents the basis 
for achieving semantic interoperability. 
In other words, and according to Gruber (1992), ontology is a description of the 
concepts and relationships that can exist for an actor or a community of actors. 
Pragmatically, a common ontology defines the vocabulary with which queries and 
assertions are exchanged among actors. Ontological commitments are thus agreements 
made, so those involved use shared terms in a coherent and consistent manner.  
Ontology can thus, as stated by Wache et al. (2001), be used to reveal both implicit and 
hidden knowledge. Understanding and constructing a consensus ontological stance has 
its obvious benefits in disaster management. Confusions leading to hesitations or even 
prevention of a given action may hold grave consequences including fatalities. 
The ontology followed in this thesis is interpretivism: the world is produced and 
reinforced by humans through their actions and interactions, which are observed in their 
true settings, in this case in energy-generating plants in the UAE. 
4.2.2 Epistemology  
Epistemological assumptions are a general set of assumptions about how researchers 
obtain and accept knowledge (reality) about the world (Sexton, 2008). This involves the 
theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, the validity of that 
knowledge and the possible ways of gaining it (Sutrisna, 2009). Thus, epistemology 
involves the ways in which knowledge is generated, taught, learnt and assimilated by 
those who operate on the ground (McEntire and Marshall, 2003).  
Epistemology concerns the nature, definition and limitations of that knowledge with 
concepts such as belief, memory, certainty, justification and evidence (Cooper, 1999; 
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Floridi, 1996). It considers the creation and dissemination of knowledge within a certain 
context or discourse. It is therefore the study of knowledge and justified belief. 
Consequently, epistemology is concerned with the following types of questions 
(Stanford University 2005): 
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? 
What is its structure, and what are its limits? How are we to understand the concept of 
justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external 
to one's own mind?  
In other words, epistemology uncovers the strengths and weaknesses of values, 
assumptions and methods relied upon for theory development (McEntire and Marshall 
2003).  
The paradigm adhered to in this thesis is interpretivism, with a strong focus on social 
actor-constructed meaning and methodologies that yield qualitative data. There is 
however mixed methodologies applied with lean interpretivists not ruling out the use of 
surveys and Likert scales within the questionnaire. The strengths of quantitative and 
qualitative methods can be combined to bring synergy and robustness to the work 
presented. 
Both the survey and the interview will pose qualitative and quantitative questions. As 
the aim of research is to enhance resilience within the UAE’s critical energy 
infrastructure,  and given that individuals give their externality meaning in the specific 
context where they are found, it is more appropriate to lean towards interpretivism for 
the ontological and epistemological framework.  The qualitative responses will however 
be quantitatively “coded” and grouped together, according to the similarity of 
responses. Such data is validated through the positivistic style line of questioning. Table 
3.2 shows the distinctions between qualitative and quantitative methods which are also 
detailed below. 
4.2.3 Axiological assumptions 
Axiological assumption is concerned with the role of values. Value, or the concepts of 
“good” or “bad”,  implies the assignation of a social definition which itself is subject to 
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the surrounding phenomena. Such phenomena will be deemed to be either beneficial, 
neutral or detrimental to Man and the society that mankind has created. To any given 
individual or group of individuals, “value” serves a given interest. That is to say if 
someone has no interest in something, that same something will be of no value. 
Subsequently the attitude expressed will also depend on that value. 
In short, according to Permilovskiy (2012), a value always exists and depends on the 
subject. Furthermore, an axiological assessment will measure the quality of an 
“evaluative judgment” or the idea that in judging something one also expresses a feeling 
of “like” or “dislike”, “importance” or “unimportance”. 
In positivist research, the researcher declares that research is value-free from any 
influences from society, ethics, and politics and unbiased, because positivists consider 
that they are independent from what they are researching (Collis and Hussey, 2009). On 
the other hand, interpretivists believe that the process of research is value laden, which 
means that the researcher is involved with that which is being researched (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). 
The application of axiology in disaster management lends itself to a paper by Hartman 
(1967) where he took the classic study of axiology and developed the branch “formal 
axiology”. This branch uses mathematical tools – calculus to measure how judgments 
are made and gives a quantitative aspect to the otherwise subjective term “good”.  
According to the CAVS (2014) (Centre of Applied Valued Science) there are three 
dimensions of value that are: 
Intrinsic: These values are unique to each conscious being and are linked to that given 
being’s individual feelings and character. 
Extrinsic:  Refers to the everyday physical world of functions, processes, activities and 
objects that can be compared to each other, like houses, sports or jobs – those that exist 
outside of the “self”. 
Systemic: This dimension is for complete concepts that exist as a whole i.e. Systems of 
thought, ideologies and philosophies. Systemic concepts include things like ideas, 
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music, mathematics, plans, organisation, statements, structure, graphs, judgments and 
propositions. 
These three components of “value” will determine what a government or organisation 
sees, in the words of Immanuel Kant, as its moral “sense of duty” or ethical code. This, 
in turn, will dictate how a country or public/private entity responds to a disaster and 
how the consequences of that disaster are to be managed. Subsequently the axiology 
followed here in this thesis is that of formal axiology. 
Furthermore, one cannot deny that the researcher’s own values are present in the choice 
of research area, formulation of research questions, selection of methods and 
techniques, implementation of data collection, the analysis and interpretation of data 
and conclusions (Bryman, 2008). It is therefore reasonable to state that the research 
presented in this thesis is value-laden. 
4.2.4 Positivism and Interpretivism 
Sutrisna (2009) declares that positivists support the application of methods of natural 
science to the study of reality and beyond, as the ‘truth’ is out there to be discovered (by 
the researcher). Positivists desire the use of statistical analysis of data collected by 
large-scale empirical surveys and controlled experiments and formulating hypotheses 
and then testing them (Amaratunga et al., 2002). It maintains an independent and 
objective stance (Table 4.2). These assumptions are commonly found in research studies 
in the natural sciences (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
In contrast, interpretivists concentrate on the meaning rather than the measurement of 
social reality, because they focus on understanding the phenomena (reality) in depth to 
find out  answers to the questions such as why, what and how (Collis and Hussey, 
2009).  Besides, under the philosophy of interpretivism, the researcher is a part of what 
is being researched and is not independent of it (Sutrisna, 2009; Remenyi et al., 1998). 
Consequently, interpretivists consider that reality can only be interpreted. These 
assumptions are commonly found in the field of social sciences, which is concerned 
with the activities and behaviour of people (Table 4.2).  Also, the process of inquiry in 
the social sciences can influence both researchers and those participating in the research 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009).  
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Collis and Hussey (2009) provide a summary description of the philosophical 
assumptions under the two main philosophies. 
Table 4.2: Assumptions of the main philosophies. Source: Collis and Hussey (2009) 
Philosophical assumption Positivism Interpretivism 
Ontological assumption 
(the nature of reality) 
Reality is objective and 
singular, separate from the 
research 
Reality is subjective and 
multiple, as seen by the 
participants 
Epistemological assumption 
(what constitutes valid 
knowledge) 
Researcher is independent 
of that being researched  
Researcher interacts with 
that being researched 
Axiological assumption (the role 
of values) 
Research is value-free and 
unbiased 
Researcher acknowledges 
that research is value laden 
and biases are present 
 
The nature of the disaster theory field and its application means that various research 
approaches can be applied – ranging from strongly positivist which entails disaster 
statistics and a quantitative universal measure of disaster, as discussed by Gad-El-Hak 
(2008), to a more interpretivists view of disaster as a semantic construction (Boin and 
Hart, 2007) requiring qualitative analysis. The qualitative sociological connection to 
disaster is explained by Mileti (1987, p69): ‘from a methodological point of view, 
disaster research is hardly distinguishable from the general sociological enterprise’. 
However, the positive approach to disaster management is not frequently used, as 
disaster management is political in nature and issues of these types interfere with 
positivistic approaches. Consequently, one has no choice but to reject its use in the 
disaster (Shrader-Frechette, 1991).  
Positivists believe that there is a truth or objective reality waiting to be discovered by 
social scientists and that researchers discover this reality by staying detached, neutral 
and objective throughout the research. They concentrate directly on relationships among 
variables, especially those of cause and effect (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). In other 
words, they do not pay much attention to people’s inner mental states, but seek to 
develop causal explanations for phenomena and in doing so try to reduce the whole into 
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its simplest components in order to simplify its further analysis (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997; Sekaran, 2003). Such an attitude is clearly inappropriate for the fulfilment of the 
aim of this research, which is to develop an in-depth understanding of the phenomena 
under investigation within the three case studies, as discussed later in sections 4.4.1 and 
4.4.2. 
Furthermore, this research will be exploratory and explanatory. Such research is 
conducted when little information is available, as is the case for those issues involved in 
improving resilience and enhancing the disaster management practices in the UAE 
energy sector. Thus, adopting a qualitative methodology within the interpretivist 
research paradigm is a way to become familiar with the phenomena so that more 
rigorous research can progress (Sekaran, 2003). It seems clear that Hussey and Hussey 
(1997), Sekaran (2003), Denzin and Lincoln (2003) and Silverman (2003) provide 
views that support the adoption for this study of a qualitative interpretivist approach 
rather a quantitative positivist one. 
Disaster practice built on interpretivism concepts focuses on the meaning of policies, on 
the values, feelings, or beliefs they express, and even on the processes by which those 
meanings are communicated to, and understood by various audiences (Yanow, 2000). 
Based on the above discussion, this research is positioned as broadly interpretivist in 
philosophy. However, some aspects of the positivist approach, in terms of collecting 
quantitative data, are incorporated into the research design, which was adopted 
following a review of literature and the development of the research questions. 
4.2.5 Quantitative and Qualitative Methods 
Interpretivism and positivism are represented by two main types of social science 
research, namely qualitative and quantitative (Yin, 2009; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Qualitative research is found under the philosophy of interpretivism and consequently 
includes the study of a given phenomenon in its natural site.  The methodology applied 
includes case studies, questionnaires, interviews, and observations.  Quantitative 
approach is supported by the positivist philosophy which concerns with observable 
measurable facts (Collis and Hussey 2003). Research, according to this perception, 
requires the use of numbers and statistical methods and tends to be based on numerical 
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measurements of specific aspects and the testing of replicable hypotheses (Thomas, 
2003).   
In practice, most research does not fit neatly into one category; instead, much of it 
combines both. Some data may be collected that lends itself to statistical analysis, whilst 
other data, which is equally important, does not. This is why King et al. (1994) state 
that neither qualitative nor quantitative research is superior to the other or more 
scientific than the other. The differences between qualitative and quantitative methods 
are identified in Table 4.3. That said, most researchers place emphasis on one form or 
the other. Strauss and Corbin (1990) state that these emphases relate to the researchers’ 
own beliefs and training and to the nature of the problems studied. 
Table 4.3: The main differences between qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Source: Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005. 
Qualitative Quantitative 
Emphasis on understanding Emphasis on testing and verification 
Focus on understanding from 
respondent’s/informant’s point of view  
Focus on facts and/or reasons of social 
events 
Interpretation and rational approach  Logical and critical approach 
Observations and measurements in natural 
settings 
Controlled measurement 
Subjective ‘insider view’ and closeness to 
data 
Objective ‘outsider view’, distant from 
data 
Explorative orientation Hypothetical-deductive; focus on 
hypothesis testing 
Holistic perspective Particularistic and analytical 
Generalisation by comparison of properties 
and contexts of individual organism 
Generalisation by population 
membership 
 
Hussey & Hussey (1997) indicate that the main reasons for taking a qualitative 
approach relate to the nature of the research and its philosophy. The nature of the 
present research is shown by its aim to undertake theory building rather than theory 
testing and the fact that the researcher intends to make generalisations to theory rather 
than about a population. Its philosophy, as noted above, is interpretivism, carrying the 
assumption that reality is constructed by the participants in this research (Sekaran, 
2003). Besides, this research focuses on meaning rather than quantities and it seeks a 
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deep understanding of the factors that enhance the resilience of the critical energy 
infrastructure in the UAE. This is an exploratory study investigating the process of 
meaning and experience that people bring, which requires the researcher to examine 
real-life events in order to explain why and how certain obstacles arise to the 
implementation of a strategic disaster mitigation plan, in the three electricity generating 
plants taken as case studies, in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. In doing so, this study 
seeks to make inferences and to draw conclusions. It can be concluded that a qualitative 
approach is most appropriate when selecting the methods to be used in this study, a 
conclusion which is supported by the work of many researchers.  
4.3 Research Approach  
The research questions, along with the aim and objectives, play an important role in the 
selection of the research approach. Accordingly, Oppenheim (2005) argues that 
choosing the best approach is a matter of appropriateness. According to Saunders et al. 
(2009), there are two general approaches to the reasoning of the research in the 
literature, deductive and inductive approaches. Table 4.4 compares the deductive and 
inductive reasoning. 
Table 4.4: Differences between deductive and inductive Approaches (source: 
Pathirage, et al., 2008).   
Deduction Induction 
Moving from theory to data 
 
 
 
Moving from data to theory 
Common with natural sciences Common with social sciences 
A highly structured approach Flexible structure to permit changes 
Explain causal relationships between 
variables 
Understanding of meanings humans attach to 
events 
 
 
Events 
Select samples of sufficient size to generalise 
conclusions 
 Less concern with the need to generalise 
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Deductive reasoning is a theory testing process which starts with a theory or hypothesis 
from the literature and seeks to observe whether the theory applies to specific instances.  
It goes from the general to the specific. Typically, this involves a literature review, 
which is then used to generate a conceptual framework and develop a hypothesis. The 
hypothesis is then tested, affirmed or rejected, through the gathering of data. Such 
activity is most intrinsically connected with quantitative research, due to the large 
quantities of data used to verify hypotheses or find patterns. 
Inductive reasoning is generally an inquiry to understand a social or human problem 
from multiple perspectives (Yin, 2009). It is a theory building approach used when a 
researcher collects data and develops a theory as a result of data analysis (Saunders et 
al., 2009). In other words, it goes from the specific to the general, starting with 
observation, then the identification of patterns, followed by the creation of a hypothesis, 
its exploration/validation and lastly the development or formation of a theory. 
Deductive reasoning, conversely, involves theory testing and goes from the general to 
the specific. Deductive reasoning in research has become synonymous with positivism, 
inductive reasoning with interpretivism (Pathirage et al., 2008; Saunders et al., 2009).  
Collis and Hussey (2003) and Saunders et al. (2008) encourage the combining of 
deductive and inductive approaches within the same piece of research. According to Yin 
(2009), some element of inductive research is very likely where a case study strategy is 
used, due to its necessary qualitative elements which help the development of the 
formation of the “how” and “why” questions. Semi-structured interviews, which can be 
simple conversations, can help provide the meaning to the action observed as it has both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects.  
Accordingly, it was decided that the most appropriate design for the present research 
was for it to start with a literature review, to aid an understanding of the phenomenon 
from a theoretical perspective, followed by field research to deal with it from the 
empirical viewpoint. Therefore, the researcher has chosen to combine the deductive and 
inductive approaches: a list of key components of the resilience and vulnerability within 
the context of the Emirati energy sector were derived from the literature and then 
investigated within the case study settings (deductive). After that, the findings from the 
fieldwork will be incorporated into the existing theory (inductive). 
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4.4 Research Strategy  
Saunders et al. (2009) define the research strategy as the general plan of how the 
researcher will go about answering the research questions in order to satisfy the research 
objectives, whereas Remenyi et al. (2003) state that it provides the overall direction of 
the research, including the process by which that same research is conducted. Yin 
(2009) lists five different research strategies, as summarised in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Different Research Strategies. Source: Yin, 2009. 
Strategy Form of Research Question Requires control of 
Behavioural Events? 
Focus on 
Contemporary 
Events? 
Experiment How, Why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, What, Where, How 
many, How much? 
No Yes 
Archival 
analysis 
Who, What, Where, How 
many, How much? 
No Yes/No 
Historical  How, Why? No No 
Case study How, Why? No Yes 
 
Yin (2009) identifies three conditions which can be used to select the appropriate 
strategy for the research:  
• The type of research question;  
• The control of the researcher over behavioural events;  
• The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. 
Yin (2003; 2009) indicates that the case study is a particularly appropriate strategy 
when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed. This allows the researcher to determine 
not only what happened but also how it happened or why it happened. He also 
recommends a case study strategy when the researcher has little control over the events 
and when the focus is on contemporary events. Yin (2009, p18) defines a case study as 
“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within 
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its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident”.  
Furthermore, many scholars including Saunders et al. (2009), Amaratunga (2002) and 
Velde et al. (2004) affirm that the case study is suitable if the researcher needs to gain 
rich descriptions and deep understanding of the context; it is a valuable way of 
exploring existing theory and will enable the researcher to investigate real life, which 
can provide powerful insights. Besides, one of the strengths of the case study strategy is 
that it allows the researcher to use a variety of sources and a variety of types of data as 
part of the investigation (Denscombe, 2003). Also, the case study is a favourite strategy 
for research that has a qualitative orientation (Amaratunga, 2002). 
However, Yin (2009) notes that the case study is far from perfect and could lead to a 
lack of rigour with too specific results that take a long time to obtain. One problem that 
must be considered carefully is that the conclusions drawn may be specific to the 
particular organisations studied and may not be generalisable (Gable, 1994). 
Another possible strategy for this type of research is that of the survey. The survey 
technique relates to a group of methods which emphasise a quantitative analysis for a 
larger group of organisations, than that which is considered by the case study. The 
typical methodology in survey strategy is that of questionnaires, telephone interviews or 
even structured face-to-face questionnaires/interviews, via the appropriate selection of a 
representative sample. This would then enable the researcher to make generalised 
statements regarding the objective and value of the study. One of the difficulties of this 
strategy is its snapshot nature, which provides a wide angle lens but a poor focus on 
some of the in-depth information and meanings that the researcher is ultimately 
interested in. It is therefore helpful to combine the survey and case study strategies in 
some form. 
Based on the above discussions, the method with the strongest potential application to 
the topic of this study, i.e. resilience and vulnerability within the context of the Emirati 
energy sector, is the case study. Archival and historical strategies can be dismissed 
because of their focus on past events, whilst the experimental strategy can be rejected 
because of the inherent need to control behavioural factors.  
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4.4.1 Single Case or Multiple Cases 
A case study can be conducted within one organisation (a single case study) or more 
than one organisation (multiple case studies). The main distinction to make when 
implementing a case study design is between single case and multiple case designs 
(Yin, 2009). Perry (1998) mentioned that there are no specific guides for the number of 
cases to be incorporated. However, this research will adopt a multiple case studies 
design as illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: Single, multiple, holistic and embedded case study designs, including 
that selected by the author for this research. Source: Yin, 2009. 
Yin  (2003) argues that multiple case studies may be preferable to a single case study 
and that any researcher who elects to use a single case study needs to have a strong 
justification for this choice. Indeed, Yin (2009) observes that multiple case studies are 
more common and are generally used to replicate findings or support theoretical 
generalisations. Multiple case study research increases external validity and it helps to 
protect against the observer bias (Voss et al., 2002). By studying multiple cases which 
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cover several key components of the energy sector (from key electricity plants, network 
equipment and final users) in the main Emirate states, the present researcher will be 
better equipped to gather sufficiently rich data to address the research questions. 
It will also guarantee the best sources of data relevant to the current research. The use of 
multiple cases would strengthen the research, as there is a higher probability of 
triangulating findings and so of identifying any information that is erroneous or 
exceptional. 
It is important that suitable case studies are selected. Evidently, a national grid depends 
on the reliability of its service and equipment in its entirety, which can affect the quality 
of electricity delivered. Any malfunctioning, poor coordination or indeed 
mismanagement by any number of parties can lead to power surges or power dips, 
whilst excessive use of reactive power can multiply the power losses experienced. If 
inappropriate or insufficient case studies are taken, then an unrealistic and potentially 
damaging conclusion (for political or technical reasons) could be reached. 
A holistic multiple case study design was chosen because the study required a holistic 
perspective, involved one bounded case, qualified as being both explanatory and 
exploratory in approach and sought to understand the level of resilience in the current 
disaster management strategy for the Emirati energy sector. 
Based on the above considerations, three case study organisations were selected: three 
electricity generating plants, in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. 
4.4.2 Justification of the Choice of Case Study Organisations 
It is important that suitable case studies are selected, because of the nature of the 
electrical grid and the need for reliability of the service and the equipment in its entirety.  
Three electricity generating plants, in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah are used as case 
studies and have sufficient scope for the study as they are the largest plants within the 
context of the Emirati energy sector.  
Furthermore, the cities of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah can be considered the most 
sophisticated of Emirati cities. Their location means that their services are provided to 
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large numbers of consumers. To this researcher’s knowledge, no other researchers have 
had this level of access in the past to investigate issues relating to the UAE’s energy 
infrastructure. These plants will become typical, as they represent the future of other 
UAE’s critical energy infrastructure via the development of strategic disaster mitigation 
planning, since they will carry the same structure and administration systems. Thus, the 
lessons and knowledge that could be obtained from these case studies would be vital 
and significant for other Emirati energy sector infrastructures currently being planned in 
the UAE.  
4.5 Research Time Horizon 
The research onion by Saunders et al. (2009) shows two principal time horizons. The 
first is longitudinal and the second is cross-sectional. The former involves longer term 
research by having an extensive timeframe involved (typically years) or various points 
of measure at more than one point of time. This kind of research sketches out the effect 
or dynamics of an observed phenomenon, providing a “why” it occurs.  This “why” can 
be discovered, precisely because a chain of repeating studies can be built, which a 
researcher can examine and re-examine, as time proceeds and as they become more 
intimately aware of the complexity of the issue being studied (Jueterbock, 2012). 
Longitudinal studies, whilst providing a clearer picture of the reality on the ground, are 
by their nature time consuming. This is one of the main reasons that they fall beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
In the work reported in this thesis, the time horizon reflects that of cross-sectional 
studies with a small sample, to allow for a more qualitative approach. That is to say, that 
all variables studied are considered at the same specific point of time. Cross-sectional 
studies emphasise observation and come under the category of descriptive research. 
According to Jueterbock (2012), there are some issues that need to be overcome in this 
time horizon. First, the sample may not reflect or represent the true nature of the total 
population. This is not a significant concern, however, if it involves a smaller sample. 
This sample was purposely selected so as to maintain a more qualitative dataset and an 
interpretivist philosophy. The second disadvantage is that information can be skewed as 
one does not have the advantage of time to isolate factors that may influence 
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correlations and observations. The third is that there is simply no answer as to “why” 
that which is observed occurs. 
Thus, whilst this type of research can describe the characteristics of the phenomenon 
being studied, a researcher using it cannot determine cause and effect relationships. One 
typically uses this research as a preliminary test, which would then lead on to a further 
study (Cherry, 2014). Even if no further research is undertaken, this perspective allows 
a researcher insight into performance paradoxes, know-doing gaps and the role of 
employees in the event of a specific disaster at a specific point of time (Roettgers, 
2011). 
Cross-sectional studies, meanwhile, may be so vast that the variables of interest may be 
overlooked or scarcely measured with very weak evidence of cause and effect. If a 
survey is to successfully elucidate causal relationships it must contain all the right 
questions asked in the right way (Gable, 1994). As a result it can be quite inflexible 
with limited robustness - there is little one can do upon realizing that some crucial item 
was omitted from the questionnaire, or upon discovering that a question is ambiguous or 
is being misunderstood by respondents. It is therefore helpful to combine the survey and 
case study strategies, as has been done in this study. 
4.6 Data Collection Techniques   
There are numerous ways to obtain primary data, such as interviews, questionnaires, 
observations or archival material (collie and Hussey, 2009; Easterby-Smith et al., 2004). 
In fact there is no method fits all studies. The specific requirements, the research 
philosophy, research approach, research strategy, and objectives of research will usually 
dictate the appropriate method to use (Yin, 2009). According to Hussey and Hussey 
(1997), there are two major types of data collection; primary data and secondary data.  
Primary data is information collected specially for the purpose of this study. Secondary 
data is information collected for another purpose but related to the subject of the study, 
and which the researcher has gathered to build the theoretical base for this study. The 
sources of these data include mainly: articles, papers, research, reference books, theses, 
magazines and the internet. 
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In this research both primary and secondary data were used. In general, questionnaires 
and documentation were used to collect data, along with interviews as support technique 
to gather in-depth information from case studies.  
Based on the above, triangulation has been employed, as one method is not sufficient to 
solve the problem of various factors under study. Also, data triangulation enhances the 
reliability and validation of collected data. It also increases the opportunity to generalise 
results; thus addressing the criticism of qualitative research. 
4.6.1 Questionnaire  
The questionnaire is a multipurpose instrument that combines various aspects of the 
investigation, from the evaluation of people through to the processes and training. It can 
provide both qualitative as well as quantitative data. Saunders et al. (2009) argue that 
the questionnaire survey is often the only available way to develop of a representative 
picture of the attitudes and characteristics of a large population, while Bell (1993) 
points out that when using a large sample, it is important to ensure that data can be 
gathered and reliably processed. Moreover, measures of statistical significance are easy 
to calculate with questionnaire data. According to Oppenheim (2000) and Saunders et 
al. (2009), there are several advantages gained in adopting questionnaires, the most 
important being the straightforwardness, speed, economy and efficiency with which 
data can be collected from a large sample.  
However, Hussey and Hussey (1997) identify many disadvantages, such as: 
• The typically low response rates;   
• The difficulty of designing questions;   
• The participant may not be the intended recipient and hence, may not have the 
required expertise. 
The development of a questionnaire, based on qualitative data (as in this research) 
generated from field observations and interviews, may also contribute to greater 
confidence in the generalisability of the in-depth results found. It is thought that this 
should provide objective data which can be more easily evaluated in light of the national 
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nature of the Emirati energy sector. In terms of exact methodology, the questionnaire 
consists of a collection of questions of various types which have been carefully and 
systematically prepared according to the interest and values of the investigator (Garcia, 
2003). The success of a good questionnaire is based on the strength of the questions it 
asks, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3: The five factors involved in asking a good question. Source: Fonseca, 
2012. 
According to Garcia (2003), closed questions are principally used to clarify the facts 
concerning previously stated information. They must not be overused, however, as the 
investigator will otherwise substantially reduce the information available and may cause 
the respondent to feel cross-examined. Typical closed questions include the answers 
“yes”, “no” or “maybe”. To open them up a subsequent (open) question could be: Why 
do you think that? 
Closed questions can also be used in the way where the respondent is asked to choose 
from a set of potential answers such as: Never; occasionally; frequently or Always. 
Closed questions could also represent as they do in this investigation a scale or a matrix 
numbered 1 to 10 (refer to Table 4.6). 
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Table 4.6: A matrix table taken from the questionnaire. Source: Al Khaili (2013) 
# Questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Tectonic activity – Earthquake o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
2 Tectonic activity – Tsunami o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
3 Climatic activity – Flooding caused 
by wave surges 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
4 Climatic activity – Flash floods o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
5 Climatic activity – Shamal o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
6 Climatic activity – Extreme heat 
(above recorded mean) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
7 Climatic activity – Other extreme 
meteorological conditions 
(hurricane, dust storm etc) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
8 Landslides, liquefaction and slope 
failure 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
9 Manmade disaster – Terrorism o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
10 Manmade disaster - Chemical spill 
and/or explosions 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
11 Manmade disaster - Health and 
safety related accidents  etc) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
The difficulty in preparing a well written questionnaire is the issue of exhaustively 
covering all possible answers. This may be a very complex task, at least in the 
beginning, because the subject is an unknown, meaning that the writer needs to think 
before time about all or any of the possible answers (opinions) provided by the 
respondents. The inclusion of the category “other” can help, but it does have the 
disadvantage that it has the effect of converting the closed question to an open one. 
Nonetheless, this tactic is particularly useful in the early pilot stage, as it allows one to 
explore all possible answers that the investigator was unable to envision when the 
questions were first set. After this stage Garcia (2003) believes that they should become 
an obsolete feature, given that the investigator should have sufficient information 
through triangulation, to ask the “right” question. 
The open questions meanwhile offer a greater opportunity to obtain information that 
could be used subsequently. Such questions are generally as follows: What? Who? 
Where? When? How? Why? How much or how many? Such questions will thus 
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generally involve the terms “would” and “could” as they are conditional and serve to 
express an idea or clarify it.  
4.6.1.1 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was selected in this research to obtain data about attitudes and 
perceptions towards Emirati energy sector infrastructures. It was issued to workforces in 
order to acquire a descriptive and general picture. The questionnaire was designed and 
processed in accordance with the following conditions: 
 A formal description agreement of the research was signed by respondents 
before starting; 
 Qualitative and quantitative-style questions were designed, most offering 
multiple choices or with responses structured in a matrix (Appendix 1); 
 Written in the official language of the UAE, Arabic; 
 Any potential disruption to the electricity generating plants of Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai and Sharjah was minimised; 
 The confidentiality and anonymity of the responses were guaranteed in 
advance; 
 Respondents were given the right to ask questions about the project and if 
unsatisfied, they were able to freely withdraw from it at any stage, without 
having to provide a reason; 
 Respondents were assured that their participation was voluntary in nature; 
 To understand the questionnaire and the purpose behind it, an information 
session and introduction by the researcher and informative written information 
were given on site; 
 The respondents were instructed to put their questionnaire in a sealed envelope.  
 On refusal, the individuals were personally thanked and simply asked to put 
their blank questionnaire in the designated area.  
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 Respondents who filled in the questionnaire and signed their consent form 
(Appendix 3) were given the author’s contact details and invited to ask further 
questions. 
One hundred questionnaires were distributed in the three energy generating sites (Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah), of which 42 were answered. Given the cultural sensitivity of 
the Emirati workplace and the limited interest of Emirati women in working outside the 
office environment, all non-management respondents were male. All were aged between 
30 and 40 years. The mean number of years that respondents had been employed at the 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah plants were 4.5, 4.2 and 4.1 respectively, while their 
respective length of experience was 4.4, 3.8 and 7.1 years. All respondents worked in 
either the operational, administrative or technical areas.  
The questionnaire was divided into three sections, each using close-ended, open-ended 
and leading questions on the following topics: 
• Preparation of the Emirati energy sector for natural and man-made hazards 
• Perceived state of preparedness 
• Barriers to be overcome so as to reduce vulnerability and increase preparedness. 
4.6.2 The Interviews  
To conduct a case study, the researcher has to identify the sources of evidence, as 
explained by Yin (2009). This research used multiple sources, as mentioned in section 
3.6.   
Interviews are one of the methods that allow a researcher to gather valid and reliable 
data, which is associated with the research question(s) or objectives. Fonseca (2012) 
argues that one must prepare the interview by always keeping the principal objective in 
mind. This involves careful selection of the interviewees, because the sample should 
cover all of the hierarchy, from the typical manual worker to the director. Furthermore, 
the researcher must ensure that each interviewee understands what the interviewer is 
really asking – thus improving the final quality of information (Carmona, 2013).  
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According to Vincoli (1993), the success of an interview depends on the interviewer’s 
professionalism, objectivity and ability to evaluate the information given in an 
appropriate manner, which is also friendly enough for people to provide information. In 
an interview one must express empathy but avoid sympathy to demonstrate that whilst 
they may not agree with everything said, they are able to understand the situation from a 
view different from their own (UN, 2003). 
According to Saunders et al. (2009), interviews can be classified into three categories:  
• Unstructured interviews;  
 • Semi-structured interviews; 
• Structured interviews. 
Structured interviews are characterised by the use of a set of questions with the same 
wording, asked in the same order. This type of interviews could contribute to obtaining 
uniform information, which assures the comparability of data (Oppenheim, 2005). 
In unstructured interviews the interviewer formulates questions unexpectedly during an 
interview (Sekaran, 2003). The interviewees in this type of interview feel free to talk 
about their points of view, opinions and attitudes related to the topic of the research. In 
this situation, the interviewer needs to have a clear idea about the aspects that are 
wanted to be explored, since there are no determined questions to work through 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Regardless of the possible fluency that both structured and 
unstructured interviews offer, the semi-structured interview contains numerous 
advantages of both methods (Yates, 2004). In general, the semi-structured interview has 
many advantages, such as:  
• Flexibility in providing rich and in-depth information;  
• Giving sufficient freedom to the interviewer;  
• Allowing for changes in the questions based on the experience gained by the 
researcher during the interviews. Hence the type of information obtained from 
those who are interviewed earlier may be different from that obtained from those 
interviewed later (Oppenheim, 2005);  
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• Delivering uniform information similar to that provided by structured interviews 
without losing the flexibility and freedom of unstructured interviews; 
• Allowing the researcher to explore complexity, ambiguity, or incompleteness in 
the responses that interviewees may give.  
However, there are some disadvantages in the interview method. The whole process can 
be expensive and time-consuming, especially if there are a large number of respondents 
to be interviewed. Furthermore, the interviewer may affect the validity and reliability of 
the questions by something as simple as his or her mood. This could influence the 
interaction with the interviewee and thus the interview process and the data.  
4.6.2.1 Justification of Choosing Semi-structured Interview in Data Collection  
The semi-structured face-to-face interview method was chosen in this study because of 
the advantages mentioned above. This method is described by Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2004) as being the most principled of all qualitative methods. It was also chosen 
because of the necessity to understand the basis for the interviewees’ views, beliefs and 
attitudes, as well as to develop an understanding of each respondent’s own point of view 
regarding disaster situations.  
Additionally, it is important to note that some Arab researchers, for example Al-
Bahussain (2000) and Al-Faleh (1987), have used semi-structured interviews to conduct 
empirical work. These researchers found that such interviews were a very successful 
approach in Arab organisations, where people prefer to talk rather than to complete a 
questionnaire. Furthermore, the response rate from questionnaires is very low when 
compared with direct interviews.  Therefore, the interview tool was designed to give 
interviewees every opportunity to explain their own experiences from their own 
perspective, in that way supporting the inductive nature of the study.  
In this research semi-structured interviews enriched the results of the questionnaire. It 
was a way to cross-examine the reliability of the questionnaire and served to ensure that 
workers’ concerns were heard. All interviews were conducted face to face at the 
workplace, to facilitate the process. In compliance with the ethical approval for this 
research (Appendix 4) all interviewees were given anonymity. 
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Saunders et al. (2009) claim that the reliability and internal validity of the data depend 
on the design of questions and the strictness of the pilot testing section (4.8). Thus, with 
the above mentioned facts in mind, the questions were developed in accordance with the 
following techniques: 
• Creation of the initial draft of the interview questions from a literature review; 
• Modification of the questions following a pilot study;  
• Administration of the final revised questions. 
4.6.2.2 The Interviewees (Research Sample)  
Interviews are methods of collecting data in which selected participants are asked 
questions in order to find out what they do, think or feel (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  
Taylor and Bogdan (1984) define qualitative interviewing as flexible, as there is no need 
to be specific as to the number or the type of participants before embarking on the 
research. Based on this principle the researcher started interviewing without knowing 
how many participants would be interviewed and continued until most answers had 
become repetitive and he judged that the data gathered was sufficient to achieve the 
research aim and objectives.  
For this research, the interviewees were carefully selected managers who were thought 
to have sufficient working knowledge of the plants in their current state and of any 
future plans, etc. A total of nine logistics, finance and project managers were 
interviewed at the three sites. The inclusion of the different managerial levels enhanced 
validity through the triangulation of data by gathering different points of view. 
4.6.3 Documentation 
Mason (2004) states that documentation is a technique used in qualitative research. It 
was used in this research to overcome the potential low reliability of the data produced 
from the questionnaire and interviews. Authors including Silverman (1997), Denzin and 
Lincoln (2000) and Yin (2009) have asserted that a documentation review is one of the 
most important ways of supporting evidence gathered by other methods of data 
collection. According to Mason (2004) and Yin (2009), documentation review has many 
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advantages, such as reducing researcher bias, but it also has disadvantages; for example, 
the documents studied may not be representative and may not allow generalisation. In 
addition, some documents, such as personal diaries and private letters, are not easily 
accessible. 
Related documents used in this research were: annual reports from the Emirati energy 
sector; government legislation (federal and/or state); regulations and training files; 
financial reports and company policy.  
4.6.3.1 Pilot Study  
Many authors including Sekaran (2003) and Yin (2009) believe that the questions asked 
by the researcher in interviews or questionnaires should be subject to a preliminary test 
or pilot study. A pilot study is advantageous in filtering the questions to clarify wording 
and design. In this research, a pilot questionnaire was administered to four Emirati PhD 
students at Salford University. By this means, the researcher ensured that the 
questionnaire was clearly designed and simply understood by respondents. This was 
accomplished by asking the four participants to complete a feedback form about the 
simplicity, layout, ambiguity and clarity of the questionnaire items. 
A similar pilot study was conducted to elicit feedback in order to redraft and improve 
the interview questions. As a result the language of some questions was modified to 
make them clearer, that is, unambiguous and more understandable.  
4.7 Data Analysis  
In this thesis, descriptive statistics and content analysis were undertaken for the 
questions presented in the surveys. When the answers were in a numerical form, 
descriptive statistics were used to summarise tendencies (patterns). Central tendency is a 
particularly important consideration. This involves working out the mean, median, 
range etc. It also typically involves the creation of graphics to enable a clear visual 
representation of the phenomena being investigated. Briefly, according to Thompson 
(2009), descriptive statistics are typically used to compare results from one study with 
another and this can help researchers detect sample characteristics that may influence 
their conclusions. 
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The data obtained in this study, however, was not always provided in numerical or 
quantitative form. In this case, content analysis was undertaken.  This is typically used 
when qualitative information needs to be reduced to numerical terms, as was the case 
for the questionnaire surveys and interviews. It is a way of trying to analyse the content 
of qualitative material (data) by quantifying it (Browne, 2011). It is summarises, rather 
than reports. It thus seeks to generate conclusions which are generalisable, meaning in 
this case that they can be applied to the whole Emirati energy sector, rather than being 
limited to a full and precise statement of the sentiments of one particular group or 
individual (Neuendorf, 2002). 
Content analysis has various advantages, such as being relatively cheap, and if done 
properly, it is a reliable method that can be easily checked by other researchers. 
However, it also holds various disadvantages that must be neutralised as much as is 
practicably possible. These include selection of appropriate categories and the 
researcher’s intrinsic bias, which will affect data interpretation; in addition, it is mainly 
concerned with what is being studied and not so good at explaining it (Browne, 2011). 
In general, content analysis involves multiple stages, where the answers provided are 
first read and categorised by some criterion such as an underlying theme, level of 
emotion, favourability or key term. This process is repeated, creating sub-groupings, 
until there are no more categories left to allocate. Each sub-group is then reviewed so as 
to reduce the overall number of categories. In its simplest form, content analysis 
allocates a value to each of the groups; which are then tabulated and presented as either 
a cross-tab report or rudimentary frequency distribution (SSU, 2014).  
In this thesis, the combination of the two data analysis techniques means that once 
survey data is collected from respondents, the next step is to input the data into an 
appropriate programme for the statistical analysis of data and its interpretation. 
Steps in data analysis include: editing and coding survey data; processing them using 
appropriate software; providing a descriptive statistical analysis for all the questions to 
generate insights. In order to give some quantitative indication of the results, such as 
relative preparation for example, an index using the mean is to be constructed for each 
situation. 
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For a comprehensive analysis of the data, the researcher breaks it down into the 
following sections: 
 Preparation of the Emirati energy sector 
 Level of preparedness of energy sector workers in Abu Dhabi vs Dubai  
 Potential barriers and solutions. 
4.8 Relation between data collection tools and research objectives 
The aim of this section is to map the research objectives against how they were 
achieved through the various research techniques discussed in Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2. 
Table 4.7 summarises the research objectives and the corresponding data collection 
techniques. 
Table 4.7: Research objectives and corresponding data collection methods 
 
Research objectives 
Data collection technique/s used 
Literature 
review 
Questionnaire 
Interview
s 
Documentatio
n  
To identify Emirati critical energy 
infrastructure facilities and their 
vulnerabilities to hazards 
 
   
To examine current disaster 
management practices and their 
relation to those infrastructures 
deemed critical within the energy 
sector. 
 
 
 
  
To critically evaluate existing 
barriers to application of disaster 
management practices on critical 
energy facilities in UAE. 
 
   
To contextualise and define the 
concepts of disaster resilience and 
strategic mitigation planning 
within the UAE.     
   
 
To develop a framework for a 
strategic disaster mitigation plan 
for critical energy infrastructure. 
    
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4.9 Reliability, Validity and the Ability to Generalise 
Validity and reliability for qualitative research means that data collection can be 
repeated, with the same findings (Yin, 2009). To achieve validity and reliability, this 
researcher has tried to be consistent at all times, so that if another researcher followed 
the same processes similar results could be produced. The researcher has built a clear 
research design and has adopted appropriate methods that give high internal reliability.  
In collecting the data, consideration was given to the most proper strategy for the 
specific investigation. Yin (2009) states that the common way of approaching the 
reliability problem is to make as many steps as operational as possible and then to 
conduct the research. This means that the research procedures and methods used in a 
study should be properly documented.  
Saunders et al. (2009) note that the reliability of interviews is also related to bias. In this 
research, the researcher tried to avoid bias through improving the perceptions of 
respondents by building a good relationship or trust with the participants, providing a 
good introduction to the study, giving emphasis to the confidentiality, and finally 
leaving respondents to talk as they felt inclined.  
4.10 Ethical Approval 
Ethics in the context of research refers to the suitability of the researcher’s behaviour in 
regard to the rights of those who become a part of the research, or are influenced by it 
(Saunders et al., 2009). It is the ideology of behaviour that guides honest choices about 
behaviour and relationships with others (Saunders et al., 2009). In this respect, the 
policy of the University of Salford obligates researchers to apply for ethical approval 
before conducting field studies.  
Professional ethics are core to the undertaking of good and sound scientific 
investigation. The researcher must ensure that a person’s dignity, integrity and sense of 
self-worth are maintained. The importance of human relationships should not be 
underestimated and certainly not sacrificed for the benefit of the research. 
According to Adams and Callahan (2013, p17):  
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“The primary concern of the investigator should be the safety of the research 
participant. The scientific investigator must obtain informed consent from each 
research participant. This should be obtained in writing after the participant has had 
the opportunity to carefully consider the risks and benefits and to ask any pertinent 
questions. Informed consent should be seen as an ongoing process, not a single event or 
a mere formality. The investigator must protect the subjects’ privacy and 
confidentiality. Researchers must have mechanisms in place to prevent the disclosure 
of, or unauthorized access to, data that can be linked to a subject’s individual identity”. 
The difficulty of creating an ethical framework within disaster theory is that disasters 
are, more often than not, chaotic and destructive, making human subjects vulnerable and 
subject to unforeseen risks or levels of discomfort. Participants must thus be protected 
and fully aware of potential risks and of any effects, negative or positive, that could 
result from the research or the researcher’s activities.  
Disaster research requires the collection of evidence and the identification of the 
absence of any factor that could serve to reduce the impact that a natural event or 
manmade activity has on an individual, community, physical infrastructure or social 
structure. This evidence, through the identification of latent failures, should drive both 
corporate and governmental policy and practice in a safer direction, i.e. proactive 
instead of reactive. 
The weighting of proof due to the sensitivity of the disaster discipline, given that failure 
in the disaster mitigation plan and strategy may result in deaths or other forms of 
catastrophic losses (monetary, political power, etc.), means that research participants are 
particularly vulnerable to emotional or physical repercussions and/or burdens. Disaster 
research draws attention to where a person or team have or are likely to fail in the event 
of any given number of scenarios. It heightens the sense of urgency to act and rectify 
policies or procedures (Mathuna, 2010). 
If issues are identified but cannot be readily solved, respondents may feel helpless and 
become despondent. It would be unethical for a researcher to put a participant in this 
position. The problem is that whilst such issues can be anticipated there may be little 
that a researcher can do given that he or she has only limited power to influence those 
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who make wide reaching decisions to make them correctly, according to the facts 
presented by a thesis. Researchers can advise and may to some extent facilitate, but 
ultimately they cannot force a decision. 
The researcher applied for ethical approval prior to conducting the field study. The 
Research Governance and Ethics Committee (RGEC) subsequently granted the 
researcher the ethical approval to conduct the data collection (Appendix 4). 
4.11 Chapter Summary  
To achieve the aim and objectives of this study, the research philosophies, approaches 
strategies and data collection methods have been identified and their selection justified.  
This chapter has explained that deductive and inductive methods were selected and has 
justified these choices. The research strategy was to collect data in multiple case studies 
set in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. The decision to use a qualitative methodology 
approach and the use of questionnaires and semi-structured interview technique as the 
main sources of evidence has been fully rationalised.  
Finally, the chapter has explained how the data was collected and analysed. The 
following chapter discusses the findings that emerged from the collected data. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents and analyses the questionnaire and interview results from the three 
electricity generation sites of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. The limitations of the 
results and the two tools used are also considered. All data and data analysis 
subsequently informs the discussion and the answering of each research objective and 
question, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.  
5.1 Survey and Interview Description: Methodology, Site Location and 
Respondents 
The primary data collection research of this study involved a combination of semi-
structured questionnaires and opened-ended face to face interviews. The language was 
the official language of the UAE, Arabic. One hundred questionnaires were distributed, 
of which 42 were answered (20 Abu Dhabi, 15 Dubai and 7 Sharjah) with various 
refusals. All questionnaire participants were male energy sector professionals and most 
were aged between 30 and 40 years. The individuals were selected for their position and 
willingness to participate, but given the high number of refusals, particularly in Sharjah, 
this was not as selective as originally intended. The three power plants, and thus the 
potential participants, were themselves selected according to the strategic importance of 
the plants, in terms of number of customers and the significance of the business districts 
and urban areas served. Consequently, the study covers a substantial proportion (around 
65%) of domestic and industrial energy users in the UAE. The mean length of time that 
participating energy sector workers had been employed at the Abu Dhabi plant was 4.5 
years, slightly longer than the mean of 4.4 years that they had served in their current 
positions. The equivalent figures for Dubai were a little lower, at 4.2 and 3.8 years 
respectively, while in the Sharjah case, average length of employment was much greater 
at 7.1 years, with a mean of 4.1 years in current position. Figure 5.1 shows the work 
position of the respondents: all worked in either the operational or technical areas, those 
having the most direct contact with any threats in the field. Overall, most participants 
(81%) were either foremen or electrical technicians/engineers. Given this 
predominance, overall as well as at each site, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
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responses were similar for the three companies, despite their administrative and 
geographic differences. 
  
Figure 5.1: Work position of the respondents 
 
The interviews were undertaken with the management of each plant (see Table 5.9 for 
details) and were used to obtain further information, in order to validate the 
questionnaires.  
5.2 Site Location 
The locations were three electricity generating plants: one in Abu Dhabi, one in Dubai 
and one in Sharjah. Both the questionnaires and interviews were conducted in these 
three locations. The exact locations are shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Power station locations. Source: Author, adapted from Google Maps 
(2014) 
5.3 Questionnaire Format   
The questionnaires contained a set of eight questions with various sub-sections (refer to 
the Appendix). There were both qualitative and quantitative questions, and most were 
multiple choice or structured in a matrix. In the latter, the respondent was given a scale 
of 1 to 10 on which to make his choice. In addition, “yes/no” answer options were used.  
In order to ensure a collective understanding of the questionnaire and the purpose 
behind it, an introduction and information session was given by the researcher. At this 
point, respondents were given the right to ask questions and to withdraw from the 
process. Respondents were also told that their participation was voluntary in nature and 
that their anonymity and data protection were assured. They were given the option to 
withdraw at any stage, without having to provide a reason. 
The questionnaire contained questions on the following topics: 
 Preparation of the Emirati energy sector with regard to natural and man-made 
hazards 
 Perceived state of preparedness 
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 Vulnerability and resilience  
 Significance of climate change or other hazards which may alter the 
vulnerability of the energy sector and that of the general public. 
 Barriers to be overcome to reduce vulnerability and increase preparedness. 
 
5.4 Analysis 
Once survey data was collected from respondents, the next step was to input the data 
into an appropriate programme for statistical analysis and interpretation. The analysis 
comprised three steps: (i) editing and coding survey data, (ii) processing it in Microsoft 
Excel (iii) providing a descriptive statistical analysis for all the questions to generate 
insights. There are three basic measures of central tendency: mean, median and mode. 
In order to give some quantitative indication of the results, such as relative preparation, 
an index was constructed for each situation. 
For a comprehensive analysis of the data, sections are broken down as follows: 
 Preparation of the Emirati energy sector 
 Level of preparedness of the Emirati public 
 Level of preparedness of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah 
 Energy infrastructure vulnerability 
 The role of climate change 
 The greatest vulnerability 
 Potential barriers.  
 
The findings for each of these themes is presented in the following sections. 
5.4.1 Preparation of the Emirati energy sector 
Question 1a explored which hazards the Emirati energy sector was best prepared for. 
Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 provide a descriptive statistical analysis of the perceptions of the 
employees of the three companies, while Figure 5.3 is a graph of the overall results for 
this item.  
Regarding preparation, in terms of the overall results, respondents stated that the 
Emirati energy sector was best prepared for two categories of manmade disasters, i.e. 
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health and safety issues or accidents and terrorist activity, along with extreme heat 
(Figure 5.3). Respondents located in Abu Dhabi and Dubai believed that the sector was 
most prepared against terrorism, extreme heat and health and safety-related accidents. In 
general, with the exception of terrorism, where the mean score was 6, respondents 
appeared to believe that the energy sector was ill-prepared to face natural disasters, 
since state of preparation scores were rarely above 5. It can be stated, based on the 
maximum values of Dubai, that workers felt more prepared for disasters in Dubai than 
in Abu Dhabi. This result is reinforced in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Sharjah’s results, as Table 
5.3 shows, were very different from those of Dubai and Abu Dhabi.  The modal value is 
5, which is higher than that for most of the answers given in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 
Tectonic activity and terrorism were said to be the least prepared for. The latter, in 
contrast to the other results, is perhaps due to the substantially lower resources provided 
in Sharjah to fight terrorism. This in turn is likely to relate to the lower terrorism risk 
faced compared to the arguably more important cities of Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Sharjah 
respondents stated that climatic activity was the least significant issue. The perceived 
resilience to flooding may result from their recent experience with flooding events and 
the changes introduced to improve emergency response and mitigation.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistical analysis for Question 1 in Abu Dhabi 
Parameter Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Medi
an 
Mode 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Kurtosis 
Asymmetric 
Coefficient 
Range Min Max Sum Count 
 
Tectonic activity – Earthquake 
 3.06 0.15 3 3 0.64 0.41 6.55 -1.56 3 1 4 55 18 
Tectonic activity – Tsunami 
 2.89 0.08 3 3 0.32 0.10 5.98 -2.71 1 2 3 52 18 
Climatic activity – Flooding caused by wave surges 
 2.83 0.12 3 3 0.51 0.26 10.4 -3.24 2 1 3 51 18 
Climatic activity – Flash floods 
 3.28 0.19 3 3 0.83 0.68 7.85 2.92 3 3 6 59 18 
Climatic activity – shamal 
 3.72 0.30 3 3 1.27 1.62 1.28 1.55 4 3 7 67 18 
Climatic activity – Extreme Heat  
 5.78 0.39 6 6 1.66 2.77 -0.56 -0.29 5 3 8 104 18 
Climatic activity – other extreme meteorological 
conditions 
 3.78 0.31 3 3 1.31 1.71 1.05 1.52 4 3 7 68 18 
Landslides, liquefaction and slope failure 
 2.89 0.11 3 3 0.47 0.22 18.00 -4.24 2 1 3 52 18 
Man-made Disaster – Terrorism 
 6.06 0.42 6 6 1.76 3.11 0.45 0.12 7 3 10 109 18 
Man-made Disaster - chemical spill and/or explosions 
 3.67 0.28 3 3 1.19 1.41 2.22 1.68 4 3 7 66 18 
Man-made Disaster -  health and safety related accidents 5.56 0.41 6 6 1.72 2.97 -0.47 0.09 6 3 9 100 18 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistical analysis for Question 1 in Dubai 
Parameter Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Median Mode 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Kurtosis 
Asymmetric 
Coefficient 
Range Min Max Sum Count 
Tectonic activity – Earthquake 3.13 0.17 3 3 0.64 0.41 -0.13 -0.10 2 2 4 47 15 
Tectonic activity – Tsunami 2.93 0.18 3 3 0.70 0.50 3.99 -1.33 3 1 4 44 15 
Climatic activity – Flooding caused by wave surges 3.13 0.17 3 3 0.64 0.41 5.64 1.78 3 2 5 47 15 
Climatic activity – Flash floods 3.33 0.16 3 3 0.62 0.38 2.62 1.79 2 3 5 50 15 
Climatic activity – Shamal 3.67 0.23 3 3 0.90 0.81 -1.35 0.78 2 3 5 55 15 
Climatic activity – Extreme Heat  6.40 0.29 6 6 1.12 1.26 -1.12 0.46 3 5 8 96 15 
Climatic activity – other extreme meteorological 
conditions 3.60 0.34 3 3 1.30 1.69 2.89 2.01 4 3 7 54 15 
Landslides, liquefaction and slope failure 2.87 0.09 3 3 0.35 0.12 4.35 -2.40 1 2 3 43 15 
Man-made Disaster – Terrorism 6.33 0.46 6 8 1.80 3.24 0.08 0.10 7 3 10 95 15 
Man-made Disaster - chemical spill and/or explosions 3.80 0.31 3 3 1.21 1.46 2.17 1.56 4 3 7 57 15 
Man-made Disaster -  health and safety related 
accidents 5.67 0.47 6 6 1.84 3.38 -0.67 -0.07 6 3 9 85 15 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistical analysis for Question 1 in Sharjah 
Parameter Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Median Mode 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Kurtosis 
Asymmetric 
Coefficient 
Range Min Max Sum Count 
Tectonic activity – Earthquake 
 4.71 1.06 4 4 2.81 7.90 -0.52 0.60 8 1 9 33 7 
Tectonic activity – Tsunami 5.00 1.13 4 3 3.00 9.00 -1.70 0.16 8 1 9 35 7 
Climatic activity – Flooding caused by wave surges 7.29 0.42 8 8 1.11 1.24 3.23 -1.78 3 5 8 51 7 
Climatic activity – Flash floods 6.43 0.69 7 7 1.81 3.29 1.29 -1.37 5 3 8 45 7 
Climatic activity – Shamal 5.71 0.89 6 8 2.36 5.57 -2.41 -0.16 5 3 8 40         7                  
Climatic activity – Extreme Heat (above recorded mean) 7.43 0.57 8 8 1.51 2.29 -0.81 -0.62 4 5 9 52 7 
Climatic activity – other extreme meteorological conditions 
(hurricane, dust storm etc) 5.57 0.78 6 8 2.07 4.29 -1.41 -0.14 5 3 8 39 7 
Landslides, liquefaction and slope failure 5.14 0.63 5 3 1.68 2.81 -1.47 -0.31 4 3 7 36 7 
Manmade Disaster – Terrorism 4.57 1.00 4 3 2.64 6.95 0.08 0.50 8 1 9 32 7 
Manmade Disaster - chemical spill and/or explosions 5.57 0.65 5 4 1.72 2.95 -2.11 0.38 4 4 8 39 7 
Manmade Disaster -  health and safety related accidents 5.57 0.53 5 7 1.40 1.95 -2.35 0.05 3 4 7 39 7 
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Figure 5.3: Level of preparation of the Emirati energy sector by hazard. 
Overall graph. 
 
Across all three sites, as noted above, health and safety, terrorism and extreme heat 
were considered the least problematic due to the high levels of preparation. Conversely, 
tsunamis and landslides, liquefaction and slope failure presented the lowest levels of 
preparation. Scores for some 73% of the hazards listed were below 4 (high 
vulnerability). 
The same three issues, health and safety, terrorism and extreme heat, registered as 
highly prepared for in the overall graph (Figure 5.3), albeit with different proportions, 
were also considered to be well prepared for in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. For Sharjah, the 
values differ substantially from those of the other two cities, demonstrating a perceived 
safety, greater than elsewhere. Their greatest level of preparation related to climatic 
phenomena. In section b and c of question 1, respondents were asked to provide reasons 
as to why hazards scored highly (i.e. > 8). Although not all respondents scored any 
hazard greater than 7, and given that the highest mode for Abu Dhabi was 6, they 
nevertheless attributed reasons to the greater state of preparedness (refer to Table 5.1). 
Again, there is a strong degree of consistency between the three datasets.  
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Figure 5.4: Reasons behind greater preparedness for the phenomena that scored 
highly across the Emirati energy sector  
 
All three sites, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah, registered similar answers and 
proportions for the three most registered answers. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Reasons for lack of preparedness of the Emirati energy sector for those 
phenomena that scored the least 
The three main reasons for a lack of preparation when it came to say landslides or 
Tsunamis are “Limited or absence of government initiatives”, the “availability and 
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dissemination of information in Arabic” and the “incomplete or absence of financial 
incentives”. 
Results were similar to the overall picture in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi. In Sharjah 
(Figure 5.5), opinion was more divided, with four categories identified, each scoring 
57%.  
After having established the preparedness of the Emirati energy sector, the participants 
were asked their opinion on the Emirati public’s level of preparedness, as presented in 
the following section. 
5.4.2 Level of Preparedness of the Emirati public 
Question 2 examined which of a list of hazards respondents thought that the Emirati 
public was best prepared for. Using the mean, Tables 5.4 and 5.5 and 5.6 indicate how 
the respondents viewed the situation. One of the most noticeable observations is that in 
comparing the level of preparedness of the energy sector (question 1) with that of the 
Emirati public, the mean drops further by an average of 0.3, with the exception of 
terrorism for the power plants of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Similar to the energy sector, the 
public were said to be best prepared for terrorism (Figure 5.6), even more so than the 
energy sector. It is not clear why this occurred, but perhaps a lower level of 
understanding was ascribed to the public because they know less about the nature and 
impact of terrorist activity. The changes between sector and public perception of 
disaster preparation were most noticeable for Sharjah, with a mean drop of 0.63. 
Respondents in Sharjah stated that the energy sector was least prepared for terrorism but 
that the public felt that it was most prepared for terrorist acts, with a score of 7.0. This 
may be due to the higher level of national confidence, when it comes to preventing 
terrorism, rather than the Sharjah region’s real ability to deal with it. 
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistical analysis for Question 2 in Abu Dhabi 
Parameter 
Mean 
Standar
d Error 
Median Mode 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Kurtosis 
Asymmetric 
Coefficient 
Range Min Max Sum Count 
Tectonic activity – Earthquake 
 3,00 0,21 3 3 0,91 0,82 7,02 2,13 4 2 6 54 18 
Tectonic activity – Tsunami 
 2,83 0,09 3 3 0,38 0,15 2,04 -1,96 1 2 3 51 18 
Climatic activity – Flooding caused by wave surges 
 2,94 0,06 3 3 0,24 0,06 18,00 -4,24 1 2 3 53 18 
Climatic activity – Flash floods 
 3,17 0,12 3 3 0,51 0,26 10,49 3,24 2 3 5 57 18 
Climatic activity – Shamal 
 3,17 0,12 3 3 0,51 0,26 10,49 3,24 2 3 5 57 18 
Climatic activity – Extreme Heat 
 4,11 0,39 3,5 3 1,64 2,69 3,98 1,96 6 3 9 74 18 
Climatic activity – other extreme meteorological 
cond 
 3,22 0,13 3 3 0,55 0,30 6,36 2,57 2 3 5 58 18 
Landslides, liquefaction and slope failure 
 3,06 0,06 3 3 0,24 0,06 18,00 4,24 1 3 4 55 18 
Man-made Disaster – Terrorism 
 7,11 0,29 7 8 1,23 1,52 -0,88 -0,23 4 5 9 128 18 
Man-made Disaster - chemical spill and/or 
explosions 
 4,06 0,34 3 3 1,43 2,06 -0,05 1,10 4 3 7 73 18 
Man-made Disaster -  health and safety related 
accidents 4,39 0,40 3,5 3 1,69 2,84 -0,45 0,88 5 3 8 79 18 
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Table 5.5: Descriptive statistical analysis for Question 2 in Dubai 
Parameter 
Mean 
Standar
d Error 
Median Mode 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Kurtosis 
Asymmetric 
Coefficient 
Range Min Max Sum Count 
Tectonic activity – Earthquake 
 2,73 0,18 3 3 0,70 0,50 -0,67 0,43 2 2 4 41 15 
Tectonic activity – Tsunami 
 2,73 0,12 3 3 0,46 0,21 -0,73 -1,18 1 2 3 41 15 
Climatic activity – Flooding caused by wave surges 
 2,87 0,13 3 3 0,52 0,27 1,40 -0,28 2 2 4 43 15 
Climatic activity – Flash floods 
 2,93 0,15 3 3 0,59 0,35 9,74 -2,37 3 1 4 44 15 
Climatic activity – Shamal 
 3,13 0,17 3 3 0,64 0,41 5,64 1,78 3 2 5 47 15 
Climatic activity – Extreme Heat 
 3,53 0,19 3 3 0,74 0,55 -0,11 1,07 2 3 5 53 15 
Climatic activity – other extreme meteorological cond 
 3,53 0,19 3 3 0,74 0,55 -0,11 1,07 2 3 5 53 15 
Landslides, liquefaction and slope failure 
 2,87 0,17 3 3 0,64 0,41 5,64 -1,78 3 1 4 43 15 
Man-made Disaster – Terrorism 
 7,13 0,31 7 6 1,19 1,41 -0,79 0,00 4 5 9 107 15 
Man-made Disaster - chemical spill and/or explosions 
 4,00 0,39 3 3 1,51 2,29 0,19 1,29 4 3 7 60 15 
Man-made Disaster -  health and safety related 
accidents 4,73 0,41 5 5 1,58 2,50 -0,40 0,51 5 3 8 71 15 
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Table 5.6: Descriptive statistical analysis for Question 2 in Sharjah 
Parameter 
Mean 
Standar
d Error 
Median Mode 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Kurtosis 
Asymmetric 
Coefficient 
Range Min Max Sum Count 
Tectonic activity – Earthquake 4.3 1.1 3 2 2.98 8.90 -0.87 1.04 7 2 9 30 7 
Tectonic activity – Tsunami 4.0 0.9 3 3 2.45 6.00 -0.58 1.14 6 2 8 28 7 
Climatic activity – Flooding caused by wave surges 4.6 0.6 5 6 1.62 2.62 -1.15 -0.67 4 2 6 32 7 
Climatic activity – Flash floods 4.6 0.6 4 4 1.51 2.29 -0.81 0.62 4 3 7 32 7 
Climatic activity – Shamal 5.4 0.7 6 6 1.81 3.29 -0.48 -0.43 5 3 8 38 7 
Climatic activity – Extreme Heat (above recorded mean) 5.6 1.0 5 3 2.70 7.29 -2.42 0.21 6 3 9 39 7 
Climatic activity – other extreme meteorological conditions (hurricane, 
dust storm etc) 5.3 0.9 4 4 2.29 5.24 -2.39 0.33 5 3 8 37 7 
Landslides, liquefaction and slope failure 5.1 0.6 5 5 1.46 2.14 -0.67 0.11 4 3 7 36 7 
Manmade Disaster – Terrorism 7.0 1.1 8 9 2.89 8.33 3.65 -1.86 8 1 9 49 7 
Manmade Disaster - chemical spill and/or explosions 5.4 0.9 4 4 2.30 5.29 -1.16 0.76 6 3 9 38 7 
Manmade Disaster -  health and safety related accidents  etc) 4.7 0.6 5 5 1.50 2.24 -0.97 0.26 4 3 7 33 7 
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Figure 5.6: Perceived level of preparedness of the Emirati public by hazard  
 
Energy sector workers considered that the public thought that the sector was best 
prepared for terrorist threats and least prepared for tectonic activity such as Tsunamis 
and earthquakes. 
 
Results from Abu Dhabi and Dubai were similar. Terrorism was by far the threat which 
was “best prepared” for. In Sharjah this was also the case, although general 
preparedness was perceived to be greater. 
Finally, it is difficult to say how relevant the information given is regarding members of 
the energy sector’s perspective on public opinion. It is, however, useful to know their 
perceptions if the energy sector is to form part of educational initiatives or the drawing 
up of a legal framework to protect public interests. This is because if they are 
challenged to think of the public, they are more likely to involve and/or represent them 
in disaster policy for the energy sector. The questionnaire subsequently considered 
which of the three sites was best prepared to deal with a disaster. 
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5.4.3 Opinion as to the Best Prepared Site 
Figure 5.7 shows that Abu Dhabi and Dubai respondents viewed Dubai as the Emirate 
best prepared for natural disaster. Indeed, more energy sector workers in Abu Dhabi 
than in Dubai itself thought that Dubai was better prepared. All participants in Sharjah 
likewise perceived Abu Dhabi as well prepared. Table 5.7 presents the reasons 
provided. 
Table 5.7: Reasons given in each Emirate as to the best prepared Emirate 
Opinions Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah 
Better corporate policy for 
preparedness and response to 
disaster 
25% 7% 14% 
Better planning standard for 
energy distribution and 
preparation against hazardous 
events 
25% 33% 29% 
Being a more organised and 
disciplined company  
20% 7% - 
Human development e.g. 
through training, motivation 
and salary  
15% 33% 29% 
Creation of a specialised area 
for disaster management 
15% - - 
Being pioneers in the field via 
innovation including better 
working and operating 
practices 
10% 27% - 
More resources for work 
equipment 
- 7% 29% 
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Figure 5.7: Emirates perceived as well prepared for hazards in the energy sector 
When asked which Emirate was the worst prepared, few people answered the question, 
as shown in Figure 5.8. Most who answered named Abu Dhabi and very few Sharjah, 
attributing the limited preparation to corporate human resource policies, particularly in 
training and development, and to poor operation planning. The absence of response may 
relate to social desirability bias. Social desirability, a problematic bias recognised as 
early as 1954 by Maccoby and Maccoby, is a social phenomenon which can be 
considered as the common courtesy and acceptability shown to strangers or 
acquaintances (or researchers) before they penetrate the circle of friends or enemies. 
Social desirability is best described as: 
The basic human tendency to present oneself in the best possible light. A light which 
can unfortunately significantly distort the information because respondents are often 
unwilling or unable to report accurately on sensitive topics… for impression 
management reasons (Fisher, 1993, p303). 
Social desirability can occur in research due to issues of trust as respondents may not 
truly believe or understand what the researcher will really use the information for. 
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Figure 5.8: Emirates perceived by respondents overall as ill prepared for natural 
hazards in the energy sector  
Given this issue of social desirability and the 69% refusal rate, it is difficult to state how 
valid these set of responses are, when comes to ill-preparation. It is clear however that 
Dubai is perceived to be the best prepared Emirate. Unfortunately, these answers were 
not expanded upon in the questionnaire, nor in the subsequent interviews with 
management. Following the question regarding state vulnerability, the questionnaire 
moved on to infrastructural specifics. 
5.4.4 Energy Infrastructure Vulnerability 
Question 3 broke down the energy sector into its constituting components and asked 
respondents to identify which were the most vulnerable. Abu Dhabi and Dubai selected 
fuel exploration and supply (oil, gas) as the most vulnerable, as shown in Figure 5.9.  
Sharjah differed from the other two sites, perhaps because of its less modern facilities 
and recent flooding event. That said, all respondents attributed high risk to the 
following:  
 Mechanical or electrical risk (up to 80% of respondents), which is related to the 
complexity of the equipment and techniques, high voltage, probability, of failure 
etc.  
 Chemical risk (up to 60%), -  mainly associated with the use of substances, 
flammability and the risk of leakages.  
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 Explosions (up to 50%) 
 Oceanic exploration risk (up to 27%), as operations out to sea are more 
complicated and riskier than their terrestrial counterparts 
 Social risk (up to 20%), due to the potential of the energy sector forming a 
terrorist target.   
 
 
Figure 5.9: Most vulnerable section in the energy sector  
Despite the hazards associated with fossil fuel exploration, renewable energies, along 
with nuclear, were chosen as the energy sources least resilient to natural, social or 
technological hazards (except Sharjah) (Figure 5.10). This may be due to their limited 
influence in the current energy provision. The nuclear plant at Brakah is still being built 
and is not expected to produce electricity until 2017. Likewise no wind power is 
established and remains in the planning stage (Al Mazrouei, 2013). 
 
131 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Energy sources most resilient to natural and man-made hazards 
Limited strength in renewable provision may also relate to the limited attention on 
renewable policy until after the undertaking of the questionnaire. Indeed, following the 
appointment of Al Mazrouei as Energy Minister and the subsequent commitment to 
renewable options, there has been an increased interest in renewable energy solutions. 
Under Al Mazrourei, Abu Dhabi, with its investments in Masdar, aims to get seven 
percent of its power from renewable sources by 2030. Neighbouring Dubai meanwhile 
is building a 1 GW concentrated solar array that will be the largest in the world helping 
Dubai reach five percent of renewable sourced electricity supply by 2030 (Dreazen and 
Belogolova, 2013). 
Should coverage of renewable energy be increased further it is likely that renewable 
energy will become the most resilient option for the energy sector, given that there was 
widespread recognition among respondents of the benefits of renewable energy sources: 
 Clean energy (85% of the respondents), meaning no physico-chemical risk of 
flammability or explosions.  
 Renewable energies at the moment are not currently considered to be a terrorist 
target (55%). 
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 Operation is less risky, mechanically and electrically, and because renewable 
options on land only were considered, participants felt that any negative issues 
would be less severe (50%) 
 Consequently, operation and equipment were perceived as less complex (35%).  
 
Subsequently, 100% of respondents said that renewables were safer and more 
environmentally friendly than the other categories. Many do see it, however as a simple 
technology from an economic and technical point of view. However their opinion is not 
supported by literature on the subject. Whilst it is true, compared with other 
conventional options, that the impact of renewables is negligible (Kaldellis et al, 2013), 
the extent of impact from renewable energy sources on the environment is still far from 
certain (Moriarty and Honnery, 2012). Furthermore, despite 35% asserting the 
simplicity of renewable energy, it is by no means a “simple” technology (Kunze and 
Busch, 2011; Outhred et al, 2007). In addition, the IEA (2012) speaks about the 
following barriers that must be overcome when implementing them:  
 Cost: Most renewable technologies are not yet competitive with fossil fuel-based 
technologies  
 Subsidy: To foster the deployment of renewable energy, governments use 
subsidies to lower the cost of renewables or raise their revenues, helping them 
compete with fossil fuel technologies. The justification is that imperfections in 
the market fail to factor in externalities (such as environmental costs attributable 
to other fuels) or deny nascent technologies the opportunity to mature without 
support.  
 
Clearly, the national and regional governments need to do more to communicate to 
energy sector workers the benefits of diversifying the energy matrix with alternative 
energies, including renewables. There seem to be contradictions and misunderstandings 
regarding their use, strengths and weaknesses, especially when it comes to combating 
climate change and growing carbon emissions. These issues are discussed in the 
following section. 
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5.4.5 The Role of Climate Change 
Question 4 examined the role of climate change as a significant cause of vulnerability 
within the energy sector and general public in the future. On the scale of one to ten, 1 = 
‘not at all significant’ and 10 = ‘extremely significant’.   
Table 5.8  shows a descriptive statistical analysis of the perceptions of respondents. The 
histograms (Figures 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13) show strong similarities in the set of answers 
given by all sets of respondents. Answers were strongly concentrated around the 
average value of 4 or 5, meaning there was general consensus that climate change was 
not a very important consideration challenging the resilience of the UAE energy 
infrastructure or that of Emirati society in the future. This is despite the fact that 85% of 
the population and > 90% of the nation’s infrastructure is located within several meters 
of sea level in low-lying coastal areas (Dougherty et al, 2009). The public was 
perceived to see climate change as an even lesser concern, which is in line with previous 
unpublished research by the author, which showed that most schoolchildren in their 
final year did not worry about climate change and few saw it as a concern until after a 
presentation was given (Al Khaili, 2008). The highest level of concern was registered in 
Sharjah, probably resulting from the flooding events they have experienced recently. It 
is surprising, however, that the level of concern attributed to the Sharjah public with 
regard to climate change was much less than that for the energy sector. 
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Figure 5.11: Results from the author’s unpublished research on climate change in 
2008. The values represent the number of students. S1 was before the presentation 
and S2 after. 
 
Table 5.8: Statistical parameters for Question 4  
Parameter 
Energy 
sector 
General 
public 
Mean 5.5 4.0 
Standard Error 0.1 0.1 
Median 5 4 
Mode 5 4 
Standard Deviation 0.89 0.73 
Sample Variance 0.79 0.53 
Kurtosis 1.48 1.31 
Skewness 0.18 0.07 
Range 5 4 
Minimum 3 2 
Maximum 8 6 
Sum 233 166 
Count 42 42 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.28 0.23 
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Figures 5.12 and 5.13, meanwhile, show the tendency for both sectors.  
    
 
 
Figure 5.12: Perception of the significance of climate change for vulnerability in 
the energy sector, by overall respondents 
In general, the impact of climate change for the energy sector was seen neither as 
significant nor insignificant (Figure 5.12). Energy sector workers felt that climate 
change had a less of significant impact for the general public than for the energy sector. 
Opinion was not widely divided. 
Once more, answers from Abu Dhabi and Dubai were similar. Sharjah had a wider 
spread from the mean, in the direction of higher vulnerability. This may be at odds with 
their previous answers that the region was best prepared for climatic phenomena (Figure 
5.3). It could suggest that they do not understand the implications, hence their concern, 
or it could mean that because they feel vulnerable to the threat of climate change, they 
also feel the need to prepare well for it, in the event of a potential climate-related 
disaster. 
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Figure 5.13: Perception of climate change vulnerability among the general public, 
by overall respondents 
Workers overall perceived that the public would be less concerned and view climate 
change as a less significant threat to the energy sector than the energy sector workers 
themselves. This sentiment was mirrored across all sites, but most noticeably at Sharjah. 
Respondents considered that the difference between the energy sector’s and the public’s 
perceived vulnerability stemmed from the following:  
 Awareness and knowledge regarding disaster prevention and the phenomena at 
hand is higher in the energy sector than for the general public (65% of the 
respondents). This is because the energy sector is facing situations continuously.  
 Competence, in terms of education, experience or skills, is more developed for 
those working in the energy sector (34%). Also, it has developed more training 
actions in the energy sector (37%) 
 It is still necessary to develop skills for assessing risks, especially in the public 
sector (20%) 
 Planning for vulnerability management is better in the energy sector (11%) 
 
Climate change did not appear to be of great concern, so the next question asked 
respondents what was the greatest vulnerability of the energy sector, if not climate 
change. 
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5.4.6 The Greatest Vulnerability 
Question 5 looked at which phenomena were significant causes of vulnerability within 
the energy sector, apart from climate change. Risk to terrorism was thought to be the 
greatest vulnerability, with every single respondent choosing it in Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai. The overall the figure was 98% (Figure 5.14). This was despite the fact that 
respondents had previously stated that it was the threat that the energy sector was best 
prepared for (Figure 5.3). The “other” category included war as the highest level of 
concern. War, which is related to threats of a social origin, was placed under “other” 
because it was mentioned by respondents despite not being part of the questionnaire. 
Half of the respondents, regardless of location, selected “terrorism” as a threat. In 
Sharjah, the greatest vulnerability was considered to be atmospheric, unsurprisingly 
perhaps, following the flooding events. It is perhaps a little contradictory that this, the 
greatest vulnerability, was also considered to be the best prepared for. 
 
Figure 5.14: Coverage of the causes of vulnerability in the energy sector 
 
 
138 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15: Distribution of the causes of vulnerability within the energy sector, 
apart from climate change  
 
Terrorism, atmospheric and tectonic threats were the three main causes of vulnerability. 
The next section looks at how the barriers to good disaster management practices may 
have contributed to these three and other threats as perceived by participants. 
5.4.7 Potential Barriers  
Question 6 queried if there were any existing or potential barriers which served to 
prevent the energy sector from dealing with the causes of vulnerability. Some 90% of 
the respondents in Abu Dhabi said that “public awareness and education” was the 
biggest barrier. In the case of Dubai, the figure was 100%. In Sharjah, this figure was 
the lowest of all at 86%. In fact the biggest barrier for Sharjah was “additional 
occupational staff training.” That said, the greatest barrier overall was the lack of or 
absence of national government legislation. 
For the open ended questions, participants stated that in addition to those issues listed: 
 Disaster management training in the energy sector remains to be addressed (71% 
of the respondents) 
 Staff competences, especially through education, to support the understanding of 
climate change and its related disasters (31%) 
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To complement the above, they argued that is necessary to: 
 Undertake verification simulations to assess the stage of personnel preparation, 
organisational structure in disaster response and resource capacity installed 
(31%) 
 Develop a better planning stage for disaster preparation (26%) 
 Achieve greater awareness, which means to give more priority to the issue 
(23%) 
 Improve the human management policies in companies, such as safe working 
practices, especially when it comes to time pressures (6%) 
 Set more regulations in line with sound disaster management practice (3%) 
 
It is notable that the majority of responses were aimed at human resource 
improvements, more so than other variables, including technical or financial resources, 
policies or research. 
Considering the importance given to training by respondents, relevant courses should be 
designed to develop skills and awareness using effective and participatory 
methodologies. Such an approach could be an effective way to improve safety measures 
that may lead to prevention.  Also, a revised training program assures the effectiveness 
of training. 
Question 7 asked what was required to enhance resilience in the energy sector. The 
following suggestions were made by three-quarters of the respondents as ways to 
develop a sound disaster management plan for hazards affecting the sector (refer to 
Figure 5.16): 
 More public awareness and education 
 Increased research 
 More comprehensive government legislation 
 Additional occupational staff training. 
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Figure 5.16: Ways to enhance resilience in the energy sector 
Despite having highlighted training as the main means to reduce vulnerability in 
question 6, only Sharjah designated it as the most important factor. Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai respondents gave higher priority to other factors when proposing ways to 
increase the level of preparedness: 
 Public awareness and education 
 Government legislation (at federal and/or state level) 
 Increased research to enhance scientific knowledge and understanding of the 
phenomena. 
 
There are various barriers to the success of current disaster management and mitigation 
practices. These were subsequently discussed with the management staff in their 
interviews, as elaborated upon in the next section. 
5.5 Interviewing of Management Staff 
With the aim of validating the information obtained from the questionnaires, distributed 
to energy professionals in three power plants across the UAE, the researcher undertook 
a series of interviews with six management staff at various sites. As part of the 
interview process those involved were shown some of the key questionnaire results. 
Those interviewed included male and female managers, employed in different 
professions such as finance or project management. The experience of such individuals 
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in the sector was between 7 and 21 years. Details of the interviewees are presented in 
Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9: Details of the interviewees 
Interviewee Gender Position 
Experience 
(years) 
Location 
1 Male Head of department 10  Abu Dhabi 
2 Male Assistant manager 12  Abu Dhabi 
3 Female Head of planning department 7  Abu Dhabi 
4 Male Assistant manager 8  
Dubai 
 
5 Female Head of department 10  
Dubai 
 
6 Female 
Director of 
incoming and outgoing 
managers 
14  
Dubai 
 
7 Male Head of department 13  Sharjah 
8 Male Project manager 9  Sharjah 
9 Female Secretary 5  Sharjah 
 
The objective of the semi-structured interview was the identification of the strengths, 
weaknesses and knowledge gaps perceived by those members of staff in direct contact 
with the phenomena discussed. It was hoped that this action would help support an 
effective management of those vulnerabilities within the energy sector. It addressed the 
following three objectives:  
 Identify Emirati critical energy infrastructure facilities and their vulnerabilities 
to hazards 
 Examine current disaster management practices and their relation to those 
infrastructures deemed critical within the energy sector  
 To critically evaluate existing barriers to application of disaster management 
practices on critical energy facilities in UAE 
 
Recommendations were made in line with the results to increase resilience and to deal 
better with some of the risks experienced in the Emirati energy sector. In the next few 
sections, each of these three objectives is discussed in turn.  
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5.5.1 Energy infrastructure facilities identified as critically vulnerable  
Table 5.10 lists those aspects of infrastructure that managers in each of the three sites 
deemed critical to energy production. The basis of this criticality is linked to the 
severity of impact they would have upon an electricity generating service and supply in 
the event of a hazard or disaster. 
Table 5.10: Infrastructural aspects that managers deemed most vulnerable 
Aspect Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah 
Critical energy 
infrastructure 
facilities 
Generating stations, 
transformers and 
transmission lines 
Generating station  
Station distribution 
centres, which are 
responsible for the 
distribution of 30% 
of the city’s power 
Vulnerabilities 
to facilities 
High cost of 
operation and 
maintenance  
Complexity and 
expense of system 
maintenance and 
construction, 
machinery and 
technology 
Dependence on 
others i.e. Abu Dhabi 
to generate any 
further requirements  
Most significant 
vulnerabilities 
Lack of alternative 
energy sources of 
energy  
Need to increase the 
efficiency of 
electricity generation 
and transport  
Lack of resources 
Abu Dhabi must 
provide Dubai  
In terms of own 
system, lack of 
security and 
protection leading to 
the 
possibility of 
overloading and 
blackouts 
Least critical 
energy 
infrastructure  
Distribution lines and 
cables 
Transmission 
Distribution lines and 
cables  
Why is the 
above 
infrastructure 
resilient? 
Limited effect 
elsewhere 
Cheap parts to 
replace or repair 
Less time is needed 
in their maintenance 
Well structured 
system 
Cheaper assets  
Replaced or repaired 
in less time  
Strengths 
An abundance in 
energy production  
Provides its excess 
energy to the others 
Company policy 
which has a focus on 
health and safety. 
Safe city  
Excellent police 
force both of which 
reduce the likelihood 
of terrorist attacks 
and vandalism  
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For management, “all infrastructural components are important given that they work 
collectively and none of them work in isolation”. Yet the most critical components, 
should they fail, are the generating stations and specifically, the larger pieces of 
generating equipment. Abu Dhabi holds particular strategic importance given that its 
generating system provides energy not just locally but for Dubai and Sharjah.  
The specifics of each city, management procedures and practices, as one might expect, 
affect the level of vulnerability experienced by a site and their ability to generate 
electricity. To add resilience, it was suggested that the “Dubai government could 
provide more legislation than Abu Dhabi” and that “Abu Dhabi could give more 
financial initiatives than Dubai. Dubai established health and safety before Abu Dhabi 
and gave it more importance. The city also developed more advanced education and 
training for their staff. In Abu Dhabi government initiatives play an important role as 
they encourage renewable and alternative energy, not just conventional forms”. 
Sharjah questionnaire results indicated that heightened levels of security and disaster 
preparation meant that Sharjah was less vulnerable to threats (Figure 5.4). 
In light of the above answers, strategic planning and risk management must come hand 
in hand with a detailed analysis of the threats and vulnerabilities that correspond to the 
context under evaluation (area of influence, reality, operative processes, environmental 
zoning). In addition, the scope of governmental legislation, according to interviewee 
opinion, should be widened. Any amendments or new branches should cover risk 
management and the need to establish a plan that can be applied across the energy 
sector and all facilities. The latter should champion any movement in this direction. An 
organisational structure should be developed to facilitate information flows between key 
actors. Institutions such as the police force and transit authorities must be involved to 
integrate the disaster response and/or preparation and planning. Responsibility should 
also be shared to make disaster management and mitigation more effective. Inefficiency 
may occur, for instance, if a central generating station must take all the burden and 
make all the decisions. Synergy must be built by multiple members practicing 
emergency procedures and building policies before a potential disastrous event occurs 
so that in the event of a disaster, people’s roles are known and well-rehearsed and 
resilience assured. 
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One of the unexpected results is that the experts make no mention as to the need to 
diverse the energy matrix to include renewable energy. This was however a key aspect 
in the answers of the questionnaire participants. The only associated statement is that of 
nuclear energy whereby it is considered that it “may be an important issue in the future 
as it is being developed as the country’s wealth and energy demand increases”. Indeed, 
it was not until the researcher questioned them on the theme that there was some 
reflection: “to rely entirely on renewable energy is a strategic goal, where clean energy 
is available. An example of which is solar energy and I think that in the near future we 
will witness a major shift toward reliance on solar energy, both thermal and 
photovoltaic”. Following the questioning regarding the infrastructural vulnerabilities, 
the author than asked how disaster management practices influenced them. 
5.5.2 Current disaster management practices and their relation to energy 
infrastructure deemed critical  
Table 5.11 lists those practices and processes that interviewees deemed to improve 
resilience. 
Table 5.11: Aspects of resilience as perceived by interviewees 
Aspect Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah 
Most important 
management 
practices in 
avoiding disaster 
and increasing 
resilience 
Sufficient employee 
awareness 
Studying of risk more 
comprehensively 
Strategic plan 
Strategic plan, greater 
levels of awareness, 
education  
Training and 
awareness  level 
Seen as having great 
importance. It 
contributes 
significantly to the 
ability to make the 
right decisions 
Further education is 
highly beneficial and 
disaster theory should 
be explored in schools 
and university 
Awareness should  
lead to improved 
strategic decisions 
and is thus a key 
component 
Rehearsed 
processes and 
procedures  
This occurs in 
periodic tests  
emergency planning  
Undertaken  in 
experimental training 
and professional 
education  generally 
 
By running scenarios 
to identify weak and 
strong points. Also 
amending and 
building on training 
and processes 
according to analysis.  
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In terms of education, “the training of employees, so they understand that disasters and 
hazards represent a serious problem, is important, as is explaining to them likely 
consequences of not doing their job properly. They will only know that and be able to 
act accordingly if they are well-trained, competent members of staff.  Improved 
awareness and ability will also result. Subsequently, they should be more able to 
identify weak points and communicate them. Their added level of awareness should 
also lead to improved strategic decisions and consequently their support in the drawing 
up and enhancing of strategic plans and planning generally can be achieved”.  
Various answers speak of good practices supported by policies and defined processes. 
These are significant and necessary steps for consistent improvement in key disaster 
prevention protocol, such as evacuation and role play. Further developments are 
required with the focus needing to be more preventive than reactive. Having identified 
the disaster management practices, their strengths and weaknesses, the questionnaire 
focused on the exact boundaries that can prevent management practices from being 
successful in the mitigation of a given disaster. 
5.5.3 Critical evaluation of existing barriers to the application of disaster 
management practices for critical energy facilities  
For those interviewed on the management team, the greatest barriers to the reduction of 
vulnerability and disaster potentiality in the energy sector were the same as those 
identified by the workers during the questionnaires survey. Most, if not all, were related 
to education, training and increasing general awareness of energy personnel operating at 
all levels. This is most clearly seen in Table 5.12. 
Accordingly, it was stated that “policy, specifically relating to education, must be 
improved. This will support disaster mitigation generally and increase resilience”.  
Educating people, supports the development of tools and values. Both of which are 
important when it comes to making judgement calls as to the severity of a given risk. 
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Table 5.12: Key barriers to disaster mitigation according to energy sector 
managers  
Aspect Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah 
Most significant 
barriers in the 
application of the 
procedures, 
policies and 
practices 
Time and the 
effective distribution 
of tasks 
Policies which should 
be amended to 
include more 
educational 
development as a 
professional 
Lack of professional 
training and education  
Underlying 
cause of these 
barriers 
Lack of sufficient 
awareness in the 
management team  
Staff are unprepared 
or ill-prepared. 
No one has looked 
sufficiently at the 
experiences of 
neighbouring 
countries to learn 
from them 
Best position 
person or group 
for the removal 
of barriers 
No one person or 
group. Rather it is an 
integrated role 
between the private 
and public sector 
Heads of departments All involved in 
energy generation, 
transmission and 
distribution. 
 
The barriers identified in Table 5.12 and their underlying causes apply to the energy 
sector generally – not just the case studies represented directly in this research. All 
respondents conclude that responsibilities should be shared and integrated between all 
actors, public and private. 
To overcome any kind of barrier, learning from relevant and valuable international and 
regional experiences, especially if a disaster was mitigated successfully, is considered 
highly important. There was also a call to nationally “share energy sector experiences, 
within the government ministries. In fact, government legislation needs to facilitate, if 
not force the sharing of experiences (i.e. there should be umbrella procedures). 
The recommendations, for strategy building, that come out of the series of interviews 
are as follows: 
 Build upon current knowledge and better analyse information on the nature of 
the energy sector to comprehensively understand risk and risk prevalence 
 Upon deciding risk management planning, develop cost-benefit analysis in order 
to establish adaptation strategies that are not only efficient but also sustainability 
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 Strengthen policies for disaster management and incentivise the right type of 
investment opportunities to trigger various financially and technically viable 
solutions. 
 Increase public awareness when it comes to those themes relating to disasters 
and hazards that may have a detrimental effect  on the energy sector 
 Generate networks of learning which facilitate the exchange of best practices 
and the sharing of resources between companies or across the various public 
bodies. The fundamental idea of any such network should be an improved level 
of resilience. 
 Increase the quantity and quality of resources dedicated to research and 
innovation. This is particularly key when it comes to the diversification of 
energy resources and the development or renewable energy and clean tech. 
 Focus on the concept of sustainability with regard to the corporate or residential 
consumer.  
 
This section represents the last of any participant response. It is now important that the 
author considers any limitations which may have affected the quality of any of 
responses and/or analyses of the previous sections. 
5.6 Limitations 
It is important that the limitations of the results, in terms of their validity and 
representativeness, are reflected upon. One of the major issues is that only 42 of a 
possible 100 questionnaires were answered. The other respondents refused, as was 
permitted under the ethical framework developed in this thesis. These refusals mostly 
occurred in Sharjah, which although much smaller than the other two sites, was 
involved to a much lesser extent than originally anticipated. This meant that only seven 
employees responded. This number was less than half that of Dubai and almost two-
thirds less than Abu Dhabi. It is thus difficult, with such a small number to know 
whether those seven persons represented the general employee population or were 
anomalies. It also means that the results of the overall graphs are more likely to 
represent Abu Dhabi or Dubai opinion, rather than be a representative depiction of the 
overall opinion. In hindsight, greater weighting should perhaps have been given to the 
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responses of Sharjah participants, so as to prevent the obscuring of their voice in the 
presentation of the overall results. 
All questionnaire respondents were male, effectively silencing the woman’s voice at the 
general worker level. This issue may be particularly problematic in questions where the 
workers must place a value on the public’s perception of disaster – most of that 
population is either a woman or child, neither of which were represented in the 
questionnaire. It is however difficult to address this issue due to cultural sensitivities. 
Women are not frequently found in these types of working conditions outside the office 
environment.  There are few in the energy sector generally. The author addressed the 
issue of representation by asking women, who occupied administrative roles such as 
Finance Manager for their participation in the interview. In fact half of the interviewees 
were female, in an attempt to reduce this problem. 
Time was a major issue, especially in terms of that spent in collecting primary data in 
the UAE. Limited time was spent at each site and this may have affected rapport and to 
some extent the analysis presented in this chapter, given that primary knowledge was 
restricted to a few weeks each time in the field. 
The interviews were limited in terms of number, due to time. Apart from that some the 
answers provided were vague and not particularly easy to analyse. In providing vague 
answers, respondents were able to answer the interviewer’s question and move one step 
closer to finishing an undesired question and answer session whilst not being overly 
committed to one course of action or another. Vague answers may have resulted from 
vague questions despite the efforts made to avoid this possibility, as explained in 
Chapter 4.  
Vagueness and time issues means that the views expressed may not be representative or 
reflect the reality on the ground. The limited information provided also meant that no 
statistical analysis was possible. Any analysis was strictly qualitative and thus 
subjective in nature. This, as discussed in Chapter 4, is a source of weakness, which is 
why quantitative analysis was used in the questionnaire survey and why methodological 
plurality was employed in this investigation. 
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5.7 Chapter Summary 
The results from Abu Dhabi and Dubai were very similar. In terms of preparation, 
respondents believed that the sector was best prepared for terrorism, extreme heat and 
health and safety-related accidents. In general, with the exception of terrorism, with a 
mean of 6, limited error and a higher concentration to the right of the mean, respondents 
expressed the view that the energy sector was ill-prepared to face disaster. It can be 
said, based on the maximum values of Dubai, that workers feel more prepared for 
disaster than their Sharjah and Abu Dhabi counterparts. Shajah’s results are very 
different. This may be due to the lower number of respondents- only seven- meaning 
less than half of that for either Abu Dhabi or Dubai. Representativeness may be a key 
issue, especially when it comes to the overall graphs, which more readily reflect Dubai 
or Abu Dhabi opinion due to the disparity in the number of participants. In hindsight the 
answers from Sharjah should have perhaps been weighted differently. There was a 
perception in Sharjah that the energy sector was more prepared, with a mean of 5.73. 
The lowest levels of preparation were considered to be for terrorism and tectonic 
activity. Terrorism is in direct contrast to that experienced by energy sector workers 
elsewhere. It is also surprising that Sharjah employees believed that the public 
perceived the sector to be best prepared for terrorist acts. This may reflect national 
rather than regional resilience. 
All respondents identified renewable energy as safer than either nuclear or conventional 
options. However, 35% see it as a simple technology from an economic and technical 
point of view, a fact not supported by literature on the subject. Thirdly, war and 
terrorism were seen as key threats to the Emirati sector, despite not being specifically 
listed as possible answers. In fact 50% of respondents said that “terrorism” was the risk 
of number one concern. Climate change is also recognised as a problem, most acutely in 
Sharjah. The main barriers to resilience in the energy sector are said to be: 
 Disaster management training in the energy sector remains to be addressed (71% 
of the respondents) 
 Staff competences, especially through education, to support the understanding of 
climate change and its related disasters (31%) 
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The interview answers focused predominately on those issues brought up in the 
questionnaire. Emphasis was placed on the need for further education, awareness and 
training in order to build staff competence. 
The wider repercussions of the results and recommendations presented in this chapter 
for the development of an appropriate disaster mitigation plan and strategy are discussed 
in Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This thesis states five objectives with which to achieve the aim of drafting a framework 
to support the development of resilience within the UAE’s critical energy infrastructure 
facilities, through the introduction of a strategic disaster mitigation plan. The first four 
objectives have been dealt with in the previous chapters. The first, to identify Emirati 
critical energy infrastructure facilities and their vulnerabilities to hazards, was 
introduced in Chapter 1 and comprehensively evaluated in the literature review in 
Chapter 2. The second objective, to examine current disaster management practices and 
their relation to those infrastructures deemed critical within the energy sector, was 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 (in terms of secondary research) and in Chapter 5 (in 
terms of primary research). The third objective was achieved through Chapters 2 and 3. 
The fourth objective was considered in the literature review of Chapter 2. The fifth and 
last objective is to develop a framework for a strategic disaster mitigation plan for 
critical energy infrastructure. Chapter 3 provided a draft framework but without taking 
into account the findings, analysed in Chapter 5. Such data is evaluated in the wider 
context of the Emirati energy sector, in terms of what these findings might mean, their 
value and their contribution to the future. The limitations of the thesis in terms of the 
benefits it may bring to the disaster discipline, energy sector and the possibility of 
building resilience is also discussed.  The shortcomings of the research and future 
research topics connected to those themes presented in the thesis are also elaborated on.  
The next section proposes what kind of strategy and disaster mitigation plan is needed 
to further protect critical energy infrastructure, and what the framework may look like. 
In light of the empirical results analysed in Chapter 5, which supplement the provisional 
framework set out in Chapter 3, this chapter discusses in depth the various elements that 
constitute a well-developed strategic disaster mitigation plan for the UAE energy sector. 
The discussions range from what kind of strategic planning is required to best mitigate 
disaster in the Emirati energy sector (Section 6.1), effective forms of training and 
education (Section 6.4.1), critical energy infrastructure (Sections 6.3 and 6.5.2), the role 
of renewable energy in national development and its contribution to resilience through 
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the diversification of the energy matrix (Section 6.4.2), the importance of creating a 
platform for dialogue and the sharing of information within the government. The 
structure of the document (Section 6.6) and its communication (Section 6.2) are also 
discussed. 
6.1 Proposed Strategic Disaster Mitigation Plan 
Critical factors for a successful strategic disaster mitigation plan and disaster 
management, according to Moe and Pathranarakul (2006, p412), include effective 
organisational (or institutional) arrangements, coordination and collaboration, 
supportive laws and regulations, effective information systems and communication, 
managerial and team member competence, effective consultation with key stakeholders, 
clearly defined goals and commitments by all parties, effective logistics and sufficient 
mobilisation and disbursement management; in other words, a comprehensive set of 
measures across the entire disaster lifecycle. All of these need to be discussed and 
developed in the establishment of a multi-year plan. 
The environment and ecological resilience should not be overlooked or downplayed. 
Any strategies must be anchored to national Emirati policies and legislation 
Communication and dissemination plays an integral role in preventative disaster 
management. Measures and protocols for communication strategies should also be 
included. Finally a disaster mitigation plan may discuss relevant case studies and should 
include general recommendations, conclusion and future outlook, so that following data 
collection and analysis, the following issues, first highlighted in Chapter 3, can be 
discussed in more detail: 
1. Identify the targets – who might be affected and who might not? 
2.  Type of help – “what assistance do they need? 
3. Timing– When will assistance be most useful and when will circumstances 
allow assistance? 
4. Theme– What are the themes, issues, concerns and threats that should be 
considered in order to build and plan the right intervention package? What 
has already happened and what will happen in connection with the incident? 
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5. Team and Resources– What resources will it take to provide the right 
interventions at the right time(s)? 
 
Based on the data analysis of Chapter 5, the first question has a simple answer. Those 
that were predominately identified as key actors were the workers directly affected by 
hazards, latent failures and disastrous events. The next question also is associated with 
the same theme, i.e. issues, concerns and threats. The literature review and the responses 
to the questionnaires showed that key potential hazards included tectonic activity such 
as earthquakes and tsunamis, climatic activity such as shamal and flooding, landslides 
and a host of manmade disasters such as war, terrorism and chemical spills and/or 
explosions. Most respondents in their questionnaires and all those interviewed 
(management staff) stated that education and training were among the most important 
interventions when it came to developing a strategic plan for disaster mitigation. Further 
assistance, in terms of training and personal development, is crucial, given that the 
workers identified the main barrier as: 
 Disaster management training (71% of respondents felt that it remained to be 
addressed) 
 Staff competences (31% thought that the lack of education on climate change 
and its related disasters was a problem and required attention) 
 
To complement the above, questionnaire respondents stated that it was necessary to: 
 Undertake simulations that assess and verify the level of personnel preparation, 
organisational structure in disaster response and resource capacity installed  
 Develop a better planning stage for disaster preparation  
 Achieve greater awareness, which means giving higher priority to the issue. 
 
In terms of timing, the third question on Doherty’s list, all these issues are proactive 
responses to disaster management. That is to say that they must occur before a disaster 
strikes. Given the long term nature of a training and development programme, it is in 
the Emirati energy sector’s best interest to launch it as soon as practicably possible. 
Before any launch however, and based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and the 
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data analysed in Chapter 5, the Ministry of Energy needs to ascertain in greater detail 
the exact type and level of disaster preparation training, education and awareness. 
Interviews undertaken with management across the three sites, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and 
Sharjah, particularly emphasised the role of professional training and further education 
to combat disaster. Such initiatives proposed to go beyond those individuals working in 
the energy sector and into the reach of schoolchildren and university students. The level 
of training and general awareness was seen as having great importance, contributing 
significantly to the ability to make the right strategic decisions for sustainable 
development. 
For disaster mitigation to support development, any strategic plan must be undertaken in 
a way which optimises resources, thus reducing the duplication of effort. It should also 
initiate, or improve upon, the possibility of constructing collaborations, shared 
responsibilities and joint actions across the science-policy interface. This should in turn 
support the writing of guidance for policymakers and professional practitioners (such as 
those participants in the questionnaires and interviews) in and beyond the energy sector. 
Management representatives must therefore come together and meet with those 
politicians best placed to amend policy and practices. Any changes in terms of 
procedures and strategies must be integrated across the spectrum of installations 
associated with the energy sector, if training and development is to be truly successful. 
Committees and dialogues must occur first (See Section 6.2). They should also be 
accompanied by the closure of knowledge gaps and the re-examination of how things 
are currently being done. Pilot studies can then follow, followed by more widespread 
innovation in disaster management. This task requires multiple experts and a 
considerable amount of time. This leads to the discussion of the final question in 
Doherty’s (2008) list: What resources will it take in order to provide the right 
interventions at the right time(s)?  
In the interviews it was stated that resources that add to the overall level of awareness in 
the construction of improved strategic decisions and the drawing up of plans were much 
needed. The possibility of enhancing energy sector resilience was frequently linked to 
research and an investment in the right personnel to achieve resilience. Specifically, one 
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of the respondents, highlighted the importance on risk knowledge, identification of risks 
and ways of dealing with it: 
 “…Focus on this aspect and the rewriting of key risk concepts related to the 
energy sector in a simple and understandable way, in order to raise the level of 
scientific knowledge and understanding of disaster phenomena”.  
There was a notable consensus that any resource investment and utilisation should focus 
on preventative measures rather than reactive actions. There was however limited 
solution provision with many respondents identifying key issues and what any future 
resources would need to achieve, but not providing much input as to which resources 
would be most useful. There was no talk of timeframe or personnel assignation, in terms 
of the number of hours needed to attain what was being asked for etc. Regional and 
international experiences were said to be key, but again nothing detailed was mentioned 
as to what exactly would contribute to the resilience of the Emirati energy sector. 
National government ministries and legislation were seen as important to encourage 
experience sharing and umbrella procedures, but no information was provided to direct 
the researcher more precisely towards what exactly should be shared or which 
procedures were useful. There seemed to be an overriding reluctance to provide real 
solutions with strategic actions that could be followed up. This may be to do with the 
desire to look knowledgeable in front of the researcher and not suggest ideas that may 
indicate otherwise. It may also be a way to minimise responsibility in the future, in the 
sense that if an individual identifies a possible solution he or she may then be put in 
charge of seeing it through.  
Accountability is a key component of any strategic disaster mitigation plan which not 
only serves to reduce risk but also acts as a catalyst for development. National 
legislation and actors such as the National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management 
Authority must ensure that any implementation of a disaster strategy and the actions that 
stem from it are monitored and audited independently to ensure not only legal 
compliance but also the establishment of the highest global standards. All information, 
apart from the most sensitive, should be made available on request to the general public, 
or least the community affected. Such information could include natural or man-made 
(terrorist) alerts, the official response, the consequences of an event and the key actions 
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put in place to reduce or prevent damage from its future recurrence. Preventive 
measures such as planning policy and urban and mains grid mapping should also be 
made public, where a clear societal interest has been identified. 
To incorporate all the above into a strategic disaster mitigation plan, it is essential that a 
set of targets are established at every level of governance. Such aims should differ 
slightly according to the nature of the disasters faced and the capacity with which to 
meet the targets. There should be a supporting government drive to bring each level to a 
certain standard, so that cooperation can occur when it comes to trans-boundary issues 
such as tectonic activity. This can be done following the training and education. 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, training and education are two important tools to 
combat vulnerability and to build resilience. Both are integral components of a long-
term disaster mitigation strategy. Despite the emphasis placed on the building of 
professional competencies, by those responding to the questionnaire as well as those 
interviewed, only an explanation as to why and for whom disaster education was 
necessary was given. No one stated what they needed to involve and how one might go 
about doing this, which is not helpful when it comes to strategic decision making. 
Section 6.4.1, according to the knowledge presented in this thesis, discusses what kind 
of educational development and training is needed and how it might contribute to the 
disaster discourse and the strategy for disaster mitigation. Such information should 
provide added value to those communities at risk, and to disaster and energy 
practitioners using this thesis to build resilience into the Emirati energy sector. 
Meanwhile, the next section considers the communication of the strategic plan. 
6.2 Communicating a Strategic Disaster Mitigation Plan 
One of the key issues revealed in the questionnaire and interview sessions was the role 
of the government and especially the need for the coordination and sharing of disaster 
policy and practices across energy generating sites. For resilience to be built and 
maintained, the Emirati Government (on a ministry level and below), in order to reach 
local level departments, must improve communication to ensure standardised and 
coherent operations in the running and protection of critical infrastructure. As first 
elaborated upon in Chapter 3, all communication processes should occur transparently 
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and involve multi-stakeholder input. An example of where such communication is 
beneficial is the holistic look at land use designation and policy, urban and spatial 
planning and construction/reconstruction, so as to address potential risks in a preventive 
and decisive manner. It is not sufficient to bring together a skilled and capable 
committee and external consultants to design and develop a disaster mitigation plan for 
a certain circumstance if no one knows the plan even exists. Even if one does know of 
their existence, the plan and protocol need to be accessible – both physically and 
conceptually. In other words, those who need to access it and train their staff, according 
to the information contained within a plan, should know where they can obtain a copy. 
It is best to have both a hard and an electronic copy. The latter is easier to share on mass 
but a physical copy is useful for reference and for training purposes. Furthermore, if a 
disaster results in the loss of power and/or data, a hard copy is the only copy a team may 
have available to them. Furthermore, any copy must be readable.  In some cases, various 
translations of the master document may be required. 
Any communication team must prioritise the timely delivery of information to target 
audiences. For example, whilst team leaders in energy generating plants need the plan in 
its entirety, a community leader will potentially only be interested in the section, plan 
and protocols that specifically relate to community resilience. In this case, it may be 
prudent to ensure that this section (or chapter) is simplified. This represents one way of 
using appropriate communication mechanisms to ensure that the message gets across. 
According to Haddow and Haddow (2013), for the successful dissemination of a 
disaster mitigation plan, those responsible for writing it (in this case the tripartite 
committee) must consider the ultimate goal of the disaster mitigation plan, in 
measurable terms, and the objectives that one should establish in order to reach that 
goal. The audience, the messengers, the tools and the time allocated to communicate the 
plan should also be considered.  
When considering the audience, a plan and the means of communicating that plan must 
identify the functional needs of those who will be using it. Perhaps the most 
complicated component is the community. The way to address elderly members of the 
Emirati community, some of whom are illiterate, is not the same as the way one 
addresses young and equally illiterate children. Tools should thus be used in 
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combination to get the attention of all involved. Older members may prefer the more 
traditional means of Bedouin communication, i.e. word of mouth, from community 
leaders to the wider group. Others still may use the television and radio. Younger 
generations may be more reachable via social networks and online streaming platforms. 
Equally important are those individuals selected to bear the message. For some, 
demographic groups elected and appointed government officials. His Royal Highness 
and UAE president Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan is a good example of an official who 
is widely respected by the population. His intervention would have an extremely 
positive impact on the general population’s adherence to the disaster mitigation plan. 
For children, the message could be more effective if given by animated characters. 
Finally, and like with any plan, there should be an evaluation phase with the goal of 
continual improvement. This should also be communicated so that there is informed 
forward progress, future collaboration and consensus. 
The above paragraphs represent the details of a framework for a communication process 
for the dissemination of a strategic disaster plan. These are of course subject to change 
and depend very much on the nature and network of the tripartite members. It is thus 
poignant to remember, that the fundamental role and characteristics of communication 
in disaster planning lies in the detail.  This is according to Luchini (2014, p.198): 
… to be considered through resilience characteristics in terms of coherence of the 
message, robustness of the channel… subculture and those who send the messages. 
In addition to a brief outline of a communicative process in the strategic disaster 
mitigation plan, the tripartite committee should also develop a far more detailed 
“National Emergency Communications Plan” for the four years that the mitigation plan 
operates. It should also be updated regularly, given the speed of progress in the 
telecommunications sector, technology and the way in which the general public choose 
to communicate. The rules and recommendations that apply on the update of the 
mitigation plan are also of relevance here. 
6.3 What is Considered to be Critical Energy Infrastructure? 
In Chapter 2, critical energy infrastructure was shown to have a broad definition. It was 
said to include any: 
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“… physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication 
networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, 
would significantly impact on the nation or affect its ability to ensure national security” 
[p30] 
Here in this study, it was however, ultimately the energy sector managers that identified 
the most critical aspects of infrastructure - their significance and function. Their 
decision, as is frequently the case, was performed using a qualitative approach, based on 
expert judgement, and a limited range of risk attributes, i.e. high, medium and low, as 
highlighted by Setola and Geretshuber (2009). In turn, the choice of range tended to be 
linked to economic costs, ease of replacement (should a unit fail) and overall impact on 
the electricity service in the region. Subsequently, the distribution lines and cables were 
seen as the least critical, and the most resilient. Most managers saw the generating 
stations as the most significant weakness due to the expense and complexity to bring 
them back on line. Others refused to break the system down into its individual 
structures, stating that it can only ever be seen as a whole.  
6.4 Barriers and Ways of Improving Disaster Resilience 
This section elaborates on the findings concerning disaster education, disaster training 
and awareness, along with a full and correct understanding of renewable energy and its 
potential integration in the energy sector. It will discuss, in depth, the mechanisms that 
can be put in place to address such issues.  
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the TOSE measures of resilience (Chang and 
Shinozuka, 2004) are these:  
 Technical resilience refers to how well physical systems perform.  
 Organisational resilience refers to the ability of organisations to respond to 
emergencies and carry out critical functions. 
 Social resilience refers to the capacity to reduce the negative societal 
consequences of loss of critical services.  
 Economic resilience refers to the capacity to reduce both direct and indirect 
economic losses. 
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The results reported in Chapter 5 are more focused on the organisational and social 
issues of resilience. Technical and economic resilience were not directly addressed, but 
rather provided some insights into how the draft strategic disaster mitigation plan 
should evolve into the final strategic plan. Limited disaster awareness and training were 
the main organisational problems, alongside staff competences and communications, as 
well as misunderstandings regarding renewable energy technologies. Social resilience 
was addressed via questions eliciting energy sector workers’ perceptions of the general 
public’s views on and readiness to cope with potential disaster events. This section 
takes each of these topics in turn and addresses the issues raised. 
6.4.1 Effective forms of training and education 
It is no secret that formal education and professional training on disaster mitigation and 
risk reduction are an integral part of a forward looking, longer-term strategy for 
anticipating risk. 
Given the emphasis placed on training improvements, the recommendations made by 
the researcher at the end of Chapter 5 included the generation of networks of learning to 
facilitate the exchange of best practices and the sharing of resources between companies 
or across the various public bodies. The aim here would be to increase the quantity and 
quality of resources dedicated to research and innovation. Both are long-term strategies 
which require the integrated effort of various actors across the public and private 
sectors. Financial resources need to be set aside to develop an application system and 
regulations, either nationally or internationally, and to fund three or four-year research 
studentships. There also needs to be funding for those professionals charged with 
making the decisions on research priorities and the kinds of professional and/or 
academic candidates best placed to complete a doctorate degree and apply their 
knowledge to the Emirati energy sector on their return. Learning networks also take 
time to become established. Conferences and debates need to be offered to those actors 
in private companies and public bodies, in order to begin the process of knowledge 
sharing and building. One could begin, for example, by inviting those members who 
attended the 2015 World Future Energy Summit in Abu Dhabi. Another important 
consideration when it comes to building knowledge networks is Masdar City and the 
associated initiatives such as the Abu Dhabi Government-owned Mubadala 
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Development Company, with its mission to invest, incubate and advance the 
establishment of a clean energy industry in Abu Dhabi and around the world. This is 
especially true given its international status and credibility within clean tech and energy 
research. Groups such as those linked with Masdar also support the construction of 
knowledge and analysis of risk and risk prevalence. They may also help government 
ministries to achieve another recommendation for strengthening disaster management 
policies. It is equally likely that they could aid research programmes that investigate 
investment possibilities and various financially and technically viable solutions. 
In short, long-term strategic planning is necessary to mitigate disaster. In the first 
instance, the government must ascertain which actors, both national and international, 
have the knowledge and capacity to research, more comprehensively, the issues 
presented here. Conferences and committees are a good first step in bringing competent 
individuals together to begin dialogue. Once capacity has been built and communication 
enhanced, strategic planning must focus on policy, legislation and practice. It is 
important to have a standard in the private and public sectors that applies across the 
board. The timeframe for attaining at least a platform from which a national strategy can 
be developed should be less than three years.  
It is not however, a case of simply building knowledge and enhancing awareness, as 
Shaw and Oikawa (2014) point out, given that, in their experience, Japanese high school 
children are particularly aware and knowledgeable when it comes to a whole host of 
natural hazards, but are not able to translate theoretical lessons into practical action. For 
these authors, the most successful form of professional training and preparation for the 
reduction of risk  has been the delivery of extremely realistic, action-oriented education 
in  reducing disaster and risk; this then has to be linked to the roles and responsibilities 
of local government, schools, homes and the wider community. All such actors must 
have a basic level of disaster education. If one can remove, or at least reduce, some of 
the vulnerabilities that they face, resilience will be built – not just in the energy sector 
but generally. For example, should the emergency services have to focus their 
immediate efforts on digging trapped people out of the ground, considering that with the 
most basic disaster training, these people could have evacuated the building, it will take 
them longer to bring the energy installations and other forms of infrastructure back on 
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line. By taking such precautionary measures, the recovery period can be shortened and 
the resilience triangle can shrink to an almost unnoticeable size. As the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG, 2011) states, increasing awareness of the local 
community, regarding the threats directly relating to them and what can be done on an 
individual (household) level to actively plan and prepare, can and does save lives and 
assets. 
The kind of education that COAG refers to is that of frequent emergency drills and 
simulations, the re-evaluating of escape routes and behaviours that hinder good health 
and safety practice. It may also encompass the installation of domestic technologies 
such as evacuation alarms, in the event of fire or tectonic activity. Such devices act as 
early warning systems and increase the probability of survival. Training and education 
should take place in schools and higher education institutions, village meeting places, 
and in the offices/workplaces of key sectors or professions such as town planners. Rural 
(traditional Bedouin) Emirati women and other vulnerable individuals or groups should 
not only be included but encouraged to champion and hold a leading position in the 
development and operation of such initiatives.  Traditional community values, such as 
those held by Bedouin, should be reinforced. Education and training programmes 
should not come at the expense of independence, resourcefulness and cooperation. The 
community receiving disaster and risk reduction training must be encouraged to make 
full use of their pre-existing managerial skills, creativity, and innovative and lateral 
thinking. In fact, and according to Fernandez et al (2012), the real and noticeable 
difference, following educational drives, must come from within the community which 
can then take ownership of it. If not, funding and material support may be wasted or 
mismanaged. 
For energy sector professionals involved in disaster management and mitigation, such 
as those working in the public sector, any training or education must be focused on 
advanced planning and the mobilising of resources to combat disaster. It must also have 
motivational elements, not just education and theory. Any disaster management training 
must be offered at the beginning of any contractual appointment, and updated 
frequently, at least, on an annual basis, with refresher events. It is beneficial to use case 
study examples and practical actions, tailored to the needs of the organisation and the 
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level (capacity) of the group (Collins, 2000). Inviting disaster training professionals 
from recognised bodies is also beneficial. Education must, however, be directed towards 
key aspects of the energy sector such as the protection and the building resilience of 
critical energy infrastructure. In order to safeguard something however, one must 
identify its definition and scope, hence the importance of the next section. 
6.4.2 Renewable Energy, Development and Disaster Resilience 
One of the key aspects of the questionnaire and interviews was the possibility of 
utilising renewable energy to make the energy sector more resilient and ultimately less 
reliant on fossil fuels. The problem is however one of perception. All worker 
participants commented that renewable energy technologies were the weakest link in the 
chain. In fact, not a single participant felt that alternative energies were a real option to 
build resilience, contrary to research undertaken elsewhere and discussed above. 
Renewable energy may be seen as weak due to the limited attention given to these 
technologies prior to the appointment of Al Mazrouei as the Energy Minister, which 
happened subsequent to the questionnaire. There is certainly some recognition by 
questionnaire respondents as to the benefits that renewable energy may have on overall 
energy sector. This acknowledgement is somewhat contrary to the statement by 
respondents that renewable energy is not a technology capable of reducing vulnerability. 
Renewable energy was also conspicuous by its absence, in interviews with 
management, when it came to identifying the need to diversify the energy matrix and to 
include alternative cleaner options. This limited awareness does not reflect the national 
policy to promote renewable technologies, in order to reduce the financial risk of what 
was then associated with a high oil price, established back in 2012. Both Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai promoted the generation of electricity by non-conventional energy, by setting 
targets of seven and five percent respectively of installed capacity by 2030. This is 
equal to 1.5 GW of a total 23 GW (Krane, 2014).  
A key finding is thus the need to not only promote renewable energy, in terms of 
technical capability and installed capacity, but also to educate and build awareness 
about the benefits of its inclusion in the energy matrix as part of a disaster mitigation 
strategic plan. 
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Apart from that, a truly holistic mitigation plan for the UAE must incorporate personnel 
from various disciplines, including experts in the integration of renewable energy policy 
and practices. It must not take the traditional path of solely improving the existing large 
infrastructures via the reinforcing of transmission towers, the construction of sea 
defences around power plants, the stockpiling of larger amounts of fuel at plants etc. 
Instead, and as Evans and Fox-Penner (2014) indicate, disaster mitigation plans must 
encompass a combination of local generation and storage, increased procedural 
redundancy, conventional system hardening and stockpiling and smart grid 
functionality. Then and only then could an energy system be called resilient.  
6.5 Amended Topics and Structure of Final Disaster Framework 
Chapter 3 introduced the practical knowledge needed to develop a draft strategic 
mitigation plan. It discussed some of its key elements such as how it will be constructed 
and which content is significant. The latter included the definition, explanation and 
typology of hazards and vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure and barriers to resilience 
in technical, organisational and economic terms. The results presented in Chapter 5 will 
now be integrated into the draft framework to create the final strategic disaster 
mitigation framework. 
6.5.1 Amendments to Hazards and Vulnerabilities 
This section remains largely unchanged from the material presented in Chapter 2 and 
consolidated in Chapter 3. The major exception is a greater level of detail that will be 
provided for those manmade disasters and vulnerabilities such as social unrest, war and 
terrorism, which were identified as key concerns by the participants. 
6.5.2 Amendments to Critical Infrastructure 
The information provided in Chapter 2 will be supplemented by the responses of those 
participating in the interviews. Examples of key case studies and infrastructures, using 
the three power plants, will be included. A semi-quantitative cost-benefit evaluation of 
key infrastructure, as part of a risk assessment, will build on the qualitative analysis 
provided by the management staff in their respective interviews so that financial and 
human resources can be properly assigned, managed and directed to the most critical 
components of the energy sector. 
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6.5.3 Structure of the final disaster mitigation plan document 
Figure 6.1 shows a chapter-by-chapter structure of what the founding strategic disaster 
mitigation framework document could look like, taking as its basis the themes explained 
in this chapter and publishing them in a precise manner, to aid those who will make the 
plan a reality within Emirati disaster policy and practice. 
The first chapters of a disaster mitigation plan, as discussed in Chapter 3, must include 
the national, regional and global context, i.e. the current state of disaster theory, key 
definitions and data and key concepts regarding the UAE in terms of legal, 
environmental, social and economic aspects and the potential disaster that could serve to 
disrupt them. Much of this context can be found in Chapter 2 of this thesis. It will also 
integrate the primary questionnaire and interview data when it comes to concerns such 
as barriers. The third chapter of the disaster mitigation plan could include information 
pertaining to the document itself. In other words, it could point to how it was 
constructed and by whom. The scope, objectives and rationale behind the plan and the 
risk assessment should be explained. This helps to support future continuity, and to 
answer questions about validity, representativeness and reliability.  The following 
chapters will follow the disaster management cycle, first introduced in Chapter 2. It is 
worth reiterating, as stated in the literature review, that the process of dividing the 
disaster process into various, albeit overlapping, stages is a useful heuristic device 
driving better understanding (Levinson and Granot, 2002) from which a disaster 
management plan can be implemented. It is, however, quite difficult because they are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive of each other (Latfifi, 2010). This difficulty is 
another reason why a tripartite committee should be engaged in the establishment and 
communication of a strategic mitigation plan. There needs to be a consensus between all 
parties (government, industry and civil society) as to the exact structure and content of 
each chapter in the disaster plan so that all components are fairly and equally 
considered. Chapter 6 of the plan, monitoring and evaluation, will act as a feedback 
loop to the participants of this thesis. Having identified their concerns this part will act 
as a plan-do-check-act method. 
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Figure 6.1: Strategic Disaster Mitigation Plan, chapter by chapter 
 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has evaluated the importance of the results presented in Chapter 5 and 
supported by the literature review (Chapter 2) and the draft disaster framework (Chapter 
3). It has discussed the content and communication of a strategic disaster mitigation 
plan, including the important barriers that need to be considered. The amendments to 
the draft plan have been highlighted. 
The final chapter discusses the important practical and theoretical contributions of the 
thesis to knowledge in the energy sector and the wider academic world and explains 
how such knowledge would be integrated into the final strategic disaster mitigation 
plan. It also considers the limitations of this study and makes some suggestions for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
7.0 Introduction 
This research aimed to develop a framework to enhance the resilience of the UAE’s 
critical energy infrastructure facilities through a strategic disaster mitigation plan. This 
principal purpose was subsequently broken down into five research objectives and their 
accompanying research question, which were addressed throughout and discussed 
comprehensively. In this concluding chapter, the most important findings are 
synthesised. Before going through each objective and question, it is worth reiterating 
the importance of this study. 
Firstly, it is recognised on a global scale that population increases combined with an 
ever more complex society and economic and geopolitical systems means that more 
people and assets are vulnerable to hazards than ever before. In Chapter 1, it was noted 
that since 1973 disaster statistics have seen a rising trend (UNISDR, 2012; Guha-Sapir 
et al, 2003). Such statistics report that between 2000 and 2011, 2.7 billion people have 
been affected by hazards, 1.1 million of whom lost their lives as a result (UNISDR, 
2012). The financial cost is also escalating. This means that developing and emerging 
nations are particularly vulnerable to natural hazards and ill-prepared for terrorist threats 
and activity. For the UAE specifically, the range of disasters that the nation could face 
is appreciable, given that they could stem from tectonic activity, climate change and 
even terrorism, as explained in the literature review in Chapter 2. Given the numerous 
types of hazards that could impact the UAE, the energy sector in particular must reduce 
vulnerability and build resilience both in the infrastructure and in the communities 
threatened by a potential disaster. Failure to protect the Emirati energy system and 
prepare it for future hazards, regardless of their specific origin, means that the country 
as a whole will be severely weakened in its ability to defend and govern during and 
following a catastrophe. Communication systems, transport links, hospitals and the 
emergency services, for instance, all depend on a stable and constant energy supply, no 
more so than in the aftermath. A loss of power will most likely have longer-lasting 
impacts on the economy and geopolitical status. It will also affect social cohesion and 
individuals’ ability to rebuild their lives and the community which they inhabit. 
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This research represents one of many efforts helping direct the UAE into a more 
resilient and sustainable future. It provided a means to explore key concepts of disaster 
resilience for future planning in urban development and in the prevention of terrorism, 
the understanding of climatic phenomena linked to the exacerbation of global warming 
and some of the consequences linked to natural phenomena. It identified weaknesses in 
key issues such as education and training, including latent failures. It thus provides a 
platform for enhancing the competence of employees in the energy sector. In turn, their 
ability to react and communicate in a more efficient manner during a disaster event and 
its immediate aftermath could save lives and protect assets (financial, social or 
environmental). This research also supports long-term planning and the procedures that 
contribute to the overall wellbeing of the energy sector and the nation as a whole by 
reducing the time needed to recover from an event. In short, this research cements the 
five pillars of resilience: preparedness; protection, early warning, emergency response 
and recovery, by giving key actors in civil society, industry and the public sector the 
means with which to discuss disaster issues and to develop strategic mitigation plans, as 
elaborated in Chapters 3 and 6 of this thesis. 
7.1 Research Objectives Revisited 
Apart from the contributions of this thesis to the energy sector and their impact on it, 
there are also contributions that are beneficial to academia and specifically to disaster 
theory. First and foremost, this thesis serves to highlight some issues of perception and 
challenges in the UAE and calls disaster practitioners to use their knowledge and 
expertise to help the Emirati government disseminate information such as that relating 
to renewable energy or disaster management programmes, in a more efficient way. In 
many cases, this thesis, especially in Chapter 2, updates country specific information, 
which has not been generally available post 2007. This research arguably represents the 
first of its kind in its seeking to understand the issues that concern energy sector 
workers and managers in the field, by directly soliciting this information from them. 
This gives a unique insight into some major problems, either latent or experienced on 
the ground. That said, to truly understand the importance of the findings for both the 
Emirati energy sector and disaster theory, the objectives and questions were considered 
previously, but now warrant a more precise answer. 
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Research Objective 1: “To identify Emirati critical energy infrastructure facilities 
and their vulnerabilities to hazards”. 
Associated research question: “How and to what extent is the state of the Emirati 
critical energy infrastructure facilities vulnerable to hazards?”  
Chapter 2 of the thesis discussed certain aspects of the multiple and diverse hazards, 
both natural and manmade, that could potentially affect the energy sector and the 
Emirati society. These include those relating to tectonic activity, climatic phenomenon, 
accidents and terrorism. The complication in answering this question comes not in the 
identification of the hazard but rather in the identification of the infrastructure deemed 
critical. In the first instance, the identification of criticality, by both energy sector 
workers in their questionnaire and management in their interviews, was subjective.  The 
identification was based not on quantitative modelling or semi-quantitative scenarios 
but rather on intuition, built on experience.  Their decision, as is frequently the case, 
was performed using a qualitative approach, based on expert judgement, and a limited 
range of risk attributes i.e. high, medium and low, an approached critiqued by Setola 
and Geretshuber (2009). It is not the most appropriate form of decision making and in 
the absence of a logical chain derived from a suitable form of risk analysis, it is difficult 
to say with any degree of certainty which infrastructure is the most vulnerable and 
warrants investment (financial or otherwise). A lack of quantitative data can also result 
in a loss in perspective and makes standardised policy and practices all the more 
difficult to achieve. A deeper discussion of the need for more quantitative 
measurements can be found in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
Another problem encountered is the fact that critical infrastructure is not necessarily an 
easily definable physical object but rather an indefinable network. Its ‘parts’ often, if 
not always, constitute more than one sector and are critical to many societal functions, 
not just those isolated to power production. All parts make up the whole and it takes a 
holistic perspective to fully immerse oneself in the real concept of critical infrastructure. 
While some energy facility managers identified in their interviews physical components 
as “resilient” or “vulnerable”, others refused to break the system down into its 
individual structures, stating that it can only ever be seen as a whole. At some point, 
however, one has to try to separate components in order to enhance the resilience of the 
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whole. After all, it would be counterproductive, if not impossible, to afford the same 
level of protection and financial input to the safeguarding of a single cable as for a gas 
turbine. The need to manage vulnerability more intelligently leads naturally to the 
second objective. 
Research Objective 2: “To examine current disaster management practices and their 
relation to those infrastructures deemed critical within the energy sector”.  
Associated research question: “What are the current disaster management practices 
and what is their relation to those infrastructures deemed critical within the energy 
sector?” 
Participants shared little information as to the exact nature of disaster practices and what 
could be done to solve any underlying issues. Whilst there was a notable consensus that 
any improvement measures needed to be focused on preventative measures rather than 
reactive actions, there was no talk of timeframe, of personnel assignation in terms of 
hours or indeed of other resources required to improve disaster practices. It is difficult 
to provide an exact description, given the absence of answers regarding current 
activities. There seemed to be an overriding reluctance to provide real solutions with 
follow-up actions. This may be to do with the desire to appear knowledgeable to the 
researcher by refraining from suggesting anything that may indicate otherwise. It may 
also be a way to minimise responsibility in the future, in the sense that if an individual 
identifies a possible solution he or she may then be put in charge of seeing it through.  
Regardless, the current Emirati disaster management practices in the energy sector need 
to be enhanced and modified to reflect the reality of an energy network as opposed to 
physical isolated installations. The final framework for a strategic disaster mitigation 
plan as a platform has its basis in increased dialogue and tripartite solutions between 
civil society, the State and industrial actors. It is not the ideal scenario, but it does 
provide a means to answer this question satisfactorily in the near future. The ultimate 
aim of this thesis, which is also its general contribution, is the improvement of 
operations, policies and practices of the Emirati energy practitioners and the community 
through a strategic plan. This plan must support the sustainable development of a UAE 
that is better and more proactive in its preparation for any potential hazard (manmade or 
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natural) that could temporarily or permanently affect the sovereignty and functionality 
of the country and its population, particularly when it comes to those matters associated 
with energy. 
Research Objective 3: “Critically evaluating existing barriers to the application of 
disaster management practices on critical energy facilities in UAE”.  
Associated research questions: “What are the barriers that affect the application of 
disaster management practices on critical energy facilities in UAE” and “How can 
these barriers be reduced?” 
Answers to these questions were provided in the primary research by both general 
workers and site managers. Data analysis in Chapter 4 identified the main barriers as: 
 Disaster management training, 71% of respondents felt that it remains to be 
addressed 
 Staff competences, 31% thought that the lack of education on climate change 
and its related disasters was a problem and required attention 
 
To complement the above, respondents of the questionnaire stated that it was necessary 
to: 
 Undertake simulations to assess and verify the state of personnel preparation, 
organisational structure in disaster response and resource capacity installed  
 Develop a better planning stage for disaster preparation  
 Achieve greater awareness, which means to give more priority to the issue 
 
Given the consensus that training and general awareness level are of great importance 
and that they contribute significantly to the ability to make the right strategic decisions, 
the implications of this research are highly relevant. If education, training and elevated 
staff competences are considered important by management, then one must further 
question why employees feel that the current level of training is not sufficient. Quite 
clearly therefore, management staff representatives need to come together and meet 
with those policymakers best placed to amend energy sector policy and practices. Any 
changes in terms of procedures and strategies must be integrated across the spectrum of 
172 
 
installations associated with the energy sector, if training and development are to be 
truly successful. Committees and dialogues must be established first (see Chapter 3). 
They should also be accompanied by the closure of knowledge gaps and the re-
examination of how things are currently being done. Pilot studies could be conducted, 
followed by widespread innovation in disaster management. This task requires multiple 
experts and a considerable amount of time. Such efforts will be better programmed if 
undertaken as part of a strategic disaster mitigation plan developed within the national 
context. Hence the inclusion of the fourth objective. 
Research Objective 4: “To contextualise and define the concepts of disaster 
resilience and strategic mitigation planning within the UAE”. 
The discussion of this objective is well developed in the literature review of Chapter 2.  
Consequently, only two relevant points will be highlighted. In 2015, social media, for 
example, plays a key role in strategic mitigation and communications before, during and 
following the aftermath of a disaster. In 2013, the National Crisis and Emergency 
Management Authority (NCEMA) were taken by surprise by the rapid spread of 
misinformation following two earthquakes. The situation forced NCEMA to appear on 
national television and various press conferences in order to calm the public after 
exaggeration led to widespread panic. The threat of panic due to incorrect and/or 
unsubstantiated information entering the public realm means that NCEMA, and various 
other institutions must maintain a constant presence on social media platforms 
(YouTube, Twitter and Facebook accounts), so as to alert members of the public with 
disaster facts and the necessary information for the prevention of disaster and advice 
during and immediately after it.  
Another key point worthy of comment, specifically for the energy sector, is the wider 
recognition in 2015 of the need to diversify the energy matrix with 
renewable/alternative energies. Renewable energy can play a key role in the 
development of a more resilient energy sector, sustainable economy and community. 
When larger conventional power plants fail to operate, following tectonic movement for 
example, the distributed form of energy that comes from solar and wind farms etc can 
play a part in keeping the lights on in those urban areas affected by a disaster. The 
possibility of  keeping important facilities such as hospitals or emergency service 
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locations working then further reduces the risk of indirect casualties or fatalities. 
IRENA is headquartered in the UAE and should support  strategic disaster mitigation 
planning and policy via the diversification of the national energy matrix and the 
reinforcing of strategic technologies such as concentrated solar power, which would 
make the country less vulnerable to natural hazards, social unrest and terrorism. The 
government needs to work harder to ensure that expert information is passed down to 
national actors for the benefit of Emirati development. It must facilitate communication 
and the establishment of committees that serve as bridges, not as barriers (see Section 
2.5.4). Existing barriers can be removed through the development of a framework, as 
proposed in the answer to objective 5. 
Research Objective 5: “To develop a framework through a strategic disaster 
mitigation plan for critical energy infrastructure”.  
Associated research question: “Why does the Emirati energy sector has not adopted 
a strategic disaster mitigation plan?” 
Based on the evidence presented in this thesis, the adoption of a strategic disaster 
mitigation plan has not occurred for various reasons. One of the most important ones is 
the evident lack of communication, particularly apparent in the drive for renewable 
energy from high ranking officials (and from those lower down) that has simply not 
reached those working on the frontline of energy generation. Furthermore, if training 
and education programmes are noticeable by their absence, it is unlikely that 
communication between managers and employees is optimal. Training and education 
play a key role in ensuring safety, good working practices and resilience. They can also 
provide a platform for the voicing of concerns. Another reason for the lack of a strategic 
disaster plan is the cultural reluctance to find solutions to identified problems, as has 
been discussed previously.   
The thesis should thus contribute to the development and dissemination of a 
comprehensively written framework to build resilience and sounder practices in the 
energy sector. Ultimately, the success and limitations of this study in facilitating better 
disaster management practices in the energy sector depends on the practitioners and 
policymakers themselves. This research calls for standardised practices and protocols 
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within the energy sector. It calls for greater awareness in terms of theoretical knowledge 
among sector workers and key members of society and government. It demonstrates the 
need for dialogue and for inviting industrial leaders and high level academics from other 
countries to participate in building a more resilient UAE. It is perhaps wise to use the 
annual renewable energy conferences in Abu Dhabi in a more constructive way than as 
a “showcase of talents.” Indeed, such professionals could help in diversifying the 
energy matrix via clean technology. This is one example of how a proactive vision and 
policy, rather than a reactive stance, can support communities, industry and the 
government to deal with vulnerabilities prior to a state of emergency. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Framework for critical energy infrastructure based on a strategic 
disaster mitigation plan 
Natural and manmade disasters were identified during questionnaires survey and critical 
infrastructure components were also identified during both the survey and interviews. 
Barriers were highlighted during question survey and interview components of the 
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disaster mitigation plan were discussed in Chapter 6. These are highlighted in the 
framework presented in Figure 6.1.  
 
7.2 Limitations of this Study 
In this section two main limitations are considered. The first relates to the limitations of 
the thesis for the academic community; the second to limitations with respect to with 
the Emirati energy sector.  
In both cases, a thesis, is limited by the number of people who read it and act 
accordingly. If this thesis remains on a shelf, it will be ineffectual and its value 
questionable. To support proactive development, meetings, following the completion of 
this study, are also necessary to ensure that the results and key findings of this 
investigation are communicated to the energy sector workers at the three sites visited, 
regardless of whether they participated or not. Any follow-up actions, such as an 
amended training schedule, should also be clearly planned, with fixed dates for the 
accomplishment of their objectives. 
7.2.1 Academia and Disaster Theory 
Of course, there are various limitations, when one thinks of the usefulness of this thesis 
for the research community. Given the case study approach, it may be difficult for other 
investigators to apply the findings to their own work. That is not to say that the results 
presented here are invalid but rather that they are specific to the situation found in three 
Emirati power plants. Therefore, it is necessary, for the satisfaction of academic 
curiosity to undertake further research in the Emirati energy sector. In to discover just 
how representative that which is presented here is.  It is worth noting that part of the 
problem may be that most of the current theories on disaster are either European or 
North American. Limited literature exists which directly relates to the culture and 
practices of the Middle East. The application of disaster theory in the UAE, at least 
within this research, seems to show the difficulty Emirati based respondents have in 
communicating in relation to disaster. By its very definition, disaster invokes feelings of 
discomfort, negativity and anxiety. Judging from the results and their analysis, Emirati 
energy managers do not appear to focus on such issues and prefer to “save face” rather 
than solve them. Disaster theory must help researchers deal with such tension and 
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cultural conflicts between an academic framework and the reality on the ground. This 
latter point is however a limit of the theory rather than of the thesis per se.  
7.2.2 Emirati Energy Sector 
There are three limitations of this work as far as the Emirati energy sector is concerned. 
The first, and perhaps the most obvious, is the small sample of participants, particularly 
in Sharjah (due to high refusal rate). It could be argued, for example, that the results 
presented here are not representative and that further research needs to be done. The 
second is the fact that this work is presented in English rather than in Arabic. This could 
present some barriers to the efficient development of a plan. Nevertheless, every effort 
must be made to present this work, and if necessary translate the major findings into the 
readers’ mother tongue. This is not so difficult given that all fieldwork and much of the 
notes supporting the construction of this thesis exist in Arabic. The third limitation is 
that for those working in the energy sector, the scope of this thesis is more broad than 
deep. Many of the terms presented in Chapter 3 will be completely new to them. In 
addition, some of their technical or engineering preoccupations are unlikely to have 
been addressed. This is because whilst renewable energy integration may be important, 
the research participants failed to understand the nature of the technology and 
subsequently were unable to explain how this might be achieved. That said this broad 
basis is useful for the tripartite council as a multidisciplinary body with a mixture of 
interests, skills and abilities. This thesis can act as a starting point for this committee 
which can, via its members, address some of the specific concerns that are identified 
here; however, a further explanation would fall beyond the scope of this thesis. 
7.3 Contributions of the Study 
The thesis serves to highlight some issues of perception and challenges in the UAE and 
calls disaster practitioners to use their knowledge and expertise to help the Emirati 
government disseminate information, such as that relating to renewable energy or 
disaster management programmes, in a more efficient way. It has makes theoretical 
contributions, such as the participation and voice of women in the interviews, that are 
useful to academics operating in the field of disaster and supporting efforts to improve 
disaster preparation and resilience. 
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7.3.1 Practical Contributions 
Practical knowledge helps in the deep understanding of the concepts along with the 
origin and the importance of the facts learned through theoretical knowledge. 
Sometimes there are obscure lessons which are not so easy to communicate from a 
theoretical stance but which gain value once they can be practically demonstrated in a 
way that aids proper understanding. This thesis gives important advice and 
methodological steps, derived from fieldwork, when it comes to developing a strategic 
mitigation plan and communicating it for the building of disaster resilience in the 
energy sector. It provides key information that could be used to improve the design and 
structure of current educational and professional programmes undertaken by individuals 
in the sector. The same information can be used for the mid- to long-term strategic 
planning for the diagnosis and building of resilience, through strategic planning when it 
comes to adapting to the threat of climate change. The thesis provides tools for 
qualitatively evaluating the various threats and vulnerabilities faced by the UAE and 
acts as a platform for change. 
The framework of the strategic disaster mitigation plan has been developed 
comprehensively (Chapters 3 and 6), going beyond the document and content to the 
identification of key actors required for the construction and dissemination of a useful 
tool and/or instrument that can be used to build resilience into the Emirati energy sector. 
In addition, the plan is a new variant of the plan-check-act methodology frequently used 
worldwide in the industrial sectors. 
The identification of misconceptions regarding renewable energy should be used by the 
Ministry of Energy to better communicate alternative technologies and their integration 
within the energy sector. The thesis contains useful information which can be easily 
transformed into practical knowledge via the various social actors participating in the 
tripartite committee.  
7.3.2 Theoretical Contributions 
In terms of its contribution to theoretic knowledge, this research represents the first of 
its kind in that it asks energy sector workers and managers in the field which issues 
concern them. This gives academics and professionals alike a unique insight into some 
178 
 
major latent problems that would perhaps have remained unnoticed but require more 
comprehensive investigation. Furthermore, in the literature review, it was shown that 
there was a distinct lack of academic research into disaster theory and management as 
applied to the UAE. This thesis provides data and accessible information as to the 
reality experienced in the Gulf region and in predominately Arab and/or Islamic cultures 
that have the concept of inshallah (God willing), whereby a risk may be taken because 
any negative impact is expected to occur if only God allows it to. This has specific 
implications for policy and practice within energy organisations operating in such 
settings, and for the way disaster is viewed. The number and variation of potential 
disasters ranging from atmospheric and tectonic to terrorist-related means that the 
energy sector in vulnerable zones and developing countries elsewhere can apply the 
lessons learned to their specific locations. This would not have been the case for the UK 
energy sector, which is mature and which does not face this combination of threats.  
The inclusion of women as interviewees has ensured that disaster was also considered 
from the female perspective. This is important because most disaster victims are among 
the most vulnerable and thus likely to be women and children, who are not well 
represented in the Emirati workplace. Furthermore, the identification of social 
desirability bias when it comes to response validity and the high refusal rate, 
particularly in Sharjah, gives any subsequent researcher empirical knowledge that 
should serve to support future field investigations. 
The theoretical knowledge contained within this thesis builds on the information gained 
from previous studies of disaster phenomena, corroborates such information and puts it 
in one place. This undoubtedly eases subsequent research, as the obtaining of reliable 
secondary sources represented one of the more difficult issues. Finally, the possibility of 
identifying cultural concerns means that there is a platform for communication between 
energy sector workers and the wider academic world, as addressed in Section 7.3.4. 
Meanwhile, the next subsection considers the contribution to the Emirati energy sector. 
7.3.3 Contributions to the Emirati Energy Sector 
The contributions of this thesis to the Emirati energy sector are more tangible than those 
for academia. Specifically, the feedback from the members of the Emirati energy sector 
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is indicative of the latent failures and urgent issues in this sector, predominately those of 
training, education and communication relating to the potential integration or use of 
renewable energy as part of a resilient energy matrix. The Ministry of Energy must 
ensure that top-down orders and initiatives reach those directly working day-to-day in 
electricity generation. Targets publicised from the highest government offices mean 
little if those operating in the sector remain unaware. For clean energy targets to be 
achieved there needs to be a buy-in by the whole Emirati population, otherwise these 
findings represent nothing more than wishful thinking and lip service to sustainability, 
as opposed to real and powerful sustainable development. Perhaps IRENA could help 
with this, given that it is headquartered in the UAE and has access to many world 
experts on clean and renewable policies. 
The widely held consensus that the major issues relate to absent or insufficient 
education, training and personal development is worrying, but the raison d'être of this 
kind of investigation is to highlight the latent failures before a disaster inevitably 
uncovers them in less desirable or even catastrophic circumstances. The discussion 
points in Chapter 6 provide a draft sketch of those steps required to improve training 
and renewable technology integration. Although nothing is set in stone, Chapter 6 
provides a good basis with which to start collaborative discussions between interested 
parties. One can subsequently begin drafting both the mitigation plan and the 
communication plan for its successful dissemination and uptake by members of national 
and local government, industry members and communities across the UAE. Some of 
these findings presented here are likely to be of use to those individuals constructing 
strategic disaster mitigation plans for neighbouring countries such as Oman. 
7.3.4 Academic and Disaster Theory Contributions 
Academics have a role when it comes to the development of a strategic disaster 
mitigation plan. In the literature review, it was shown that there was a distinct lack of 
academic research for disaster theory and management applied to the UAE. The 
publication of this thesis thus provides data and accessible information as to the reality 
experienced in the Gulf region, specifically within the energy sector, for both academic 
and energy professionals (Al Khaili and Patirage, 2014). It builds on previous studies 
regarding disaster phenomena and corroborates such information, and puts it into to 
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once place. This undoubtedly eases subsequent research, as the obtaining of reliable 
secondary sources represented one of the more difficult issues. In many cases, Chapter 2 
updates such information, which has not been generally available since 2007. This 
research represents the first of its kind in that it asks energy sector workers and 
managers in the field which issues concern them. This gives a unique insight into some 
of big problems that have become latent ones. It is not a case of looking in on those 
working in the energy sector in order to “help” them, but rather, a way ensuring that 
their voices are heard in the wider academic community.  
The exact contributions of thesis to disaster theory are more difficult to affirm. Part of 
the problem, as aforementioned, may be that most of the current theories on disaster are 
either European or North American in origin. Such issues do provide a much needed 
platform for further dialogue and problem solving within the discipline. 
The questionnaire and interview results identify the most significant barriers to 
resilience, such as education and cultural problems, which have since converted into 
latent problems and have slowed the process of finding optimal solutions within the 
sector. The possibility of identifying cultural concerns means that instead of being a 
problem they can in fact act as a platform for communication and continuous 
improvement. The framework of the strategic disaster mitigation plan has been 
developed comprehensively (Chapters 3 and 6), going beyond the document and content 
and onto who are key actors required for the construction and dissemination of a useful 
tool that can be used to build resilience into the Emirati energy sector. Subsequently, 
this thesis can catalyse a tripartite community to take action and improve the overall 
performance of energy sector workers and a whole host of associated professions – 
government officials, town planners, academics and industry leaders. 
7.4 Further Research and New Directions 
Further research needs to indicate the representativeness of the findings presented. This 
could be undertaken in a post-doctoral study, as it is simply a matter of taking the 
theoretical basis and premise and applying the method elsewhere. It would be beneficial 
for an Emirati student to work alongside the tripartite committee as they develop the 
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plan. They could assess how well such undertakings address the disaster cycle and build 
resilience in the energy sector. 
As elaborated in Chapters 3 and 6, a tripartite committee needs to be established to 
make sure that this framework becomes a working document and a reality which makes 
a difference to how disaster is mitigated and managed in the UAE. 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire   
 
Building Disaster Resilience within the Emirati Energy Sector through a 
Comprehensive Strategic Mitigation Plan 
 
Name of Company                              __________________________________________ 
Years employed at Company             __________________________________________ 
Position                                              ___________________________________________ 
Years of Experience in current position ____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
1a) Out of the following options, which of these hazards do you think the Emirati 
energy sector is best prepared for? Scale each one 1-10. 1 LEAST prepared, 10 
MOST prepared. 
 
# Questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Tectonic activity – Earthquake o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
2 Tectonic activity - Tsunami o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
3 Climatic activity – Flooding caused by 
wave surges 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
4 Climatic activity – Flash floods o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
5 Climatic activity – shamal o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
6 Climatic activity – Extreme Heat (above 
recorded mean) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
7 Climatic activity – other extreme 
meteorological conditions (hurricane, 
dust storm etc) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
8 Landslides, liquefaction and slope 
failure 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
9 Manmade Disaster – Terrorism o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
10 Manmade Disaster - chemical spill 
and/or explosions 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
11 Manmade Disaster -  health and safety 
related accidents  etc) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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- Any other (Please explain ____________________________________- 
1b) For the hazards you scored the most highly (i.e. > 8) which of the following 
reasons do you attribute to the greater state of preparedness? 
 
- Government legislation  (Federal and/or State) 
- Government initiatives (Please state which)  ____________________________ 
- Financial incentives      (Please state which)  ____________________________ 
- Company policy 
- Occupational training and staff competence 
- Scientific knowledge and understanding of the phenomena 
- Availability and dissemination of information in the Arabic language within the sector 
- Public awareness and pressure 
- Other (Please explain) 
-  
1c) For the hazards you scored the lowest (i.e. < 4) which of the following reasons 
do you attribute to the lack of state of preparedness? Please cross out should it 
not apply 
- Incomplete (or absence of) Government legislation (Federal and/or State) 
- Limited (or absence of) Government initiatives  
- Incomplete (or absence of) financial incentives      (Please state which)  
____________________________ 
- Not specifically addressed in company policy 
- Incomprehensive (or absence of) occupational training and staff competence 
- Scientific knowledge and understanding of the phenomena 
- Availability and dissemination of information in the Arabic language within the sector 
- Public awareness and pressure 
- Other (Please explain) _________________________________________________ 
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2a) Out of the following options which of these natural hazards do you think the 
Emirati public are best prepared for? Scale each one 1-10. 1 LEAST prepared, 10 
MOST prepared. 
# Questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Tectonic activity – Earthquake o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
2 Tectonic activity - Tsunami o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
3 Climatic activity – Flooding caused by 
wave surges 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
4 Climatic activity – Flash floods o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
5 Climatic activity – shamal o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
6 Climatic activity – Extreme Heat (above 
recorded mean) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
7 Climatic activity – other extreme 
meteorological conditions (hurricane, 
dust storm etc) 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
8 Landslides, liquefaction and slope 
failure 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
9 Manmade Disaster – Terrorism o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
10 Manmade Disaster - chemical spill 
and/or explosions 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
11 Manmade Disaster -  health and safety 
related accidents  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Any other (Please explain) ____________________________________ 
 
2b) In relation to the energy sector, are there any particular STATES (Emirates) that 
you believe to be extremely well or ill prepared for natural hazards? Please, if 
appropriate, indicate which Emirate and provide an explanation 
 
WELL PREPARED  
______________________________________________________(EMIRATE(S)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
(REASON PROVIDED) 
 
ILL PREPARED   
 _______________________________________________________(EMIRATE(S) 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
(REASON PROVIDED) 
 
3) For any of the hazards you highlighted in the above questions, which sections of 
the energy sector do you consider to be the most vulnerable? 
- Fuel exploration and supply (oil, gas) 
- Power generation facilities 
- High voltage transmission and distribution 
- Medium voltage transmission and distribution 
- Low voltage end user infrastructure 
 
 
3b) Please could you list three reasons as to why you believe this to be the case? 
 
 
 
 
 
3c) Which type of energy source do you consider to be the most resilient should a 
natural hazard occur? 
- Oil 
- Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Renewable 
3d) Which do you consider the least resilient should a natural hazard occur? 
- Oil 
- Gas 
- Nuclear 
- Renewable 
 
210 
 
3e) Could you briefly explain the reasons behind your selection? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4a) In the future, do you see the role of climate change as a significant cause of 
vulnerability within the energy sector? Please circle as appropriate, where 1 is not at 
all significant, 10 is extremely significant. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
4b) In the future, do you see the role of climate change as a significant cause of 
vulnerability within the general public? Please circle as appropriate, where 1 is not at 
all significant, 10 is extremely significant. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
4c) In which ways are the vulnerabilities different? 
S 
Different 
1) _______________________________________________________ 
 
2) _______________________________________________________ 
 
 
211 
 
 
3) _______________________________________________________ 
 
 
5) Apart from climate change, is there any other natural or manmade 
phenomenon which is a significant cause of vulnerability within the energy 
sector? Please Circle all which could apply. 
 
- Tectonic (earthquake, tsunami) 
- Atmospheric (severe storms, shamal, dust storms, extreme heat) 
- Nuclear accidents 
- Health and safety issues 
- Population growth 
- Accelerated energy demand 
- Urban migration (national) 
- Immigration 
- Terrorism 
- Social unrest 
- Other, please explain__________________________________________ 
 
 
 
5b) Which of the above are of the highest concern? 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________________  
 
6a) Do you consider there to be any existing or potential barriers which serve to 
prevent the energy sector from dealing with the aspects of Question 4 & 5? 
- Yes   - No   - Don´t know 
6b) Can you please explain your answer? 
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7) Could you propose any improvement to the energy sector which would serve to 
enhance resilience? 
- Incomplete (or absence of) Government legislation (Federal and/or State) 
- More comprehensive Government initiatives (Please state which)  
__________________________________ 
- Additional financial incentives or subsidies      (Please state which)  
____________________________ 
- More explicit company policy which deals with energy, environment and conservation 
issues 
- Additional occupational training to build staff competence 
- Increased research to enhance scientific knowledge and understanding of the 
phenomena 
- More availability and dissemination of information in the Arabic language within the 
sector 
- More public awareness and education 
- Other, please explain _________________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you for your time. Finally… 
8a) Is there any question(s) here that you consider either ambiguous or 
inappropriate? 
Ambiguous __________________________________________________________ 
Inappropriate ________________________________________________________ 
 
8b) Did you at any point ask the researcher to clarify a question(s)? 
Which? ______________________________________________________________ 
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8c) Did the researcher respond satisfactorily to any queries you may have had? 
Please Circle 
- Yes  - No  - N/A 
 
8d) Are you fully aware of the researcher’s intentions and the reasons why you have 
been asked to complete this questionnaire? 
- Yes   - No 
 
8e) Are you unhappy with any part of the questionnaire or the way in which it was 
conducted? 
- Yes  - No  
Please explain ___________________________________________________________ 
 
9) Do you have any other additional comments or suggestions? 
 
 
 
Name:  ………….., PhD Candidate 
Address: Room 413, School of the Built Environment, 4
th
 Floor, Maxwell 
Building, The University of Salford, M5 4WT, Manchester, United 
Kingdom 
Tel:  +44 (0) 7……..  
E-mail: (….. @edu.salford.ac.uk) 
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Appendix 2:  Interview questions (1) 
 
1. How many years do you have in the energy sector? How many in your current place of 
work? How many in your current position? 
2. Do you have experience abroad or only locally? If you went abroad, for how many long 
did you go? 
 
3. Do you have any comments in respect to the following graphs?: 
 
(a) Company 1  
 
 
(b) Company 2  
Greater state of preparedness of the Emirati energy sector  
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4. Given that respondents identify a “lack of scientific knowledge and understanding of 
the phenomena”, as a key weakness in the preparation against threats, what could the 
energy sector and the government do to reduce this vulnerability? 
5. What do you think about the workers perceptions that a greater training and 
development programme is needed for the preparation and response to threats? How 
do you feel knowing that they listed it as the greatest barrier to a resilient energy 
sector? 
 
 
6. Apart from the fact that the UAE has never been subject to terrorist attacks or war, 
could you provide a reason as to why you think respondents believe that it are either 
one of these two which present the greatest threat and  require the greatest level of 
protection?  
 
7. Workers in both companies (in Abu Dhabi and Dubai) have stated that Dubai is the 
best prepared to affront the threats of natural hazards. What could be their reason(s) 
for arriving to this conclusion? 
 
8. Which strategies could Abu Dhabi develop to reach the same ( real or perceived) level 
as Dubai in terms of pre-emergency preparation? 
 
9. What perspectives are there for the integration of renewable energy in the energy 
sector, taking into account that they are perceived to be the most secure forms of the 
future?  
 
10. What is your opinion on developing the 3 suggestions below, in order to build 
resilience in the energy sector and disaster management? 
 
 
Interview questions (2) 
 
Objective 1 
Identify Emirati critical energy infrastructure facilities and their vulnerabilities to 
hazards. 
1) What do you consider to be the MOST critical energy infrastructure in the UAE 
energy sector? In terms of generation, transmission and distribution… 
2) Why do you think that? 
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3) What are their most significant vulnerabilities? Technologically, politically, 
resources… etc 
4) What do you consider to be the LEAST critical energy infrastructure in the UAE 
energy sector? In terms of generation, transmission and distribution… 
5) Why do you think that? 
6) What are the greatest strengths…? 
7) Do you have any comments in respect to the following graphs?: 
 
 
 
7) the question based on the answers to the questionnaires, e.g. in the questionnaire 
the respondents answered “x”, why do you think their response differs to your own? 
8) Is there anything you would like to add regarding infrastructure and/or 
vulnerability? 
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              Objective 2 
To examine current disaster management practices and their relation to those 
infrastructures deemed critical within the energy sector. 
How would you define the terms “disaster” and “resilience”? 
2) What do you consider to be the most important management practices in avoiding 
disaster and increasing resilience? 
3) Is your answer to the previous question based on previous experience? If it is, what 
experience did you have? If not, what do you base it on? 
4) To what extent do you believe training and awareness amongst your employees is 
important? 
5) If they answer “very important”, ask them why members of staff believe that this is 
one area that could be improved… 
6) Could you briefly go through your safety protocol and policy that is enacted in the 
event of an emergency? 
7) What procedures do you have in place to ensure that every member of staff is 
rehearsed in that plan and would know what to do in such an event?  
8) Is there anything you would like to add regarding management practices? 
 
Objective 3 
To critically evaluate existing barriers to application of disaster management practices 
on critical energy facilities in UAE. 
1) What do you consider to be the most significant barriers in the application of the 
procedures, policies and practices, you mentioned above? 
2) Why do you think they present a barrier? 
3) What do you consider to be the underlying cause of these barriers? 
4) Since occupying your current position, do you think the number and type of barriers 
have changed? Can you give me an example? 
5) the question, in relation to the results i.e. if it the same answer: 
The workers also mentioned this in the questionnaire, how do envision the control or 
diminishing of such barriers? 
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Or: 
The answer differs to that of the workers. Why do you think that is? Do you think that 
both of you could be right? What do you think could be done? 
6) Do you think that the aforementioned barriers apply only to this installation or the 
Emirati energy sector in general? 
7) Who do you think is in the best position to remove or reduce the barriers? E.g. 
private sector, government, external agents (other countries) 
8) Are they approachable? Do you think a person in your position could communicate 
and coordinate with them? If not, then who? 
9) Do you have any other comment you would to add? 
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Appendix 3: Consent Form 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
Title of Research Project: Building Disaster Resilience within the Emirati Energy 
Sector through a Comprehensive Strategic Mitigation Plan. 
Name & address of researcher: ……….., School of the Built Environment, University 
of Salford, United Kingdom. 
Tel: 004478…., 00971……… 
Sponsored: Ministry of Interior, United Arab Emirates. 
Please use the check box to the right corner after the statements. 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Participant Information 
Sheet    explaining the above research study and that I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time,    without providing a reason. 
3. I agree to take part in the above research study. 
4. I understand that if I decide to participate in this study, then the results 
obtained  from this study may be kept for possible use in future studies. 
5. I understand that my anonymity is assured and that only the researcher 
involved in this study at the University of Salford, UK, will use the data. 
I thus give permission for this individual to use this information as they 
wish within academia. 
For researcher’s use only: 
Y/N 
I agree to the interview being audio recorded. 
I agree to the use of anonymous quotes in publications. 
 
________________________ _____________ _____________________ 
Participant’s Name   Date   Signature 
 
________________________ _____________ _____________________ 
Researcher’s Name   Date   Signature 
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Appendix 4: Ethical Approval 
Academic Audit and Governance Committee 
 
College of Science and Technology Research Ethics Panel  
(CST)  
 
To  Khalifa Al Khaili and Dr Chaminda Pathirage 
 
cc:  Prof Mike Kagioglou, Head of School of SOBE 
MEMORANDUM 
 
From  Nathalie Audren Howarth, College Research Support Officer 
 
Date  9
th
 July 2013 
 
 
Subject:  Approval of your Project by CST 
 
Project Title:  Building Disaster Resilience within the Emirati Energy sector 
through a comprehensive strategic mitigation plan 
 
 
REP Reference:  CST 13/60 
 
Following your responses to the Panel's queries, based on the information you 
provided, I can confirm that they have no objections on ethical grounds to your 
project.  
 
If there are any changes to the project and/or its methodology, please inform the 
Panel as soon as possible.  
 
 
Regards, 
 
 
 
Nathalie Audren Howarth 
College Research Support Officer 
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